The Illusion of Brotherhood

By: Malik Abdul Wasay

Pakistan and Afghanistan have long maintained a relationship, and fought under the banner of “brotherhood”; however, the narrative of neighbourly solidarity is under severe strain. The October 2025 crisis, marked by cross-border skirmishes and terrorist attacks on Pakistani border posts, has revived old grievances. The 19 October truce reached in Doha between the two offered a glimmer of hope, however, Istanbul talks, which began on 25 October, hit a roadblock with Taliban unwilling to commit anything in writing. The durability of peace hinges on Kabul curbing militant groups operating from its soil earnestly.

Pakistan has in the past, shouldered the burden of Afghan wars, but recent developments suggest that this goodwill and brotherhood may have been misplaced. There is a need to examine the record: recall how generously Pakistan once extended help to its neighbour’s people, and contrast that with repeated instances where Kabul’s actions proved hurtful. Ultimately, Pakistan must chart its own course in response to these realities.

Pakistan has indeed invested heavily in Afghanistan’s stability. It became a frontline state in the 1980s, hosting millions of Afghans and backing the anti-Soviet Mujahideen with Western support. According to Foreign Office statements, Pakistan “generously hosted nearly four million Afghans for over four decades”. Even after the US withdrawal and the Taliban takeover in 2021, Islamabad has continued to extend goodwill to Afghanistan. For example, Pakistan issued thousands of medical and student visas to Afghans and facilitated humanitarian relief during natural crises.

In economic and diplomatic terms, Pakistan has always extended “all possible trade, economic and connectivity facilitation” to its neighbour which includes trade corridors and transit routes. Islamabad has allowed Afghan goods to flow through its ports and even acceded to new requests for preferential trade. On the humanitarian front, Pakistan has supplied relief: in January 2022 alone, Kabul received 18 metric tonnes of wheat from Pakistan to alleviate food shortages. Islamabad has also lobbied internationally for Afghan relief: senior Pakistani diplomats publicly urged the USA and others to release Afghanistan’s frozen central bank reserves so “Afghan people utilise their money for their benefit”. Pakistan even facilitated peace initiatives, such as the US-Taliban Doha talks to shuttle diplomacy, in the hope of achieving a stable outcome. Overall, Pakistan has frequently put “regional peace and connectivity” first, treating Afghanistan’s stability as a national interest.

However, the Afghan side’s behaviour has repeatedly betrayed this support. Militants like Fitna-e-Khawarij regularly use Afghan soil to attack Pakistan while enjoying “safe havens and liberty of action” in Afghanistan. The Tehrik Taliban Pakistan attacks in Pakistan have also risen sharply since the Taliban came to power in 2021. Pakistan has also demanded that Kabul act against TTP bases just across the frontier.  Despite multiple meetings and Taliban assurances to curb the group, these efforts have yielded no result. In October 2025, Taliban forces along with the TTP, once again launched coordinated attacks on Pakistani border posts, killing dozens of soldiers. They attacked because the TTP and Taliban forces viewed the strikes as a retaliation for alleged Pakistani air attacks inside Afghanistan targeting TTP sanctuaries.

This involves defence of its own borders and citizens on the one hand, and readiness to cooperate in areas of convergence on the other. The lesson is that Pakistan’s security and future now rest on its choices; a safer future depends on how the country learns from past betrayals, thus safeguarding its citizens, and demanding accountability from others.

Following that, Pakistani PM Shahbaz Sharif publicly accused the Afghan Taliban of “allowing their land to be used by terrorist elements,” vowing that “every provocation will be met with a strong and effective response”. Pakistan’s Army answered most decisively to the recent provocations: a swift counterattack was launched that destroyed several Afghan posts and killed dozens of Afghan soldiers and militants. Pakistan resorted to cross-border strikes after all other avenues were exhausted and Kabul’s close ties with the TTP meant militants continued operating unhindered from Afghan soil.

Beyond militancy, Kabul’s official stance has often been unsympathetic to the cause of curbing terror outfits. Even after years of Pakistani aid, Afghan spokesmen have deflected Pakistani concerns. Afghan Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi, reiterated that since the Taliban government came to power in 2021, no one has been harmed using Afghanistan’s soil. Pakistan rejected this claim and shared detailed evidence of the planned attacks.

Given this history, Islamabad must reassess its approach as it can no longer take goodwill as a given; self-defence has to be the standard. Military and civilian leaders have stated that the state will “do whatever it takes” to defend its people and territory. In practice, this includes fortifying the border defences and even pre-emptive strikes on militant hideouts in Afghanistan if a situation requires such drastic actions. Pakistan needs to make it clear that any normalisation of relations would be conditional upon an end to cross-border raids and sanctuary for terrorists.

In the long term, Pakistan’s most realistic option is a stable, peaceful Afghanistan that poses no threat to its security. Unfortunately, recent crises have again revealed the limits of the so-called brotherhood narrative. Hence, Islamabad needs to follow a pragmatic, interest-based policy.

This involves defence of its own borders and citizens on the one hand, and readiness to cooperate in areas of convergence on the other. The lesson is that Pakistan’s security and future now rest on its choices; a safer future depends on how the country learns from past betrayals, thus safeguarding its citizens, and demanding accountability from others.

The writer is a Research Assistant at the Centre for Aerospace and Security Studies, Lahore. He can be reached at [email protected].