By any historical measure, great powers rarely announce their ambitions with fireworks. They prefer white papers, strategic roadmaps, and bureaucratic understatement. China’s latest policy paper on Latin America and the Caribbean, released quietly in late 2025, belongs squarely in that tradition. Yet to treat it as routine diplomacy would be a serious misreading of the moment.
This is Beijing’s first major update on the region since 2016. In the years between, the world has hardened. The US-China rivalry has moved from abstraction to structure. Sanctions have replaced persuasion. Financial systems have become instruments of power. In that context, China’s Latin America strategy is not a provocation— it is a declaration of intent.
The thing that really stands out about this document is how it talks about identity. Beijing always says that Latin America and the Caribbean are an important part of the “Global South”. This is not a way to describe these places, it is a way to say they are part of a group. It means they have all been treated unfairly by countries and they all want to change this. Beijing thinks Latin America and the Caribbean are key to the “Global South”. That is a big deal. The “Global South” is not a term: it is a group of countries that want to make things more fair.
History has a lot to teach us. Look at what happened during the Cold War. The USSR wanted to be in charge of a lot of countries that were not yet developed. They did this by saying they were a choice rather than the Western countries. China is doing something but in a quieter way. They do not use language that is meant to stir up changes. They also do not test people to see if they believe in ideas. China talks about being in control of your country, not interfering in other countries and having a balance of power, around the world.
Phrases such as “a community with a shared future” and opposition to “unilateral bullying” are not accidental. They resonate with governments that have grown wary of conditional aid, fluctuating Western attention spans, and moral lectures that rarely survive strategic inconvenience. China is not promising leadership. It is offering alignment without subordination.
At the political level, China is explicit about its expectations. Recognition of the “One China” principle remains foundational. Taiwan is treated not as a negotiable issue but as a test of seriousness. In return, Beijing pledges reciprocal support on sovereignty and territorial integrity— a currency many states value in an increasingly interventionist world.
Washington openly engages Taiwan while insisting Beijing respect US sensitivities in the Western Hemisphere. From China’s perspective, the symmetry is obvious. Great powers test boundaries where they can. China’s Latin America policy paper reflects a world that is already multipolar, not one that might become so. Washington can respond with anger— or with strategy. History tends to reward the latter.
What sets China apart is the scope of its political engagement. Beijing is no longer content with executive-level diplomacy. It seeks ties with legislatures, political parties, and state institutions across the ideological spectrum. Left or right, populist or technocratic— it makes little difference. What matters is continuity.
This is a sharp contrast to the Western habit of organizing partnerships around shared values and common adversaries. That model has strengths, but it also limits reach. China’s indifference to ideology allows it to build influence incrementally and persistently, even as governments change.
Infrastructure remains central to China’s strategy. Projects such as Peru’s $3.5 billion Chancay port or rail links across South America are tangible and visible. But the more consequential shift lies in finance.
Beijing is openly encouraging reduced reliance on the dollar in regional trade. Currency swap agreements, local-currency settlements, and deeper cooperation among central banks are no longer peripheral ideas. They are policy objectives.
In Washington, this is often interpreted as an attack on the dollar’s primacy. That framing misses the point. De-dollarization is not ideological rebellion; it is strategic insurance. Once the USA demonstrated its willingness to weaponize access to the dollar-based financial system, other states began exploring alternatives. Latin American governments, even those aligned with Washington, have taken note.
Coupled with expanding Chinese credit lines— such as the $9.2 billion facility announced in 2025— and the growing presence of Chinese financial institutions, a parallel ecosystem is emerging. It is not yet dominant. But it is credible. And credibility, in international finance, changes behaviour.
China’s strategy has a sensitive part and that is security cooperation. China wants to work with countries on security issues. China is proposing that countries do military exchanges, have training programmes and work together under what China calls the Global Security Initiative. China is being very careful to make sure this does not seem like a threat to countries. The focus is on things like helping each other in disasters, giving assistance in stopping terrorism and keeping the peace. China’s security cooperation is about working on these kinds of issues.
China is changing the way it looks at things. It does not just think of itself as a country that does business with countries. China is trying to become a country that helps keep people safe in a region where the USA has a lot of influence. China is doing this slowly and carefully. The USA has always thought of this region as its area to take care of. Now China wants to be a part of it too. China wants to be a security actor in this region.
The USA still carries historical sensitivities rooted in the Monroe Doctrine. Though obsolete as policy, its logic endures. Chinese control over ports, lithium, energy grids, and digital infrastructure alarms Washington, where competition makes such leverage consequential for US interests.
Resource access sharpens the picture. China’s investments in lithium across Bolivia, Argentina, and Chile intersect directly with US efforts to secure supply chains for batteries, defence systems, and clean energy technologies. Agricultural trade tells a similar story, as Brazilian and Argentine exports increasingly displace US farmers in the Chinese market.
Latin America, however, is not a passive arena. Governments in the region face pressing development needs and limited financing options. The Chinese capital is often welcomed not because it is Chinese, but because it is available.
Panama’s withdrawal from the Belt and Road Initiative in early 2025 under US pressure illustrates the dilemma. Strategic alignment with Washington can carry immediate economic costs. Chinese engagement, by contrast, often arrives with fewer visible conditions— though not without long-term consequences.
The real risk for the USA is not that China will “take over” Latin America. That fear is exaggerated. The greater danger is strategic complacency— the assumption that influence persists by default. History suggests otherwise. Power erodes when engagement fades.
There is a final irony worth noting. Washington openly engages Taiwan while insisting Beijing respect US sensitivities in the Western Hemisphere. From China’s perspective, the symmetry is obvious. Great powers test boundaries where they can.
China’s Latin America policy paper reflects a world that is already multipolar, not one that might become so. Washington can respond with anger— or with strategy. History tends to reward the latter.
