India’s heinous role behind Mukti Bahini & BLA

The Mukti Bahini, a Bengali nationalist guerrilla force that emerged during the 1971 crisis in East Pakistan, is widely perceived as a terrorist entity, orchestrating a campaign of armed insurgency aimed at violently dismantling the Federation.

This perspective challenges the notion of a spontaneous nationalist uprising, instead portraying the Mukti Bahini as a meticulously organized proxy force, allegedly supported, trained, and armed by India. Its alleged purpose was to weaken and ultimately facilitate the secession of East Pakistan through a calculated strategy of terror, sabotage, and ethnic cleansing.

The campaign was not solely directed at the Pakistani military; it purportedly involved brutal attacks on civilians, particularly non-Bengali populations like the Biharis, who were seen as loyal to the central government. The genesis of this conflict traces back to the political deadlock and civil unrest that intensified in East Pakistan following the 1970 general elections.

The Awami League, under Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, having secured a majority, reportedly refused to compromise on its demands for autonomy, thereby exacerbating the divide between the two wings of the country. When the Pakistani military initiated Operation Searchlight in March 1971 to restore law and order, it was met with fierce resistance, which swiftly evolved into a full-fledged armed insurrection under the Mukti Bahini banner. This burgeoning insurgency, it is alleged, received substantial logistical and military backing from India. Indian training camps across the border in West Bengal, Assam, and Tripura reportedly became fertile ground for Mukti Bahini fighters, where India ostensibly provided arms, intelligence, medical care, and communication support, effectively transforming the group into a foreign-backed proxy.

Decades later, the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), designated as a terrorist organization by Pakistan, the United States, and the European Union, emerged as a contemporary manifestation of a systematic campaign of terrorism against the Federation of Pakistan. Originating in the early 2000s, the BLA has reportedly evolved from a small guerrilla outfit into a sprawling insurgent force capable of launching coordinated, large-scale offensives. Its stated goal of establishing an independent Balochistan has reportedly resulted in repeated attacks on military convoys, civilian infrastructure, economic projects, and ethnic minorities. According to the PIPS Pakistan Security Report for 2024, BLA-orchestrated attacks surged by a significant 119 percent, accounting for 171 terrorist incidents in Balochistan alone, leading to 225 fatalities.

This grim statistic positions the BLA as one of the most lethal perpetrators of violence in the country for that year. Their operations reportedly encompass a range of tactics, including high-casualty assaults on security installations, highway ambushes, suicide bombings, and hostage-taking. One of the most emblematic recent events was the audacious hijacking of the Jaffar Express on March 11. BLA militants allegedly detonated explosives to halt the train in the remote Bolan Pass, subsequently seizing it and holding hundreds of passengers hostage, primarily targeting off-duty security personnel.

The group issued ultimatums demanding the release of Baloch political prisoners. “Operation Green Bolan,” the Pakistani armed response, ultimately rescued approximately 354 hostages, though the standoff resulted in a few fatalities among both hostages and rescuers, and all 33 militants were killed, leaving dozens injured.

Thus, the Mukti Bahini and the BLA are often viewed as two distinct but intrinsically linked terrorist movements, both driven by the ultimate objective of destabilizing and dismembering the Federation of Pakistan. While separated by decades and operating in different geographical contexts— the Mukti Bahini in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in the early 1970s, and the BLA primarily in southwestern Balochistan today— what connects them is not merely their violent methodology or separatist aspirations. Rather it is their alleged external patronage, particularly the pervasive role attributed to India, which is widely believed to have masterminded, funded, and militarily supported both campaigns.

This narrative suggests that in 1971, amidst the political and ethnic turmoil in East Pakistan, India perceived an opportune moment to bolster the Bengali nationalist insurgency, seeking to weaken its regional rival. India is accused of hosting thousands of training camps across its border regions, including West Bengal, Assam, and Tripura, where Mukti Bahini fighters were allegedly armed, trained, and equipped for guerrilla warfare against Pakistani forces

From this perspective, what began as an internal crisis rapidly escalated into a full-fledged proxy war, with the Mukti Bahini receiving extensive military assistance, including weaponry, communication devices, uniforms, and even direct combat support. Indian military intelligence, particularly RAW, is asserted to have played a pivotal role in orchestrating these operations.

The guerrillas reportedly engaged in systematic sabotage, destroying vital infrastructure such as bridges, power stations, and railway lines, and waged an urban bombing campaign in cities like Dhaka and Chittagong. Critically, they also allegedly targeted non-Bengali populations, especially the Urdu-speaking Biharis, with accusations of mass killings and ethnic cleansing that remain a painful historical memory for many in Pakistan. The systematic targeting of civilians, brutal executions, and the deliberate destruction of state infrastructure are all presented as elements of a calculated strategy to render the governance of East Pakistan impossible.

India’s alleged support reached its zenith in December 1971 when it intervened militarily under the purported pretexts of humanitarian concern and regional stability. The war’s conclusion, resulting in the creation of Bangladesh, is thus interpreted not merely as an outcome of internal grievances but as a direct instance of external aggression utilizing an internal insurgent movement as a proxy. In this narrative, the Mukti Bahini was never an organic liberation force but rather an Indian proxy that operated under Indian command, with the unequivocal goal of dismembering Pakistan.

Fast forward to the 21st century, the Balochistan Liberation Army has emerged as a new face of separatist insurgency within Pakistan. Operating in the vast, resource-rich province of Balochistan, the BLA has reportedly conducted dozens of high-profile attacks on Pakistani security forces, public infrastructure, ethnic settlers, and foreign nationals, particularly Chinese workers associated with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

The assertion that the BLA is backed by Indian intelligence, mirroring the alleged support for the Mukti Bahini, is a central tenet of this perspective. One of the most pivotal events reinforcing this belief was the arrest of Kulbhushan Jadhav in 2016, a serving Indian Navy officer apprehended in Balochistan. His reported confession to being a RAW agent working to coordinate sabotage operations, fund separatist groups, and sow chaos within Pakistan, particularly in Balochistan, is considered irrefutable proof of India’s alleged involvement in fostering insurgency in the region.

Jadhav’s case, coupled with the BLA’s own statements and operational patterns, has led Pakistan to view the group not as a legitimate nationalist movement but as a mercenary force operating at the behest of a foreign adversary. The BLA has allegedly developed operational capabilities strikingly similar to those employed by the Mukti Bahini decades earlier. It has reportedly executed train hijackings, suicide bombings, assassinations, and mass ambushes on military convoys.

The March 2025 hijacking of the Jaffar Express, where BLA militants reportedly held passengers hostage, making demands that echoed the asymmetric warfare tactics attributed to the Mukti Bahini insurgency, further illustrates these parallels.

Furthermore, the group has increasingly targeted foreign interests in Pakistan, especially those linked to Chinese investment and infrastructure development, which is seen as indicative of a broader geopolitical motive transcending purely domestic grievances.

Pakistan’s leadership has consistently accused India of arming, training, and funding BLA operatives via its consulates in Afghanistan, and of utilizing third-party NGOs and media networks to amplify separatist narratives. Numerous Pakistani intelligence reports have purportedly traced the flow of funds and communications to Indian handlers, and high-profile attacks— such as the April 2022 bombing at Karachi University which killed three Chinese nationals— are believed to have had direct external coordination.

The BLA’s strategic use of media and psychological operations also reportedly mirrors tactics attributed to the East Pakistan conflict, where international sympathy was allegedly garnered through propaganda while guerrilla fighters engaged in acts of terrorism on the ground. Therefore, the Mukti Bahini and the BLA are consistently presented not as isolated nationalist movements but as integral components of a long-term Indian strategy designed to weaken and fragment Pakistan.

Both organizations, it is argued, have targeted the integrity of the state by inciting ethnic division, conducting systematic attacks on civilians and infrastructure, and undermining national unity. Whether through the mass killings of Urdu-speaking civilians in 1971 or the assassination of Chinese engineers in 2022, both the Mukti Bahini and the BLA are seen as having employed tactics that squarely fall under the definition of terrorism. These acts, it is asserted, were not merely aimed at achieving independence but at paralyzing governance and forcing international intervention against Pakistan. The argument is firmly rooted in the belief that India has consistently employed proxy actors to wage indirect warfare against Pakistan.

The objective, in this view, is not to genuinely assist oppressed communities but to exploit internal fault lines to degrade Pakistan’s sovereignty, military strength, and economic progress. With the advent of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and growing Chinese investment in Balochistan, India’s alleged sponsorship of the BLA is widely believed to serve the dual purpose of obstructing CPEC and perpetually entangling Pakistan in internal conflict.

The striking similarities between the Mukti Bahini and the BLA are considered more than coincidental; they are perceived as reflecting a consistent strategic approach employed by India. Both organizations have been involved in violent separatist insurgencies, both have allegedly targeted state authority and civilian populations, and both are reported to have received training, funding, and logistical support from Indian intelligence agencies. The names may have changed, the provinces are different, but the fundamental agenda, from this perspective, remains the same: to weaken Pakistan through internal unrest and external manipulation.

The Mukti Bahini and the BLA, therefore, are presented as two names separated by time but unified in purpose, representing a chapter in Pakistan’s history that continues to unfold, with old patterns seemingly repeating under new banners. It is considered an irony that certain individuals identified as nationalist leaders of Balochistan, such as Mahrung Baloch, reportedly remain conspicuously silent on the brutal killings of innocent people by the BLA and consistently fail to condemn these acts of terrorism.

The Government of Pakistan and the Pakistan Army are, it is affirmed, dealing with the BLA with an unyielding determination, with the entire nation standing in resolute solidarity with the government and its armed forces to curb the menace of terrorism, eliminate terrorist groups, and ultimately foster a peaceful and prosperous future for the country.