The United Nations Security Council’s pending vote on a U.S.-drafted resolution to reinforce President Donald Trump’s Gaza peace plan marks a pivotal moment not only for the war-scarred enclave but also for countries—Pakistan among them—being discreetly courted to join an international stabilisation effort. While the October 10 ceasefire, fragile though it remains, is undeniably a consequence of sustained American pressure—and while Pakistan’s own proposal to nominate Mr. Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize reflected diplomatic pragmatism—Islamabad must tread carefully. Participation in the proposed International Stabilisation Force (ISF) would be a step too far.
The latest draft circulating in New York authorises the creation of the ISF, a multinational deployment tasked with securing Gaza’s borders, facilitating humanitarian access, and overseeing the disarmament of non-state armed groups. It would operate in coordination with Israel, Egypt, and a newly trained Palestinian police service. The same draft also lays out a “Board of Peace,” a transitional governing mechanism—one that Mr. Trump could theoretically chair—until the end of 2027.
For a region exhausted by war, the ambition is sweeping. And yet ambition cannot substitute for legitimacy. For many Palestinians, including Hamas and other factions, the proposal raises fears of external guardianship and a stripping away of meaningful self-rule. Their objections may be politically self-serving, but they tap into a long, bitter history: international forces deployed without full Palestinian consent have rarely produced justice or stability.
Pakistan, which has long championed the Palestinian cause at the United Nations, must recognise the moral and strategic hazards of joining such a force. Whatever the ISF’s stated aims, Israel’s assent is not a technicality—it is a structural reality. Once a stabilisation mission becomes enmeshed with the priorities of a state that continues to reject even the faintest outline of Palestinian sovereignty, it risks acquiring a moral stain that no mandate can wash away.
This is not a moment for Pakistan to compromise its principled position. Nor is it a moment to entangle its peacekeepers—already among the most respected in the UN system—in a deployment where they may be perceived, rightly or wrongly, as enforcers of an arrangement that does not command broad Palestinian legitimacy.
Instead, Pakistan should use the diplomatic credibility it has recently gained to press for what the draft resolution only tentatively gestures toward: a credible pathway to a Palestinian state along the 1967 borders. That includes insisting that any international presence in Gaza be temporary, consensual, and firmly anchored in Palestinian self-determination—not in geopolitical convenience.
The ceasefire must hold. Reconstruction must begin. But peace built on dependency and external management will not endure. Pakistan’s role is not to police Gaza. It is to help ensure that the promise of a two-state solution—so often deferred, so often betrayed—is no longer postponed.
