AT PENPOINT
The ceasefire between Afghanistan and Pakistan showed that this was a conflict that no one wanted, and merely was the result of Afghan miscalculation of how far it could go against Pakistan. Pakistan’s escalation of the conflict, which had already been running at a sub-war level for some time, showed that it would not tolerate the attacks on its soil directed against the armed forces.
The reason for the conflict was not just the Tehrik Taliban Pakistan. The Taliban did provide them safe havens, a clear overestimation of their capabilities. Apart from the safe havens, the TTP had free access to the US arms which had been left behind by the US forces, when they scuttled from Afghanistan in 2021. Their use against Pakistan troops in the fighting around Dera Ismail Khan and Waziristan has been particularly painful since Pakistan has been making cautious moves towards mending fences with the USA.
The Taliban may have overestimated the intentions of Pakistan. It does not really wish to dominate Afghanistan, the way the British did, then the Soviets and most recently the Americans. The three great empires foundered in Afghanistan because they first tried to achieve regime change, and then found themselves having to support the puppet they had installed. Their inability to keep them in power is the result of the refusal of the Afghan people to accept them, and thus to carry out the will of the imperial power.
British friction with Afghanistan was over the border, and because Afghanistan was not willing to allow Britain to exercise complete sovereignty over the area. The first Afghan War occurred because Amir Dost Muhammad Khan wanted to receive a Russian diplomatic mission. The British Government feared that Russia would invade India through Afghanistan, and thus wanted an Amir who would not let them in. Shah Shuja, a grandson of the Father of Afghanistan Ahmad Shah Abdali and an ex-Amir, was willing to keep the Russians out, so long as he was allowed to invade Punjab (Maharaja Ranjit Singh was still alive). The’Army of the Indus’ invaded Afghanistan through the Bolan Pass in 1839, and succeeded in installing Shah Shuja on the throne. But keeping him there was another matter, and an ensuing rebellion in 1842 ended with the slaughter of all but a single British Army doctor who rode into Jalalabad (Other soldiers, but no officers arrived later). Britain had its revenge with another invasion of Afghanistan, and it did bring Afghanistan firmly into the British sphere of influence. Point made, Dost Muhammad was allowed to return to the Afghan throne, which he retained until his death in 1863.
The Second Afghan War also owed itself to the Great Game. The Afghan Amir, Sher Khan, accepted a Russian envoy in 1878. The British wanted to send an envoy too, but the Afghans refused. The envoy arrived nonetheless, but was slaughtered in an uprising. The British then took revenge, sending in an army. Amir Sher Ali fled north, but died. His heir was Yaqub Ali Khan, but he abdicated, and the British helped his cousin Abdur Rehman become Amir. The War ended with the Treaty of Gandamak of 1879, when Amir Abdur Rehman conceded British control over Afghan foreign policy, as well as substantial territory in the south, in what are now the Pushtun areas of Balochistan, as well as Chitral, which is now part of KP.
Pakistan has so far resisted sending in a ground force, as it probably does not have the ability to do so effectively. However, there is nothing to stop it using its air force. It should be noted that the Taliban feared it the most, and one of their conditions in Istanbul was that their airspace not be violated, nor Pakistan help another country attack them from the air, a clear reference to Pakistani assistance to US airpower when it invaded. That gives the Taliban the options of complying, or defeating the Pakistani ground forces.Â
There was a Third Afghan War, in 1919, in which the Afghan Army got beaten, but Afghanistan regained control of its foreign policy in the Treaty of Rawalpindi ending the war. Afghanistan failed to regain its lost provinces, and once again recognized the Durand line border since 1893. That War gave rise to a number of uprisings in Waziristan. After that, there has never been a prolonged clash across the Durand Line, though there have been incidents during the Soviet and US occupations of Afghanistan.
First the USSR occupied Afghanistan. It tried to prop up the regime of Noor Muhammad Tarakki, who had himself overthrown Sardar Daud, who had himself overthrown his cousin King Zahir Shah. After Tarakkki was killed by his prime Minister, Babrak Karmal, who replaced him, the Soviets brought in Najibullah Amin, who survived briefly after the USSR withdrew. Ultimately, sometime after the Mujahideen took over Kabul, he was dragged out of the UN compound and hung from the nearest lamppost. Earlier, the USSR had withdrawn its forces in good order across the land border between the two countries.
Next came the USA, which quickly occupied Afghanistan in 2001 after 9/11, but then spent the next two decades propping up Hamid Karzai and then Ashraf Ghani. The USA finally had to withdraw, leaving Kabul in 2021 to the Taliban, but had to leave by air. It suffered no major disaster to its forces such as the British suffered after the First Afghan War, but still the withdrawal was not really in good order, their former employees showing great desperation and fear of the Taliban.
The recent clash seems to resemble the Third War more than anything else. There was no attempt at regime change, because previous attempts have required a substitute, which Pakistan does not really have. In fact, the present Taliban regime might be seen as the Pakistan nominees. Following ancient tradition, and not recent inspiration, Afghanistan is now an Emirate.
Then there is the Great Game. Russia is no longer trying to invade, not even in the most fevered imagination. However, Pakistan now faces the threat of India. It has become more intense because of the Indian withdrawal from the Indus Basin Waters Treaty. In this context, the Taliban announcement of its intention to dam a river flowing to Pakistan seems a page borrowed from the Indian playbook. It is also worth noting that the TTP does not just get support from Afghanistan, but also from RAW. While the Afghan Taliban are ideologically akin, that can certainly not be said about RAW.
This puts paid to the already discredited strategic-depth theory. Actually, Ziaul Haq did not invent the concept so much as modify it. At the height of the Great Game, British strategists sought ‘strategic depth’ against Russia in Afghanistan. No one expected Afghanistan to stop Russia if it engaged in such an enterprise, but it could delay the invasion if there was a friendly regime in Kabul.
Pakistan’s support of the mujahideen in the 20th century, its support of what became the Taliban, and that of the Taliban afterwards, were all designed to get a friendly regime in Kabul. That it has not happened is clear.
Pakistan now finds itself where the British Empire was in the beginning of the 20th century, using air power to bomb Kabul, just as the RAF bombed the Afghan forces in the Third Afghan War over a century ago. The RAF were used in the subsequent Wazir uprisings, including that led by the Faqir of Ipi. One of the Faqir’s descendants, Gul Bahadur, is leading a group fighting the Pakistan forces. Are the good old days back again?
That is a question that the Taliban government has to answer. It must realize that it has crossed a red line with Pakistan, and is also too weak to force Pakistan to do its will. They have been coddled long enough, and have gained an incorrect impression of themselves. Core beliefs have been held in common with the TTP, but are they worth being beaten as in 1919? It appears that it has let this become the sticking point which has led to the failure of the Qatar and Istanbul talks.
Pakistan has so far resisted sending in a ground force, as it probably does not have the ability to do so effectively. However, there is nothing to stop it using its air force. It should be noted that the Taliban feared it the most, and one of their conditions in Istanbul was that their airspace not be violated, nor Pakistan help another country attack them from the air, a clear reference to Pakistani assistance to US airpower when it invaded. That gives the Taliban the options of complying, or defeating the Pakistani ground forces. The Taliban may be stupid, but not stupid enough to embark on the second course, not after the pounding they have already received.
