To understand the Sino-American rivalry within the framework of neoclassical realism, it is pertinent to revisit a significant scholarly contribution. In 2017, Graham T. Allison published Destined for War: Can America and China Avoid the Thucydides Trap? wherein he posed a fundamental question: Can two world superpowers, one dominant, the other ascending, evade an inevitable war for global supremacy? Allison formulated the concept of the “Thucydides Trap,” drawing from the insights of the ancient Greek historian Thucydides, who chronicled the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides asserted, “It was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable.”
Allison’s recommendation for US policy accommodation with China essentially reflects this necessity. Structural changes, such as China’s continued peaceful rise and the relative decline of US power, may encourage such a shift. However, an internal transformation abandoning ideological exceptionalism remains crucial. It appears that under Donald Trump’s prospective second term in 2025, elements of this strategic recalibration may become more pronounced
Allison expanded this premise, suggesting that when a rising power threatens to displace an established one, the ensuing structural stress typically leads to violent conflict, citing historical instances such as the rivalry between Germany and Britain and the near-conflict between the USA and the USSR during the Cold War. Allison’s research at Harvard revealed that 12 out of 16 such historical rivalries culminated in war. While he perceptively identifies the structural stress resulting from power shifts, Allison largely attributes the outbreak of conflicts to the rise of new powers without adequately acknowledging the revisionist policies that often accompany these dynamics. In numerous cases where war erupted, it was not merely the rise of one state that incited conflict, but rather its proactive revisionism or that of the incumbent power.
Conversely, in instances where war was avoided, status quo policies predominated, with the notable exception of the US-Soviet relations during the Cold War.
Allison’s analysis of the US-China rivalry similarly focuses almost exclusively on China’s ascent and its perceived revisionist ambitions, while neglecting the possibility that US hegemonic behavior might significantly contribute to the growing tensions. His framework assumes that the “ruling” power naturally pursues a status quo policy, whereas the “rising” power inherently exhibits revisionist tendencies. However, a closer historical examination, such as that of Athens and Sparta, reveals that conflict was not precipitated solely by Athens’ growing power, but by its assertive expansion and domination of neutral states, which eventually threatened Sparta’s survival.
Allison himself notes that Athens viewed its imperial expansion as benign, suggesting that the Spartans acted not to preserve their hegemonic status (which they arguably lacked) but to ensure their own independence and that of their allies. Consequently, the analogy of the Thucydides Trap, when applied to the contemporary US-China rivalry, may require reconsideration. If the USA embodies the assertive Athens and China the threatened Sparta, then an “inverted Thucydides Trap” emerges, whereby the structural-process stress stems from the “ruling” power’s hegemonic ambitions rather than the “rising” power’s challenge.
Applying neoclassical realism, the “inverted Thucydides Trap” can be conceptualized as arising when a dominant power seeks to impose hegemony on a rising rival. Thus, the prospect of conflict between the USA and China may be better understood not as a consequence of China’s rise, but of US hegemonic revisionism. Despite China’s rapid economic and military growth over recent decades, its rise has remained largely peaceful and has not involved systematic violations of international legal norms.
China has neither engaged in acts of aggression nor established a network of military alliances akin to the USA’s global alliance system. Conversely, the USA has exhibited more pronounced revisionist behaviour, manifest in three distinct patterns: expansion of its sphere of influence in Europe and Asia to encircle China; consistent violations of international legal and economic norms to disadvantage independent actors; and a persistent strategy of “regime change” aimed at reconfiguring adversarial states’ foreign policies.
While the Cold War was marked by the USA’s defensive containment of Soviet influence, the post-Cold War period has seen an aggressive expansion of US influence, transitioning from a strategy of offshore balancing to one of liberal hegemony, aimed at securing global dominance under the guise of liberal ideological values.
The USA’s interventions, often conducted without United Nations Security Council authorization and its promotion of a “rules-based order” as an alternative to established international law, underscore its shift toward a revisionist grand strategy.
Neoclassical realism, by integrating systemic and domestic levels of analysis, offers a more comprehensive understanding of such developments. It posits that while the distribution of power among states is critical, internal factors including domestic political dynamics and ideological orientations equally shape states’ foreign policies.
Thus, a rising power is not inherently revisionist, nor is a ruling power inherently status quo-oriented. Instead, states can choose either posture irrespective of their relative power status. Notably, China’s rise has not been accompanied by expansionist behaviour or systemic rule violations, whereas American actions suggest a deliberate effort to maintain hegemony.
Although Allison does not explicitly define the “ruling” power, it is evident that the USA, given its global influence, fulfills this role. Nevertheless, the international system remains anarchic, comprising multiple centres of power beyond the USA. Allison’s findings, along with insights from neoclassical realism, imply that adherence to a status quo policy, rather than aggressive revisionism, is most conducive to peace. Accordingly, a reorientation of US grand strategy from liberal hegemony toward offshore balancing could mitigate the risk of a US-China war.
Allison’s recommendation for US policy accommodation with China essentially reflects this necessity. Structural changes, such as China’s continued peaceful rise and the relative decline of US power, may encourage such a shift. However, an internal transformation abandoning ideological exceptionalism remains crucial. It appears that under Donald Trump’s prospective second term in 2025, elements of this strategic recalibration may become more pronounced.
