For decades, reform has been one of Pakistan’s most repeated policy promises. Every new government launches its own agenda for civil service, taxation, education, and institutional renewal, but few survive beyond the first phase. The outcome is a familiar paradox: a system in constant motion that rarely changes direction. Reform has become a habit rather than a form of correction.
This recurring cycle reflects the absence of reformers rather than reforms. The country has produced more commissions, frameworks, and task forces than any in South Asia, yet implementation remains minimal. The National Commission for Government Reforms submitted 750 recommendations in 2008; only a dozen were acted upon. The 2019 Task Force on Civil Service Reform presented another 600 pages of proposals, most of which remain under review. Without continuity or leadership to see these through, reform dissolves into paperwork.
Civil service reform remains the clearest case. Pakistan’s bureaucracy over 600,000 federal employees and 1.2 million across provinces operates under structures that have changed little since 1973. Recruitment still revolves around exams, not performance. According to the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, over 70 percent of civil servants have never received formal mid-career training, and 64 percent believe promotions depend more on tenure than merit. This is a system designed to preserve itself. When reform meets such inertia, it adapts to survive rather than transform.
Education reform tells a similar story. Between 2010 and 2024, public expenditure on education increased from 1.8 to 2.5 percent of GDP, yet learning outcomes have barely shifted. The Pakistan Education Statistics Report 2024 notes that 61 percent of grade-five students cannot read a grade-two Urdu text, and nearly half struggle with basic arithmetic. Despite over 200,000 new classrooms built since 2015, teacher absenteeism remains around 18 percent nationally. Provinces such as Punjab and Sindh now spend nearly a quarter of their education budgets on administrative overhead. The structure grows, but the results stay still.
In higher education, institutional expansion has outpaced intellectual reform. The Higher Education Commission reports that the number of universities rose from 59 in 2002 to 259 in 2024, yet Pakistan’s share of global research output remains below 0.4 percent. Fewer than 10 percent of public-sector universities meet minimum faculty-to-student ratio standards. Despite 35 percent nominal growth in HEC allocations since 2018, recurring expenditures mainly salaries and maintenance consume almost 90 percent of budgets. The system has expanded, but not evolved.
Economic reform has fared no better. The country has undertaken 13 major tax reform initiatives since 1980, but the tax-to-GDP ratio still hovers around 9 percent. In comparison, Bangladesh collects 12.5 percent and India 17 percent. The Federal Board of Revenue’s restructuring drives in 2016 and 2021 introduced digital tools but failed to simplify compliance. The World Bank estimates that nearly 38 percent of potential tax revenue is lost annually to administrative inefficiency and procedural overlap. Policy complexity has replaced policy clarity.
These inefficiencies carry a measurable cost. The IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department estimates that Pakistan loses 1.5 to 2 percent of GDP every year due to delays in project execution and redundant administrative layers. Development projects that should take three years often extend to seven. The Planning Commission’s 2024 review found that 42 percent of ongoing projects have crossed their approved completion timelines. Reform has not accelerated governance; it has institutionalized delay.
Development sectors show the same fatigue. In water management, the 2018 National Water Policy outlined 33 reform measures, but only six have been fully executed. Pakistan continues to lose between 35 and 40 percent of water in transmission due to outdated irrigation infrastructure. In health, overlapping authority between provincial health departments and federal agencies after devolution has slowed service delivery. The 2023 National Health Accounts report shows that administrative expenditure in the sector has doubled in a decade, even as the ratio of doctors to population remains below WHO’s minimum threshold of one per 1,000 people.
Part of the problem is cultural. Bureaucratic institutions reward caution more than creativity. Decision-making authority is scattered across committees, delaying accountability. The World Bank’s 2024 Public Sector Efficiency Index places Pakistan in the lowest quartile globally for decision speed. Within ministries, files move through as many as 24 signatures before approval. A single reform proposal can remain “under process” for years. The process becomes the product.
This pattern also erodes public trust. The Edelman Trust Barometer 2025 found that only 38 percent of Pakistanis believe government institutions are capable of solving national challenges—a decline of seven points since 2022. Citizens experience reform announcements without visible results. Over time, this breeds fatigue and cynicism. Policy language expands while credibility contracts.
There are still small examples of progress. The Punjab Procurement Regulatory Authority’s shift to full e-bidding has reduced average project procurement time by 22 percent since 2020. The Sindh Education Management Information System has improved teacher attendance tracking through real-time data collection. The Pakistan Single Window initiative in customs digitization has cut cargo clearance time by nearly half. These are modest but meaningful gains, proving that reform can work when continuity and accountability coexist.
Yet these cases remain exceptions rather than norms. Too often, reform in Pakistan begins with enthusiasm and ends in absorption. Each framework becomes a preface to the next. The performance of progress replaces its substance. Institutions remain busy, but not effective.
True reform requires stability of purpose and courage of simplification. It demands fewer committees and more competence. Until reform is led by reformers, individuals and institutions willing to act rather than announce. Pakistan will remain trapped in cycles of motion without movement. Reports will be published, frameworks unveiled, and pilot projects launched. The system will continue to turn. Only the direction will stay the same.
