Michael E. O’Hanlon’s 2024 Brookings report starkly frames a question that haunts the Indo-Pacific and the world: Could the USA and China go to war over Taiwan and if so, who would prevail? His analysis, centred on a potential Chinese blockade as the most probable catalyst for catastrophic escalation, provides a crucial lens for understanding the complex interplay of military strategy, economic interdependence, political will and psychological brinksmanship that defines the Taiwan Strait dilemma. Examining O’Hanlon’s arguments reveals a precarious strategic landscape where deterrence is paramount, game theory illuminates perilous choices and the ultimate outcome hinges on factors far beyond mere military might.
O’Hanlon correctly identifies a People’s Republic of China (PRC) blockade of Taiwan as the most plausible “peaceful strategy” trigger for wider conflict. Unlike an overt invasion involving amphibious landings and massive air assaults fraught with immense risk and guaranteed to provoke a fierce international response, a blockade represents a coercive grey-zone tactic. It aims to strangle Taiwan economically and psychologically, forcing capitulation or negotiation on Beijing’s terms, while potentially allowing China to frame its actions as a limited, internal matter. O’Hanlon’s prescription is clear: robust, multifaceted deterrence is the USA’s primary tool for preventing this scenario. This deterrence strategy necessitates two interdependent pillars:
- Military Preparedness: Significantly enhancing Taiwan’s indigenous defensive capabilities (asymmetric warfare, anti-access/area denial systems, and resilience) to raise the cost of any PRC aggression to prohibitive levels. Crucially, this must be coupled with a demonstrable US and allied commitment to intervene militarily in defense of the island. The goal is not to guarantee victory in a full-scale war, but to make the initiation of conflict seem irrational to Beijing.
- Economic Resilience: Fortifying the economies of US regional allies (Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines) against the inevitable shockwaves of a US-China economic conflict sparked by a Taiwan crisis. This involves diversifying supply chains, stockpiling critical resources and developing contingency plans to withstand prolonged sanctions, trade disruptions and financial instability. The aim is to ensure that the alliance system can endure the economic pain of confronting China, maintaining unity and pressure over the long haul.
O’Hanlon’s distinction between “peaceful” and “war” strategies for both powers is analytically useful, yet highlights the inherent subjectivity and danger of such categorizations. China views a blockade as “peaceful” coercion, avoiding kinetic conflict. Conversely, the USA perceives supporting Taiwan militarily as a “war strategy” only in response to aggression, while abandoning Taiwan constitutes its own “peaceful” capitulation. This fundamental asymmetry in perspective where one side’s “peaceful” pressure is the other side’s casus belli creates fertile ground for miscalculation. Beijing might underestimate Washington’s resolve, believing its blockade falls below the threshold triggering a full US military response.
Preventing war over Taiwan demands not just military might, but a sophisticated, unwavering and credible strategy of deterrence that accounts for the volatile interplay of strategy, perception, economics and the unpredictable human element in the highest-stakes game of all. The survival of the current international order may well depend on getting this calculus right.
Washington might misread Beijing’s intentions, viewing incremental pressure as a prelude to invasion rather than a standalone strategy. This perceptual gap is a core vulnerability in the deterrence equation. It is here that game theory, as O’Hanlon suggests, provides a powerful framework for understanding the strategic interactions. The Taiwan Strait confrontation resembles a high-stakes, iterated game oscillating between cooperation and defection:
- The “Rewards” Scenario (Cooperation): Both the USA and China tacitly or explicitly cooperate to maintain the Status Quo (SQ). The USA adheres to its “One China” policy without abandoning Taiwan, while China refrains from forceful reunification. Compromise, ambiguity and managed tensions prevail. Both sides avoid the catastrophic costs of war.
- The “Penalties” Scenario (Mutual Defection): China initiates a blockade (defection from SQ), the USA responds with military force and severe sanctions (defection). The result is direct conflict, potentially escalating to a wider, even total war, with devastating consequences for all parties, including global economic collapse and potential nuclear brinkmanship.
The cyclical pattern O’Hanlon observes tension, threat, détente reflects the players constantly reassessing their positions, probing the other’s resolve and calibrating their actions based on perceived costs and benefits within this game. The shadow of the “Penalties” scenario looms large, acting as a powerful disincentive against defection, yet the temptation for one side to gain a decisive advantage by defecting while the other cooperates is ever-present. This dynamic strongly parallels the “Chicken” game model. Both powers speed towards the brink; the one perceived as more willing to “drive off the cliff” (escalate to war), forces the other to swerve (concede). Survival instincts should compel both to swerve at the last moment, preserving the Status Quo. However, the game hinges critically on credible perceptions of resolve. If Beijing believes Washington will ultimately swerve (abandon Taiwan), it may press harder. If Washington doubts Beijing’s willingness to risk war, deterrence weakens.
O’Hanlon’s analysis, however, confronts two critical uncertainties that could shatter the game theory assumptions and undermine deterrence: domestic political will and leadership volatility.
- The Question of American Public Support: The Ukraine war serves as a sobering precedent. Mobilizing sustained Western public and political will for significant economic sacrifice and military risk against Russia proved challenging. Containing China, a vastly larger economic and military power deeply integrated into global supply chains, presents an exponentially greater challenge. Would the American public support sending its sons and daughters to fight and endure severe economic hardship, for Taiwan?
O’Hanlon rightly implies that without strong, sustained domestic backing, US deterrence lacks credibility. The difficulty in effectively isolating Russia raises profound doubts about the feasibility of doing so to China, making the economic resilience pillar of deterrence potentially shaky.
- Leadership Volatility and Strategic Clarity: The 2024 US Presidential election injects significant uncertainty. Donald Trump’s past statements and February 2025 refusal to commit to defending Taiwan coupled with accusations of Taiwan “stealing” chip jobs and suggestions it should pay for defence, create deep anxiety in Taipei and signal potential unreliability to Beijing. While analysts like Bonnie Glaser suggest Trump might still defend Taiwan if it was attacked, the ambiguity itself is corrosive to deterrence. Deterrence relies on crystal-clear signalling of intent and capability. Mixed messages, transactional rhetoric and perceived isolationism undermine the “resolve” necessary to convince Beijing that the USA will not “swerve” in the Chicken game. This leadership variable adds an unpredictable layer to the strategic calculus, potentially emboldening Beijing if it perceives US commitment as wavering.
Therefore, the path to preventing war, as O’Hanlon advocates, lies in strengthening deterrence, but this task is immensely complex. It requires not only tangible military enhancements for Taiwan and regional allies but also:
- Unambiguous Strategic Messaging: Consistent, bipartisan US communication reinforcing its commitment to Taiwan’s defence and willingness to impose severe costs for aggression.
- Building True Economic Fortress Allies: Moving beyond rhetoric to concrete, funded programmes ensuring key allies can withstand a protracted economic war with China.
- Managing the Perception Gap: Diplomatic channels must work relentlessly to clarify red lines and prevent misinterpretations of “peaceful” strategies.
- Navigating Domestic Politics: US leaders must build and sustain public understanding of the stakes involved in defending Taiwan and the global order.
The “who would win?” question O’Hanlon poses is ultimately secondary and potentially misleading. In a full-scale conventional conflict over Taiwan, both sides possess formidable capabilities ensuring mutual devastation. The USA and its allies might prevail in a prolonged, all-out war, but the cost in blood, treasure and global stability would be astronomical. China might achieve a fait accompli through a rapid, successful invasion or coercive blockade, but would face international pariah status, crippling sanctions and potentially a unified, hostile alliance on its doorstep. Victory, in any traditional sense, is illusory. The real victor would be the side that successfully deters conflict altogether, preserving the precarious Status Quo through a combination of strength, clarity, resilience and the rational fear of mutual destruction inherent in the Chicken game dynamic.
O’Hanlon’s analysis serves as a vital reminder that preventing war over Taiwan demands not just military might, but a sophisticated, unwavering and credible strategy of deterrence that accounts for the volatile interplay of strategy, perception, economics and the unpredictable human element in the highest-stakes game of all. The survival of the current international order may well depend on getting this calculus right.
