A Blueprint for Centralized Power?

For many decades, the complex saga of contentious rifts between the civilian government and the powerful military establishment has defined Pakistan’s political landscape and bitter history. In the midst of severe political unrest and economic instability, the 27th Constitutional Amendment Bill (CAB) has emerged and drastically altered this long-standing dynamic. This plan addresses the fundamental pillars of the state, including the military command structure, judicial autonomy, and the very nature of fiscal federalism. It is not just a technical piece of legislation intended to increase bureaucratic efficiency.

The main modifications that have been made are big and diverse. These include the establishment of a Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) and changes to the judicial transfer procedure; the creation of the Chief of Defence Forces (CDF) position, along with steps to constitutionalize five-star military ranks. One thing unites these seemingly unrelated reforms: they consolidate power. By consolidating centralized power, especially within the military establishment and the federal executive, at the expense of democratic oversight and provincial autonomy, the 27th CAB alters Pakistan’s delicate constitutional balance, even though it is purportedly presented under the pretense of modernization and efficiency.

The amendment’s most obviously significant part, which formalises power that could alter the civil-military imbalance, focuses on restructuring the military’s command structure. The amendment has created the influential Chief of Defence Forces (CDF) position concurrently with the elimination of the mostly ceremonial Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC). Crucially, the idea proposes that the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) take on this CDF position concurrently.

This move is considered a paradigm Shift that portrays the effort to improve inter-service synergy and simplify the command line. The formalization and consolidation of command over the Army, Navy, and Air Force under a single person—the COAS/CDF—is implied, though. This effectively institutionalizes the primacy of the Army Chief over the whole defense apparatus with constitutional legitimacy, potentially weakening the already-existing checks and balances inherent in having two distinct four-star jobs (COAS and CJCSC).

Most importantly is the Constitutionalizing Rank of Field Marshal as Individual Power. The provision that gives officers raised to five-star levels, such as Field Marshal, lifetime privileges and constitutional legitimacy, is arguably the most contentious. This clause has give the person holding such a rank an extended, essentially unassailable tenure and constitutional protection.

As per the critics , this move is aimed more at the consolidation of individual authority than it is about true institutional reform. A single officer may be shielded from simpler citizen oversight or dismissal if they are granted constitutional status, since removal would require the difficult procedure of parliamentary indictment. By giving its senior commanders more political clout and legal protections, it solidifies the military’s power and tilts the statutory scales further away from civilian authority. Critics contend that it further solidifies the military’s already significant constitutional position, diminishing the symbolic and real authority of the civilian President and Prime Minister over the armed forces, despite proponents’ claims that it simplifies command and guarantees stability.

The third pillar of the state, the judiciary, is also targeted by the 27th Constitutional Amendment Bill 2025 , which raises grave concerns about the continued conflict between judicial autonomy and executive power. Earlier in the 26th Constitutional Amendment , the Judiciary was already enfeebled as the Constitutional Bench was created separately to hear the cases related to constitutional provisions . The New move to create a separate Constitutional court has further eroded the functioning of the Supreme Court of Pakistan . It may create confusion whether both the Supreme Court of Pakistan and the Constitutional court will function as parallel or the latter will supersede or replace the former .

As per the amendment and subsequent clarifications by the law ministry, the Supreme Court’s broad appellate duties would be separated from constitutional interpretation and basic rights issues by the establishment of a Federal Constitutional Court (FCC). By protecting the Supreme Court from frequently contentious political constitutional issues, the pro argument contends that this could depoliticize the court and possibly cut down on judicial delays in ordinary cases. However, the negative viewpoint raises questions about the possibility of political manipulation by the president about the creation and makeup of this new, potent court. The president could successfully curb judicial activism by limiting the Supreme Court’s authority in constitutional questions, especially in politically sensitive instances where the Supreme Court has previously contested excess by the government or establishment.

The Amendment to Article 200 of the Constitution of Pakistan, related to removing the need for judge permission and Chief Justice approval for High Court judge transfers, is a second crucial judicial shift that gives the executive-influenced Judicial Commission a great deal more power. This implies a direct erosion of judicial independence. One effective technique of control is the fear of an unwelcome transfer, which would move a judge to a less attractive or inconvenient assignment. The impartiality and courage of high court judges may be jeopardized if the executive is given this power, particularly when deciding matters involving the government or influential state institutions.

The main goal of the 27th Constitutional Amendment is to establish centralized power throughout Pakistan’s three main pillars of governance: the military, the court, and the federation. It is a complex and strategically layered legislative endeavor and a hard pill to digest . The overall result of these modifications is a systematic restructuring of the legal equilibrium in favor of the federal executive and the military establishment, undermining democratic oversight and autonomy for provinces, even though some provisions may appear to offer surface-level advantages in terms of effectiveness or administrative streamlining. The Opposition has already announced the protests to resist the move to save the Constitution, coming under fire from the unpopular Government, since the Elections were doubtful as the Opposition claimed victory and there were charges of horse trading and rigging . The Constitutional Expert does opine that the opposition is pushed to the wall while the amendments are made unilaterally by the hybrid regime .

It is ironic that such a big and drastic reform agenda demands an unwavering dedication to accountability and openness in a democracy already struggling with institutional instability. It is imperative that in Parliament and throughout civil society, there should be an honest, impartial, and thorough discussion and open debate regarding the reforms. A The question of whether the pursuit of “efficiency,” as defined by the privileged few, is genuinely worth the possible cost of irreversibly jeopardizing the democratic balance . It is worth mentioning here that Pakistan has fought for generations to maintain and must be thoughtfully considered by both citizens and institutions.