When The Economist published its feature “The mystic, the cricketer and the spy: Pakistan’s game of thrones” on November 14, it did more than recycle familiar gossip about Imran Khan and Bushra Bibi. It stitched together accounts from insiders, staffers and political actors into a disturbing portrait of how spiritual mysticism, military engineering and personal ambition fused at the heart of Pakistan’s recent power project. For a leader who built his brand on “Naya Pakistan”, clean governance and institutional reform, the picture that emerges is closer to a cult of personality wrapped in the cloak of piety.
According to The Economist, Khan’s political decline coincided with an ever-deeper reliance on Bushra Bibi not merely as a private spiritual adviser but as a pivotal decision-maker in his political life. The article describes how, at moments of crisis, Khan sought from Bushra a mixture of “spiritual guidance and worldly success”, suggesting that political strategy and supposed divine insight became dangerously intertwined. Rather than resetting his politics towards policy and party organisation, he appears to have doubled down on an almost theocratic style of personal rule, in which visions, predictions and rituals carried as much weight as cabinet notes and intelligence briefs.
The most sensational elements of The Economist’s reporting relate to the alleged occult-style rituals at Bani Gala. Former staff quoted in the piece speak of daily demands for beef, black animal heads and livers, and of meat being circled around Khan’s head to ward off “evil spirits” supposedly linked to a previous marriage. These allegations, long whispered in drawing rooms and partisan talk shows, now stand documented in a prestigious international outlet, forcing a more serious reckoning. Pakistan is a nuclear-armed state facing cascading crises of debt, climate stress and security: the idea that its prime minister was allowing his psychological comfort to be managed through exorcism-like rituals should alarm anyone who believes in rational governance.
More consequential than the optics of superstition, however, is the claim that Bushra Bibi’s interference in state affairs was, in the words of one former cabinet member cited by The Economist, “absolute.” If postings, policy preferences or access to the prime minister were shaped by an unelected, unaccountable spiritual figure, then the PTI’s rhetoric about merit, rule of law and institutionalism collapses under its own weight. Instead of strengthening the state, power appears to have been re-centralised in a narrow, opaque inner circle.
The article also describes Bani Gala as a fortress of gatekeeping and fear. Household staff and a former driver recount that access to Imran Khan, flight timings and even the moment a plane could take off often hinged on Bushra’s approval. What ought to have been decisions governed by security protocols, diplomatic calendars and national urgency were allegedly subordinated to the preferences of a pir. In political terms, this is not merely eccentricity; it is a distortion of public office, where national time was bent to the rhythm of private ritual.
The Economist report goes further, drawing on the PTI’s own financiers and allies. One of the party’s key backers, Jahangir Tareen, is described as having raised concerns that Bushra was using black magic, only to find himself gradually frozen out. This reflects a pattern in which political fates were determined not by transparent party mechanisms or performance, but by whispered suspicions and household loyalties. Loyalists who questioned Bushra’s influence or crossed her path, the article suggests, were discarded with little hesitation. The PTI’s promise of justice and institutional fairness was, in practice, overshadowed by the logic of personal favour and spiritual patronage.
Overlaying all this is an older, deeper contradiction that The Economist underscores: Imran Khan’s 2018 ascent to power was widely seen as having been facilitated by the military establishment, particularly the ISI, belying his carefully curated image as an outsider battling the “system.” Now, the new reporting suggests something even more troubling— that elements of the intelligence apparatus may have used pir networks linked to Bushra to shape Khan’s perceptions, feeding information to spiritual advisers who then relayed it as “visions” or predictions. If accurate, this implies a double capture of civilian leadership: by the deep state on one side, and by a mystic court on the other.
In the end, The Economist’s reporting does not merely tarnish Imran Khan’s reputation; it crystallises what many Pakistanis long suspected. The “captain” who vowed to end manipulation did not dismantle the old order; he fused it with mysticism, allowing both the deep state and a mystic court to pull the strings. For a country craving sober, competent and accountable leadership, that may be the most damning verdict of all.
The sacking of then-ISI chief Lt Gen Asim Munir is cast in the same light. The Economist notes that his removal followed his reported briefings about alleged corruption involving Bushra Bibi. Rather than a principled stand against overreach, the decision appears, in this telling, as self-protective: the anti-corruption crusader drawing the line at scrutiny that touched his own household. When the guardian of morality shields his immediate circle, the claim to moral superiority crumbles.
Meanwhile, the hard metrics of governance tell their own story. Khan’s grand promises of millions of homes and jobs, of a transformed welfare state and a booming economy, never materialised at the scale advertised. Pakistan instead lurched from one economic scare to another, with mounting inflation and conditional IMF bailouts. The Economist recalls Khan’s later admission that such transformation could not be achieved in a single term, a realistic assessment perhaps, but one that starkly contradicts the breathless certainty with which “Naya Pakistan” was sold to the electorate.
The article also revisits the corruption cases that have landed both Khan and Bushra Bibi in jail, including controversies over expensive state gifts and the Al-Qadir-style trust arrangements. These cases, exhaustively covered in domestic media, now sit in an international narrative that cuts right through Khan’s carefully polished “clean hands” image. Even those who question the selectivity of Pakistan’s accountability system cannot easily ignore the symbolism: the anti-corruption icon ensnared in the very web he claimed to cut.
The Economist ultimately portrays the PTI less as a modern, institutionalised party and more as a movement built around a single “moral sovereign” and his veiled spouse— decisions dictated by dreams, omens and personal loyalties rather than internal democracy. When, after Khan’s arrest, PTI supporters attacked military sites and national monuments, the dissonance became glaring: a party that claims to defend institutions yet mobilises rage against them when its own leader is touched.
`Bushra Bibi herself sits at the nexus of misogyny and myth. The vicious personal attacks on her are indefensible and reveal a deep societal sickness. Yet that reality does not erase an equally serious problem: an unelected, unaccountable spiritual figure allegedly exercising massive influence over public decisions. Transparency and rule-based politics cannot coexist with governance by dreams and secret rituals.
In the end, The Economist’s reporting does not merely tarnish Imran Khan’s reputation; it crystallises what many Pakistanis long suspected. The “captain” who vowed to end manipulation did not dismantle the old order; he fused it with mysticism, allowing both the deep state and a mystic court to pull the strings. For a country craving sober, competent and accountable leadership, that may be the most damning verdict of all.
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