The foreign policy stance of former U.S. President Donald Trump reflected a striking duality, oscillating between isolationist tendencies and assertive military posturing. On the one hand, Trump expressed a pronounced skepticism toward foreign interventions, advocating for a reduced US military footprint abroad. His administration sought to cultivate improved relations with Russia, ostensibly in an effort to facilitate an end to the conflict in Ukraine. His “America First” foreign policy doctrine was generally critical of military entanglements, and in his inaugural address, he stated that the success of his second term would be measured by “the wars we never get into.”
Conversely, Trump simultaneously projected American military strength through both rhetoric and policy. His administration explicitly declared that the United States would intervene militarily in the event of an attack by China on the Philippines, a U.S. treaty ally.
Furthermore, Trump issued direct threats against Iran and North Korea while displaying an aggressive stance toward U.S. allies, suggesting, for instance, that Canada could be annexed as a U.S. state and implying potential military action to secure Greenland and the Panama Canal. This apparent paradox—a blend of isolationism and belligerence—could be interpreted as a reflection of Trump’s broader unpredictability or a lack of coherence in his foreign policy approach. However, public opinion in the United States also exhibits similar contradictions, as Americans often express a preference for non-intervention while simultaneously supporting military action in specific circumstances.
Historically, U.S. public sentiment has fluctuated between isolationism and interventionism, from the non-interventionist stance of the 1930s to the aggressive foreign policy of the early 1980s. Contemporary attitudes suggest a complex disposition, wherein Americans favor strategic withdrawal from global conflicts while maintaining a readiness to use military force when necessary.
A survey conducted in July of both ordinary citizens and former U.S. policymakers revealed significant public support for military action against China in response to hostilities in the South China Sea.
Even in scenarios where no American casualties were reported, 51 percent of respondents endorsed counterstrikes against Chinese military assets, with this figure increasing to 57 percent when US personnel were killed. Notably, partisan differences emerged, with Republicans displaying stronger support for military retaliation regardless of the administration in power. These findings do not necessarily indicate a widespread public desire for war. Indeed, Trump’s first term was largely characterized by military restraint regarding new conflicts. However, they do suggest that in the event of escalating tensions—whether in the South China Sea or with other adversaries such as Iran—public support for military mobilization could be greater than generally assumed.
While public opinion does not always dictate U.S. foreign policy, administrations often remain attuned to public sentiment regarding military engagements. This suggests that hostilities could escalate should adversaries directly engage U.S. forces. Surveys have consistently indicated that the American public prefers a reduced global presence, with a 2025 New York Times poll showing that 60 percent of respondents favored a focus on domestic affairs, including 75 percent of Republicans and 47 percent of Democrats.
Meanwhile, a study by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs found that only 17 percent of Americans believed the U.S. had an inherent responsibility to assume a leadership role in world affairs. Despite this, historical patterns indicate that U.S. voters tend to favor more assertive presidential candidates.
Political scientist Jeffrey Friedman’s research suggests that while Americans often voice opposition to military interventions, they frequently support such actions once undertaken. For example, public disapproval of U.S. involvement in the Balkans during the 1990s gave way to increased approval following President Bill Clinton’s decision to bomb Serbia.
While military action against weaker adversaries often garners public support, conflicts involving great power adversaries such as China present a different dynamic. To assess public attitudes toward such scenarios, an experimental survey was conducted in collaboration with the Chicago Project on Security and Threats and NORC.
The study asked 2,000 American citizens and 700 former policymakers to consider a hypothetical Chinese attack on a US aircraft carrier near a treaty ally. Respondents were divided into two groups: one was informed that 250 U.S. sailors had been killed, while the other was told there were no casualties. Results showed that 51 percent of respondents supported military retaliation in the absence of American casualties, while 57 percent endorsed a counterstrike if fatalities were involved.
Partisan distinctions were evident, with 60 percent of Republicans advocating retaliation even in the absence of casualties, rising to 67 percent when American personnel were killed. Democratic respondents were more measured, with 50 percent supporting a counterstrike in the absence of casualties and 57 percent endorsing one when U.S. personnel perished.
Importantly, public support for military action was not driven primarily by a desire for retribution. Instead, the predominant motivation appeared to be the protection of U.S. global standing. Among those advocating for retaliation, 53 percent cited the preservation of American credibility as a decisive factor. For Republicans, this figure rose to 63 percent. While the extent to which U.S. crisis behavior influences the actions of other adversaries, such as Iran, remains debated among scholars, the prevailing public perception is that maintaining a reputation for resolve is strategically significant.
The American public holds largely negative views of both Iran and Russia, with 81 percent of Americans expressing an unfavorable opinion of Iran and 86 percent holding a negative perception of Russia. Additionally, a 2024 YouGov poll indicated that Republicans overwhelmingly support defending NATO allies in the event of an attack. Nevertheless, historical precedent demonstrates that public support for military intervention is contingent upon specific conditions, including clear acts of aggression, the likelihood of success, and the perceived importance of US interests.
These factors have influenced past decisions, such as the non-intervention in Hungary (1956), the India-Pakistan conflicts (1965 and 1971), and the Rwandan genocide (1995). Similarly, US involvement in the Syrian civil war was limited to countering the Islamic State rather than broader military engagement.
Despite the heightened risk of military confrontation with China, both Washington and Beijing remain strongly incentivized to avoid direct conflict due to the existential risks posed by nuclear escalation.
The Cold War precedent suggests that deterrence mechanisms can function effectively even amidst heightened geopolitical tensions. Historically, China has exhibited reluctance in directly confronting U.S. military forces. During the Taiwan Strait crises of the 1950s, Mao Zedong instructed Chinese troops to avoid direct engagement with American forces. In subsequent confrontations—including the 1995 Taiwan missile crisis and the accidental U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999—China opted for diplomatic resolution rather than military escalation.
More recently, Beijing’s actions in the South China Sea have been characterized by non-lethal measures such as cyberattacks and water cannon use against Philippine vessels rather than overt military aggression. Paradoxically, a demonstrated willingness to employ military force could, in some cases, contribute to regional stability by deterring adversarial provocations.
For instance, the Trump administration’s explicit commitment to defending the Philippines may have compelled China to exercise restraint. However, given Trump’s propensity for bellicose rhetoric, his administration could also have inadvertently increased the likelihood of U.S. military engagement. His apparent personal ambition—particularly his desire to secure a Nobel Peace Prize—may have influenced his strategic decision-making. Nevertheless, his assertive declarations, coupled with an American public that is willing to support military action under certain conditions, suggest that the risk of military confrontation remains tangible.
The Trump administration’s foreign policy was marked by a complex interplay of isolationism and militarism. While the American public generally favors a reduced international footprint, historical patterns indicate that military intervention enjoys substantial support under specific circumstances. The likelihood of conflict with a major power such as China remains uncertain, yet the underlying factors shaping U.S. foreign policy including public sentiment, strategic credibility, and deterrence dynamics suggest that military escalation remains a possibility should hostilities arise.
