The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Tianjin was not a routine diplomatic gathering; it was a defining stage of multipolar politics. With more than 20 heads of state and chiefs of major international organizations, including the UN Secretary-General, converging under China’s stewardship, the world witnessed how new alliances were recalibrating global power. In this theatre, South Asia stands exposed: Beijing’s patience, Delhi’s hypocrisy, and Islamabad’s quiet but significant diplomatic revival with Washington are reshaping the region’s balance of power.
India’s latest manoeuvres reveal not strategy but desperation. Its ties with the USA are marred by tariff wars, Trump’s aggressive trade policies, and Washington’s discontent over New Delhi’s cheap oil imports from Russia. Yet, instead of mending relations with its so-called “strategic partner,” India rushed into Beijing’s arms, seeking optics of reconciliation at the SCO Summit in Tianjin. For Washington, this was not pragmatism but betrayal. At the very moment the USA expected loyalty, India chose to embrace its arch-competitor. Such hedging is not the mark of a reliable partner, but of a state consumed by opportunism.
Indeed, India’s SCO participation exposes its sheer duplicity. While it publicly champions the Western camp, it simultaneously parades through forums like SCO and BRICS, where anti-US sentiment is a binding glue. This is not diplomacy; it is hypocrisy. New Delhi longs for Western applause but cannot resist courting Beijing whenever its interests falter. When opportunity arises, India would not hesitate to leap back into Washington’s lap, claiming fidelity. This erratic behaviour underscores what many in South Asia already know: India is not a stabilizer but a spoiler, not a visionary but a reckless opportunist.
The Indian media’s chest-thumping over Tianjin adds another layer of farce. Wrapped in loud rhetoric and hollow claims, their narrative that India is “regaining strategic gains” is neither rooted in reality nor substantiated by facts. What we are witnessing is not the rise of Indian leverage, but rather a desperate search for face-saving, asylum, and rescue from the diplomatic isolation it has created for itself. The truth is unmistakable: India is not dictating terms to Washington, nor can it. The USA has already imposed hefty 50-percent tariffs on a wide span of Indian exports, and the Indian rupee has slumped to record lows. This is not “strategic autonomy” at work— it is the unmistakable sting of economic defeat. The defiant statements from New Delhi’s commerce minister sound less like strength and more like hollow defiance from a cornered player.
The SCO, for its part, is not designed to recalibrate Indian jingoism or indulge hegemonic delusions. Its agenda remains rooted in regional security, connectivity, energy, and counterterrorism. India’s dubious record of transnational terrorism sponsorship, hegemonic designs over neighbours, and constant border frictions render it an unreliable participant rather than a powerbroker. The very idea that India can “pressure” the USA via SCO meetings with Chinese President Xi Jinping or Russian President Vladmir Putin is laughable. Washington is far ahead of all except China in shaping global order. US tariff policy is dictated by cold national interests, not by Modi’s photo-ops or speeches in Tianjin. No amount of rhetorical drumming on Indian TV will undo the fact that New Delhi’s bargaining chips are weak, its economy vulnerable, and its foreign policy increasingly reactive rather than proactive.
What is unfolding is not the demonstration of power, but the display of weakness. India’s overhyped “strategic gains” narrative is nothing but a mask to cover its glaring defeats—whether in economic confrontation with the U.S., diplomatic marginalisation at global fora, or its inability to dictate terms even within South Asia. Beggars are not choosers; and India, despite its loud proclamations, is begging for relevance, scrambling for attention, and craving the restoration of ties with the very West it pretends to challenge. In reality, the SCO summit may well yield progress—but on agendas set by China, Russia, and the collective priorities of Central Asia, not on India’s jingoistic fantasies. The world sees through the hollow façade. India’s loudspeakers may blare slogans of regained stature, but its actual standing remains precarious, exposed, and diminished.
The global order is unmistakably shifting. Beijing’s calculus is patient, Washington’s approach is transactional, and Delhi’s gamble has exposed its hypocrisy. For Pakistan, the imperative is clear: not to remain a reactive state trapped by crises, but to step forward as a stabilizing pivot of South Asia and a credible voice in multipolar geopolitics. If Islamabad seizes this moment with wisdom and balance, it will not just endure shifting geopolitics— it will help shape them.
Even within South Asia, India’s ambitions to hegemonize have bitterly failed. Its neighbors reject its arrogance, from Nepal to Sri Lanka, from Maldives to Bangladesh. Its refusal to engage in good faith with Pakistan has isolated it further. Now, even Washington finds it difficult to trust New Delhi’s word. What remains is an exposed power, unable to command loyalty abroad or respect at home.
Meanwhile, the SCO summit in Tianjin highlights an opposite trajectory. More than 20 heads of states and several chiefs of international organizations, including the United Nations, converged under China’s stewardship. This breadth of participation underscores how wisely Beijing has recalibrated its leverage: not through loud rhetoric, but through patient diplomacy. The summit is not just a regional gathering; it is a global signal that the multipolar order is no longer theory but practice. Where India appears fickle, China appears steady. Where Delhi scrambles, Beijing orchestrates.
Central to this summit is the Tianjin Declaration 2025, a document that will resonate well beyond the region. Building upon Astana’s earlier vision, Tianjin charted frameworks for digital economy, renewable energy cooperation, counterterrorism coordination, and enhanced connectivity across Eurasia. Far more than ink on paper, it will shape trajectories of global politics as the world moves toward 2035. The Declaration will underscore that the age of Western monopoly is ending, and the future belongs to cooperative multipolar platforms. For Pakistan, its clauses on energy corridors, trade facilitation, and technological partnerships provide a roadmap to embed itself deeply in the new order.
Yet Tianjin cannot be only about economics and power. It must also be about justice. With almost all important Muslim leaders and the UN Secretary-General gathered under one roof, the SCO has the moral duty to deliberate on Israel’s impunity and genocidal aggression in Gaza. The strip has been turned into a graveyard where famine, drought, and man-made starvation— already declared by the UN as the worst humanitarian catastrophe of our era— are killing the innocent. If the summit is to carry weight in the eyes of the Global South, it must voice an emphatic stance against such barbarity. Silence would be complicity; unity would be a power show of conscience.
Equally, SCO must live up to its mandate of addressing bilateral disputes. India’s unilateral suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty is not just a hostile act against Pakistan but a gross violation of international law. Such reckless adventurism risks turning a water dispute into a casus belli. If Tianjin 2025 truly aspires to be a forum of peace and multipolar stability, it should have taken up this matter meritoriously to prevent future warlike situations in South Asia.
The Ukraine-Russia conflict too deserves sober reflection at Tianjin. While the West continues to exploit it for geopolitical narratives, the SCO provides a unique platform where dialogue is not dictated by Western hegemony. If discussed earnestly, Tianjin could set in motion new overtures of peace, signaling to the world that multipolarity is not merely about dividing power, but about responsibly wielding it to avert wars.
This is where Islamabad must act decisively. Unlike India’s opportunistic flip-flopping, Pakistan has demonstrated pragmatic consistency. Its second phase of CPEC— in agriculture, mining, and industry— anchors its long-term role in China’s calculus. Its renewed diplomatic traction in Washington, exemplified by Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir’s visit and luncheon in Washington, has restored Pakistan’s relevance in US strategic thinking. At Tianjin, Pakistan’s participation was not questioned; it was natural. Unlike India, Pakistan does not need to overperform in every camp— it simply needs to show that it has the maturity to balance both.
This is Pakistan’s moment of leverage. India’s gamble of playing both sides has left it distrusted in both. Washington views it as unreliable, Beijing as opportunistic. By contrast, Pakistan— once accused of overdependence— has quietly evolved into a state with multiple options. The USA cannot ignore it, China counts on it, and the SCO platform validates it.
The road ahead demands foresight. Pakistan must convert symbolic victories into institutionalized gains: trade compacts with the US., deeper energy and industry linkages with China, and active participation in multipolar institutions. The Tianjin Declaration must be embraced not merely as words, but as a springboard for Pakistan to secure a decisive role in shaping Eurasian and global politics over the next decade.
The global order is unmistakably shifting. Beijing’s calculus is patient, Washington’s approach is transactional, and Delhi’s gamble has exposed its hypocrisy. For Pakistan, the imperative is clear: not to remain a reactive state trapped by crises, but to step forward as a stabilizing pivot of South Asia and a credible voice in multipolar geopolitics. If Islamabad seizes this moment with wisdom and balance, it will not just endure shifting geopolitics— it will help shape them.
