Although hostilities between Pakistan and India have temporarily ceased, strategic analysts widely anticipate the possibility of another Indian false-flag operation– this time executed with greater precision and clearer objectives. Indian likely intent would be to avenge the setback of Operation Sindoor and to reclaim lost military prestige. Before drawing any conclusions, it is essential to carefully assess the prevailing stability-instability dynamics that define the relationship between the two nuclear-armed states.
Ever since India and Pakistan became overt nuclear powers in 1974 and 1998 respectively, they have been caught in a “Security-Insecurity Paradox” which suggests that though they have not fought any full-scale war but have been engaged in numerous conflicts– like border skirmishes, proxy wars, or limited engagements– besides arms buildup and strategic posturing. It challenges the realists’ assumption that nuclear weapons automatically create total peace. Furthermore, India’s doctrinal pursuit of strategic dominance and Pakistan’s quest for deterrence have both ensured that peace remains elusive.
At the heart of their perpetual rivalry lies a fundamental doctrinal divergence. Indian warmongers believe that they can wage a limited conventional war below Pakistan’s nuclear threshold. Indians perceived this hypothesis through their experience of the Kargil crisis where they achieved their objectives without triggering the nuclear redline. Moreover, the bases of their war doctrines, especially Cold Start Doctrine (CSD), rest on this very assumption. Pakistan, on the other hand, maintains that there is no space for conventional war between two nuclear-armed states, believing that any escalation could spiral into a full-scale nuclear conflict. This view has been endorsed by all the theorists of international relations including the hardcore realists who see no incentives for any nuclear state to opt for war.
The historic accounts since 1998 suggest a pattern of India’s tendency to mobilize militarily or orchestrate high-stake provocations for limited conventional war. The important thing to note is that New Delhi has constantly been escalating the intensity of conflict – always taking a step up on the escalation ladder. It has been done with specific aim: firstly, to test and enhance Islamabad’s nuclear patience; and, secondly, to compel Pakistan to accept its actions as a neo-normal– a transformed norm based upon so-called changed geopolitical realities. A few glimpses of their post-1998 history are unfolded in next paragraphs.
India gave the first signal of initiating a conventional war in 2001-2002, in the post-Parliament Attack drama. India conducted massive mobilization of forces to the Line of Control and international borders under Operation Parakram, and so did Pakistan. The forces returned to barracks after remaining deployed for about one year.
The episode was repeated in 2008 (Post-Mumbai Attacks). Tensions heightened but the result was the same.
In 2016, India claimed surgical strikes inside Pakistan. It was, though, a fabricated claim– as considered by both Pakistani and international experts– but was not purposeless. Where it signalled New Delhi’s policy shift to self-claimed proactive retaliation, it was aimed at assessing Islamabad’s response and measuring its nuclear threshold.
Later in 2019, using Pulwama’s– arguably another false-flag event– as a pretext, IAF violated Pakistan’s air space and conducted a failed effort at a surgical strike. Though, it caused no damage to men and material, and Pakistan was able to down IAF MiG-21 and capture its pilot, no political scientist can ignore that India took a step up on the escalation ladder.
The strategic competition between India and Pakistan is far from concluded. The region sits precariously on a tinderbox —any miscalculation, deliberate or accidental, could push South Asia to the brink of yet another crisis.
But it was not the last episode. In 2022, a BrahMos supersonic missile crashed near Mian Channu, Pakistan. New Delhi described it as an accidental firing due to a technical malfunction during routine maintenance. Was it really so? Many analysts suspect it as a deliberate attempt to test Pakistan’s air defence mechanism and alertness level.
The most recent– though not the last– episode occurred in May this year. The repetition of the old false-flag strategy at Pahalgam– where 26 innocent people became victims– and launching missile attacks on multiple targets in Pakistan, including critical installations, has further intensified strategic instability in South Asia.
While Pahalgam may be over, the underlying tensions and root causes of conflict between the two remain unresolved. Hypothesizing that India is the regional hegemon and a rising global power, its leadership confronts an exceptionally difficult security dilemma: how to make Islamabad a subservient capital of New Delhi. While analyzing a wide range of options against Pakistan, the Indian policymaking community uses the theoretical lens of Thomas Schelling’s ‘Compellence Theory’ –a distant form of ‘Deterrence’ – connoting a threat to keep the enemy from starting something. The real challenge that the India’s political leadership and security management struggle today is in calibrating a response that could satisfy public opinion, punish Pakistan but avoid a large scale nuclear or military escalation,
To accomplish above goals the Modi-led Indian elite has long been working on following options:-
First, pro-active limited military offensive along LOC and Pakistan’s mainland short of crossing the nuclear redline. The aim of this option is to capture sizable territory before the international community intervenes in effecting a ceasefire, and to be at an advantageous position on the negotiating table. The Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) and Operation Kabaddi were conceived in line with the same doctrinal thought. An unlikely proposition due to various reasons like: failure of Operation Kabaddi in 1999 and 2019, and CSD in 2001 and 2008; unlikely air superiority during war; risk of escalation into full scale war; danger of stepping over nuclear redline; strong response from Pakistan Army including threat of employing tactical nuclear weapons (TNW).
Second, limited air and missile strikes in AJK and against selected targets inside Pakistan. The option bears mixed probabilities. Missiles strikes alone, or in support of other operations, are most likely. Whereas, a repeat Balakot failed attempt by IAF is most unlikely as compared to its capabilities with Pakistan’s response options which already earned IAF an immense humiliation in 2019 and 2025.
Three, exercising nuclear option either in support of a military campaign or precision strikes on selected strategic installations/assets in Pakistan. The most dangerous but most unlikely course of action once analyzed viz-a-viz Pakistan’s second strike capability and Mutually Ensured Destruction (MAD) phenomenon.
Fourth, non-violent compellence strategy to isolate Pakistan internationally and punish it economically, politically and morally. Most unlikely if exercised as an independent choice. India has, however, long been propagating against Pakistan in all international fora without achieving its end objectives.
Fifth though not the last, symmetrical covert strategy by fomenting insurgency and disorder in Pakistan. The most likely out of all available alternatives when evaluated for gains and risks. India also has a history of its involvement in sabotage activities inside Pakistan and is likely to select it as a rational choice in meeting its long term goals in Pakistan. The mission of covert war can be operationalized through RAW network and its proxies– BLA and TTP– against: key leaders, military commanders and personnel; high value strategic organizations and their infrastructure; and, financial, economic and logistic setups including industrial units.
It’s not a new strategy as there are inerasable traces of RAW’s connections with every terrorist activity that occurs in Pakistan, but its intensity is likely to increase manifold as India in the post- Pahalgam scenario has miserably failed in other options. After suffering a humiliating military defeat and the shattering of the myth of its air superiority, India still poses a persistent mindset driven by prestige and strategic dominance.
Now what are the response options with Pakistan?
Where Pakistan has emerged as victorious in the recent conflict and been recognized as a powerful and responsible state, it needs to chalk out a deliberate and precise policy. Quid pro quo aimed at conducting low intensity operations inside India will neither be in its national interests nor shall contribute towards regional peace and stability. Pakistan should rather execute robust and effective counter-terrorism operations within its own territory. Simultaneously, it should work to diplomatically and legally expose Indian actions before the international community, thereby gaining moral high ground and strategic advantage.
The strategic competition between India and Pakistan is far from concluded. The region sits precariously on a tinderbox —any miscalculation, deliberate or accidental, could push South Asia to the brink of yet another crisis.
