By: Rafey Altaf
Let us begin by briefly examining some key facts. On April 23, 2025 — a day after the terrorist attack at Pahalgam — Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri, addressing a special press briefing following a meeting of the Indian Cabinet Committee on Security, remarked: “In the briefing to the CCS, the cross-border linkages of the terrorist attack were brought out.”
This was followed by the announcement of a series of measures, including holding the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance – “until Pakistan credibly and irrevocably abjures its support for cross-border terrorism” – and closure of the Attari–Wagah border. Mr. Misri further stated: “It [the CCS] resolved that the perpetrators of the attack will be brought to justice and their sponsors held to account.” This statement marked the first unambiguous official attribution of the Pahalgam incident to cross-border involvement.
Notably, even before this official statement, Indian media was already ablaze with finger-pointing, mere hours after the tragedy. On May 7, India launched ‘Operation Sindoor’, accompanied by an invocation of the right to self-defence. Yet, conspicuously absent until then — and still missing — was the presentation or public sharing of any evidence establishing either direct, or indirect involvement by Pakistan.
Were India’s actions justifiable under existing and established principles of international law? In the absence of such justification, Operation Sindoor cannot be regarded as a lawful act of self-defence but rather constitutes a belligerent and unlawful use of force.
At this stage, a brief consideration of the broader discursive context is warranted. While interspersed with varied rhetorical expressions, the central theme underlying statements – whether directly official, from officials on different platforms, analysts and more generally expressed in the media in India – revolved around ‘justice’. One can argue – as India can no doubt do – that the stated need or pursuit of justice does not of itself disqualify a military response from being classed self-defence. The use of force in self-defence must, however, satisfy certain requirements. Let us assess, bearing in mind that the crux of India’s allegations is that the incident in question was perpetrated by Pakistan-based terrorists (non-state actors), accompanied by recurring and explicit assertions of state sponsorship.
The right to self-defence, preserved under Article 51 of the UN Charter, is triggered only “if an armed attack occurs.” Over the first part of this century, the law in this area — particularly concerning non-state actors, under what is labelled as the “unwilling or unable” doctrine, and evolving attribution standards — has become increasingly controversial and difficult to navigate with certainty. That said, under both traditional and emerging doctrines, the actions of non-state actors can — especially when there is compelling evidence of state sponsorship — potentially qualify as an armed attack.
Let us assume, solely for the purposes of legal analysis — and while expressly acknowledging Pakistan’s firm and unequivocal denials of any connection to the perpetrators or of any state sponsorship — that the Pahalgam incident did, in fact, amount to an armed attack. Is then responsive action in self-defence, whether immediate or deferred, legally unfettered? It is not. Any use of force in self-defence, especially when directed at or within the territory of the state alleged to be responsible, must still comply with the core principles of necessity, immediacy, and proportionality.
Necessity and immediacy require a temporal nexus i.e. the armed attack is feared to be first in a series of imminent threats. India claimed that the strike of May 7 – eventually unravelling as the ‘opening act’ of Operation Sindoor – was in fact, proportional. While that claim in itself is unpalatable – given the loss of civilian lives including innocent children – what is fundamental is that there was no evidence of any imminent threats post Pahalgam. No statements to this effect were made and neither was this India’s stated reason for undertaking eventual military action. Indian Parliamentarian and noted commentator Shashi Tharoor stated in an interview that “our job is to teach them a lesson and wash our hands of the matter, that’s the idea of what our strike is all about”.
India’s press brief of April 23 would have suggested to any reasonable audience that clearly India had tangible and credible threshold proof. Perhaps they had the identity of the perpetrators or irrefutable confirmation of Pakistan sponsorship or at least independent substantiation of involvement of non-state actor elements within Pakistan. Such an assumption was absolutely warranted objectively, given India’s announcement of unprecedented measures against Pakistan. Afterall, they had acted to water-starve a nation which itself has an international humanitarian dimension, in and outside of war. Pakistan, and indeed the world waited, but other than high-octane fuelled rhetoric of justice, marked by a persistent conflation of moral imperatives and strategic objectives intermixed with historical blame pasting, nothing was offered by India. No perpetrator in custody, only references to the past. Nothing except political messaging without even a cameo appearance of legal justification.
What then of the use of force by India on May 7, 2025 and indeed what followed? In the absence of any demonstrable evidence or publicly communicated factual basis, this constitutes a direct violation of the UN Charter, particularly the prohibition against use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of another state. The action, taken under what appears to be a beleaguered and strategically constructed guise of self-defence, fails to meet legal standards required under international law. Unlike the United States, which submitted a detailed Article 51 communication to the UN Security Council following the 9/11 attacks, India provided no such open factual substantiation or legal justification to Pakistan or the international community.
In the absence of attribution based on proof, evident necessity, imminence and seriously questionable claims of proportionality, India’s position — unless it now claims an exceptionalist or unilateralist position outside the framework of international law — fails to meet the threshold for a credible invocation of self-defence under both the UN Charter and established principles of customary international law.
As the dust settles and the world takes stock, the unavoidable verdict on Operation Sindoor — met with exceptional discipline, integrity, unflinching resolve, and undeniable professionalism and operational effectiveness by the Pakistan Armed Forces, whose response left the Indian forces in utter disarray and stripped the operation of any illusion of success — is that it was, ultimately, a politically motivated act of aggression, superficially cloaked in the language of self-defence: ill-conceived, poorly calculated, and legally indefensible.
The author is an Advocate of the Supreme Court of Pakistan and lectures in constitutional law. He has previously also lectured on international law and international economic law, and has consulted on various aspects of Pakistan’s reporting obligations under international human rights treaties.
