One unforeseen consequence of Operation Sindoor has been the battering of the Indian navy’s image as a “regional policeman” in the Indian Ocean. The celebrated Indian diplomat K.M.Pannikar, a fervent advocate of the Indian Ocean being India’s Ocean, must be turning over in his grave. His treatise, India and the Indian Ocean, penned in 1945, is widely referred to by the strategic community in New Delhi to justify their country’s exclusive claim over the third largest of the world’s five oceans.
At the onset of Operation Sindoor, Vice Admiral A.N. Pramod of the Indian Navy declared, “We have quantitative and qualitative edge to deliver a massive blow to our adversary and we completely dominate the maritime front. The Indian Navy’s action is part of the escalation ladder mechanism which we have worked out amongst three services”, he added,.
Ironically, not too long thereafter, the Indian Navy acknowledged that it did not participate in Operation Sindoor and kept waiting for instructions from the government. This was nothing but a crude attempt at salvaging a sinking pride. After all, the Indian navy crowns itself with the title of a “net security provider in the Indian Ocean region”, a claim that the USA fully supports (reiterated in US-India Joint Leaders Statement of February 13). It was hence naturally expected that the Indian navy will be flexing muscle and if nothing, at least show a façade of offensive posturing.
INS Vikrant was deployed in the North Arabian Sea on April 23. But it was quickly recalled and docked in a port. This decision came in the wake of reports on the ever increasing presence and intensifying patrolling by Pakistan Navy warships and long range maritime patrol aircraft. This patrolling was over and above the deployment of its own submarines. Satellite images showed an abrupt withdrawal of the carrier and its arrival at the Indian port of Karwar.
An aircraft carrier is a formidable “offensive” instrument, a mobile airfield. It usually carries a wide variety of aircraft onboard for conduct of offensive and defensive operations. There are besides, a number of warships, conventional and nuclear submarines above and beyond airborne early warning aircraft in company.
An aircraft carrier is correspondingly meant for power projection and sea control. Few countries in the world field such costly platforms meant for sustained blue water operations. The USA has the largest fleet of aircraft carriers. Eleven carrier strike groups are enough to control and dominate all important global maritime choke points through which transits intercontinental trade. According to UNCTAD, 80 percent of global trade by volume and 70 percent by value is shipped via sea. Policing and control of these maritime choke points through presence of such gigantic platforms in other words, signify oversight of intercontinental commerce and hence global economy.
For far too long the Indian Navy has been a “free rider” using crutches of the US and other navies and looked muscular outwardly. Yet, under the cloak, the inner core remains hollow. The declaration by the Indian Navy of “dominating the maritime front” remained an elusive dream. A rethinking by the US and Quad Navies in placing reliance on such a shaky strategic partner now may be in order.
A “defensive” employment of a platform like aircraft carrier runs counter to its raison d’être. Yet here was the pride of the Indian Navy sheltering itself and taking refuge inside a harbour. With awe-inspiring onboard fleet of Mig 29-K fighters and several frontline warships in inventory, other than US-supplied cutting edge anti-submarine platforms like P8I (Poseidon) and modern conventional and nuclear submarines to accompany as carrier task force, it was time for the Indian Navy to establish its worth in the region. It could not-not even remotely.
For over three decades, the US Navy has passionately strengthened and prepared the Indian Navy, facilitating its expansion, building operational capacity and honing combat skills. The joint (Malabar series) exercises often include aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines above and beyond other forces from both sides. As an integral part of Quad, the Indian Navy also operates and interacts with three other advanced navies (Japan, Australia, USA) on a regular basis. So what happened to this navy behind which stood grand investments by such modern navies?
In the ‘Preface’ of his influential work, “Arming without Aiming: India’s Military Modernization”, Stephen Cohen of Brookings Institution contends, “The Indian Navy and Indian Air Force need to develop a much clearer vision of what they want to do with new weapons and platforms. Both services are central to India’s nuclear deterrence, but they are unable to define their roles in actual war”. This was in 2013.
From another aspect, in its apex document published in 2015, the Indian Maritime Security Strategy notes, “The Indian Navy today remains the principal manifestation of India’s maritime power and plays a central role in safeguarding and promoting her security and national interests in the maritime domain”. It is worth mentioning that over 90 percent by volume and 70 percent by value of India’s trade today is transacted by sea. For this reason, India now accords increasing focus on safety and security of trade and energy routes (sea lanes) in the Indian Ocean region. The Indian Navy is its custodian.
Despite aforesaid warnings and claims, an utterly muddled vision of the Indian Navy manifested in the maritime domain during the four days of crisis. Far from casting any worthwhile influence on Pakistan’s maritime area of interest in the North Arabian Sea (350 nautical miles) or the country’s sea lanes running from the Persian Gulf and Far as, the Indian Navy remained in safe sanctuaries. Its veneer of operations was at best, a surviving distance of 430 or so miles down south of Pakistan’s coast.
Brazen propaganda aside, all three ports of Pakistan, Karachi, Port Qasim and Gwadar continued uninterrupted operations. A smart Anti-Access and Area Denial strategy of the Pakistan Navy with well integrated platforms and a net-centric force denied any benefit to the Indian Navy. In line with the vision of the Chief of the Naval Staff, the Pakistan Navy remained fully poised and ready to protect national maritime interests and deter any aggression at or from the sea. With a blend of sophisticated maritime battlespace management system, high speed data network and advanced fire control systems for real-time engagement, the Pakistan Navy presented a fearsome and technologically adept opponent to the Indian Navy. It is worth noting that in recent years the Pakistan Navy has embraced innovative technologies expanding its combat potential. New AI-driven technologies continue to be added at a regular pace.
For far too long the Indian Navy has been a “free rider” using crutches of the US and other navies and looked muscular outwardly. Yet, under the cloak, the inner core remains hollow. The declaration by the Indian Navy of “dominating the maritime front” remained an elusive dream. A rethinking by the US and Quad Navies in placing reliance on such a shaky strategic partner now may be in order.
