Hardly does Pakistan come out of one crisis when another crisis pounces upon it. Before the economic crisis is over, the combat crisis with the Tehrik Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is looming large on the national horizon.
The basic problem with Pakistan’s economy is constant: more expenditure and less earning. Overspending is customary now. Pakistan fell into the habit of extravagance with the assistance of foreign aid, which has now almost dried out. Currently, Pakistan is looking for a new donor instead of weaning off its deleterious habit of overspending.
The bug starts from the Army, which wants to spend more and more on its hardware and manpower to sustain its presence. The Army puts a constant pressure on civilian governments to raise the defence budget. The previous government, which was of the Pakistan Tehrik Insaf (PTI), put a halt to increasing defence expenditure. The PTI enjoyed the privilege of being on the same page as the Army till February 2021. However, the incumbent government of the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM) lifted the bar in June last year and resorted to increasing the defence budget for the financial year 2022-2023. The way Pakistan’s former Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Gen Qamar Javed Bajwa retired from the Army as a billionaire speaks volumes for the lucrative rewards the Army bestows upon its servicemen.
The reward aspect has made other institutions conscious of and desirous for the same. The judiciary, especially the higher judiciary, has been trying to follow the reward system. The success of the lawyers’ movement in 2009 to restore the deposed judges offered the judiciary the needed strength to claim more finances from the national share than before. High salaries and associated perks have made the judiciary an attractive financial hub. Like the Army, the judiciary demands more and is not ready to drop its expenditures.
Both these institutions seek refuge in the constitution by declaring themselves sacred cows, the status which has inflicted deep afflictions upon Pakistan’s political polity. Further, both have joined hands to protect the interests of each other. Whereas one has become the defender of the ideological boundaries of Pakistan, the other has become the custodian of the Constitution. The Parliament is out of the equation. It is just an outsider now at the mercy of the duo.
The tragedy is that politicians are constrained not to disobey them, and the disability of politicians renders them disinclined to adopt austerity measures for themselves. Currently, the number of members of the Federal Cabinet has reached 74. The national exchequer has to pay their expenses comprising salaries and associated perquisites.
In the ongoing season of winter, there are dim chances of any flare-up in the activities of the TTP. Nevertheless, Pakistan needs to understand that the receptivity for the TTP has increased manifold in the western half because Pakistan kept the Pashtun youth annoyed. The annoyance has also strengthened the will of the Baloch dissidents (or separatists). It is not the left-over US weapons that can be turned on Pakistan; it is the lingering stifled hatred that is aiming at Pakistan.
Seeing the trend coupled with possibilities for financial sufficiency, the bureaucracy raises its bet. Expenditures outclass work. Bureaucrats also follow the same trend of expensive lifestyle and post-retirement benefits. In 2010, the Eighteenth Constitutional Amendment abolished the concurrent list and devolved several powers to provinces (to materialize the concept of provincial autonomy). Even after a decade, the bureaucracy refuses to shift its fulcrum from the Federal Capital to provincial capitals. In principle, provincial ministries should be upgraded to serve the provinces, but the bureaucracy tends to get concentrated in Islamabad. The Federal Capital is now being developed to match a province.
Though all the aforementioned circles pay tax, deducted from the source (the salary), they can maintain a comfortable life, compared to the masses, who have to pay taxes and afford the bills of health and daily expenditures. Besides, the masses live in perpetual uncertainty for being at the receiving end of the decisions taken by the powerful four: the Army, judiciary, Parliament, and bureaucracy. Presently, there is a wedge of dissociation between the rulers (the quartet), and the ruled (the masses). Divorced from each other, both ends are on their own way to survive. This is one of the reasons the masses are reluctant to pay taxes.
For the past many years, a kind of struggle for survival has been going on between the Finance Ministry and the masses. The ministry makes an effort to raise taxes while the masses devise methods to evade the taxes. One is pitted against the other. The point is simple: impressed by the quartet, the masses are not ready to adopt austerity measures. They protest against reduction in the supply of gas, oil and electricity. Instead of expressing solidarity with the country, the masses tend to express disconnect. They consider it justifiable because they have to eke out their resources without much assistance from the government.
The disconnect is spotted by militant organizations such as the TTP, which selects its target one from amongst the ruling quartet, instead of the masses. That is, the TTP is in direct conflict with the State of Pakistan, and not with the masses. This aspect makes the masses less concerned about the stance and action of the TTP. The recent protests in Swat and Wana (South Waziristan) against the rising local tide of the TTP are less against the TTP and more against the prospects for another impending internal migration, as happened in the past. That is, the locals want to sensitize the government of the TTP so that the government finds out its targets precisely instead of penalizing the whole population in the name of purging the community from the TTP. The locals are not ready now to get dislocated.
Precisely, the TTP is the headache of the government (or the quartet), and not of the masses. In the ongoing season of winter, there are dim chances of any flare-up in the activities of the TTP. Nevertheless, Pakistan needs to understand that the receptivity for the TTP has increased manifold in the western half because Pakistan kept the Pashtun youth annoyed. The annoyance has also strengthened the will of the Baloch dissidents (or separatists). It is not the left-over US weapons that can be turned on Pakistan; it is the lingering stifled hatred that is aiming at Pakistan.
It is yet to be seen how the incumbent government of the PDM deals with the crises, which are rearing their heads disturbingly one after another.
