The dynamics of security in the region has been changing especially with regards to the actions of the Islamic State Khorasan province (ISKP) following the takeover by the Taliban of power in Afghanistan in October 2021. Although at first sight the Taliban and the ISKP seem to be archenemies in a bloody turf war, recent trends, intelligence, and tactical realities of the conflict are much more complicated and darker. Surgical precision amid beheadings of two ISKP operatives by the Taliban is evidence of the severe tactical confusion between the two organizations. Quite contrary to being harsh adversaries, there is also mounting evidence that the Taliban and ISKP have similar ends, common origins, and even, in some cases, even a common operating agenda, at least to strike back against Pakistan.
The Taliban and ISKP share the same breeding grounds based on the ideology of Islam radicalism that thrived once under the seal of regional instability. ISKP has many fighters who were former Taliban fighters who left because of internal gaps or strategy, not because of ideological differences. Their perspectives of the world, interpretations of religion, and their final aim to have an Islamic Emirate in the region are very close to each other. This overlap of ground makes it very easy where the operatives can turn coat or have multiple memberships, therefore making the demarcation between the two extremely blurred.
Such dynamics of recruitment as one of the greatest pointers of their common ecosystem is truly telling. The two groups are heavily reliant on the descent of similar tribal belts of eastern Afghanistan and western Pakistan. There is a fertile environment of radical indoctrination, recruitment and training in such porous and ungoverned border regions. A combatant in Nangarhar or Kunar can alternatively ally with and defect against Taliban or ISKP without physically relocating (and vice versa). This interchangeability indicates that the two entities only differ in their operating domains, but not their ideologies.
The Taliban leadership has told numerous falsehoods that they are fighting ISKP insurgents but the situation on the ground indicates the contrary. Following its reinstatement, the Taliban has failed to succeed in eliminating the working structures of ISKP. Rather, a number of United Nations and independent intelligence reports refer to the ongoing presence and actions of ISKP in Taliban territories, especially Nangarhar and Kunar. Such act of passive tolerance begs some serious issues of what the actual motives of the Taliban are and whether there is any secret agreement between the Taliban and ISKP to keep certain things going free of any interference.
There is no better example of such duplicity than that of the posturing between the Taliban and Pakistan. The two groups despise Pakistan with great intensity though with some certain distinctions. ISKP has continuously attacked Pakistani diplomatic, military and civilian interests. At the same time, Pakistan has little chance to improve internal security efforts due to the fact that the Taliban tacitly support Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), or an outlet of cross-border attacks. There has been a growing intelligence threat that TTP and ISKP cells have been working together and this is primarily enabled by the Taliban islands. The existence of this triangular military relationship between the Taliban, ISKP, and TTP is also a multidimensional threat to Pakistan in the pretext of separate brands.
There is some rivalry between the Taliban and ISKP, which is a well-tailored hoax. Just behind this smokescreen is a convergence of strategy by which the two groups could simultaneously achieve their respective interests and destabilize Pakistan and the region. The policymakers, intelligence agencies, and regional powers now are at the point of re-assessment of the assumptions and facing this threatening nexus with clarity and determination. Doing this will just equip the same forces that they are trying to suppress.
This hypocrisy is an extended Taliban policy of media mastering. Since 2021, the group has attempted to rebrand itself from a moderate insurgency movement into a government of merit and international significance. The fact that the Taliban engages in occasional skirmish with ISKP is being used to supplement this narrative, as a measure against more extreme forces. The illusion however gives both factions some leeway to act with impunity. Whereas Taliban obtains administrative control, ISKP aims at creating havoc in the region, especially in Pakistan.
The fact that the Taliban are not decisive against the ISKP and TTP networks adds to the dilemma facing Pakistan. Though Islamabad has tried to seek diplomatic advances and intelligence-sharing by many means, these have been to no avail for the major part. The Taliban has done very little to answer that call and what they did do was heartless at the least. The resultant effect is the aggravation of the security situation in the Pakistan border areas and the escalation of the number of terrorist attacks due to the cooperation of TTP and ISKP.
The world community should no longer approach the Taliban and the ISKP in a different kind of manner. The new evidence is pointing to the emergence of a very tangled symbiotic relationship taking advantage of ideological compatibility, geographical and physical propinquity, and mutual hostility toward Pakistan.
There is some rivalry between the Taliban and ISKP, which is a well-tailored hoax. Just behind this smokescreen is a convergence of strategy by which the two groups could simultaneously achieve their respective interests and destabilize Pakistan and the region. The policymakers, intelligence agencies, and regional powers now are at the point of re-assessment of the assumptions and facing this threatening nexus with clarity and determination. Doing this will just equip the same forces that they are trying to suppress.
