It was a cloudy day in August 2003 at Ambala when George Fernandes, the Indian defence minister at the time, wearing a G-suit, took a ride in a MiG-21. The purpose of the ride was to calm the growing criticism and public anger towards the government of Atal Bihari Vajpayee, stemming from a series of crashes of the MiG-21, a fighter jet that earned monikers like “flying coffin,” and “widow maker,” claiming the lives of scores of young Indian pilots. Fast forward to 2025, and the Indian Air Force has finally decided to retire the last two MiG-21 squadrons by September 2025. However, this long-overdue retirement threatens to create a critical void in the IAF’s already struggling combat fleet by pushing its squadron strength to a dangerously low level.
The IAF inducted the MiG-21 for the first time in 1963. Over the course of years, it has operated around 700 MiG-21s, including its several variants such as the Type-77,. Type-96, BIS, and the upgraded Bison models. However, since its inception, the aircraft has been mired in controversies due to its high rate of accidents and resulting fatalities.. For instance, according to one estimate, since its induction, India has lost over 400 MiG-21 jets in crashes, which claimed the lives of over 100 pilots and some civilians.
Despite these mishaps, the IAF continued with MiG-21 in the absence of its replacement and remained one of the few major operators of this outdated aircraft, around the world till recently. The fighter’s troubled service record was further tarnished during the February 2019 standoff between Pakistan and India, in which a MiG-21, flown by Wing Commander Abhinandan, was shot down by the PAF. This high-profile combat loss, coupled with the persistent and alarming rate of crashes, as noted above, created pressure on the IAF to retire the aircraft. The IAF began retiring MiG-21s from 2017 onwards, with the original completion date set for 2022. Between 2017 and 2024, the IAF has retired at least four squadrons of MIG-21. The last two squadrons, No. 3 Squadron (Cobras) and No. 23 Squadron (Panthers), are set to retire on 19 September 2025.
The sunset moment of MiG-21s would leave the IAF in a vulnerable position. It would lower the IAF squadron strength to a historically low figure of 29 units, which is significantly lower than the sanctioned 42.5 squadrons. The gravity of this vulnerability is further compounded by the significant uncertainties surrounding the intended replacement of the two concerned squadrons of MiG-21. According to the IAF, the squadrons would be replaced with indigenously produced HAL Tejas Mk-1A. Ironically, just like the MiG-21, the Tejas MK-1A is also embroiled in controversies, though for a different reason: the persistent delays.
The first batch of Tejas Mk-1A was initially scheduled for delivery by March 2024; however, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) failed to meet the timelines. The revised schedule now indicates that initial deliveries may not commence until mid-2026, and the timeline for inducting the full fleet could potentially extend beyond 2029. Nonetheless, the reliability of even these revised timelines is questionable, particularly in light of critical supply chain dependencies.
A crucial bottleneck in the Tejas Mk-1A programme is the supply of the US-made General Electric F404 engine, which has witnessed consistent delays in recent years. According to reports, only two of these engines have been delivered so far. Moreover, the pace of future deliveries is unlikely to accelerate and may face further impediments, especially given the recent deterioration in Indo-US relations.
However, what makes this crisis more dangerous for India is the fact that it is coinciding with the rapid modernisation of air power by India’s primary competitors in the region, namely: China and Pakistan. The People’s Liberation Army Air Force already possesses a significant numerical superiority over India with over 2100 combat aircraft in its inventory. Beyond this, China also holds a crucial qualitative edge, as it operates advanced machines such as the fifth-generation J-20 Mighty Dragon and the J-35 Gyrfalcon. Furthermore, it has made significant inroads into developing a sixth-generation fighter jet and has already flown two prototypes of the aircraft. The PAF, on its part, is also rapidly modernising through the smart and timely induction of advanced platforms. The chief among them is the planned acquisition of the J-35 Gyrfalcon, which will provide it with a fifth-generation stealth fighter capability
The IAF finds itself in a vulnerable position following the retirement of its MiG-21 fleet. Considering the importance of air power in contemporary warfare, the IAF is in a strategic void. Recsent conflicts such as the Israel–Iran War, Israel’s engagements with Lebanon and Gaza, the Russia-Ukraine war, and the Pakistan-India stand-off, underscore a fundamental reality in contemporary warfare: control of the skies is an indispensable prerequisite for successful military operations.
In light of the above discussion, it can be argued that the IAF finds itself in a vulnerable position following the retirement of its MiG-21 fleet. Considering the importance of air power in contemporary warfare, the IAF is in a strategic void. Recsent conflicts such as the Israel–Iran War, Israel’s engagements with Lebanon and Gaza, the Russia-Ukraine war, and the Pakistan-India stand-off, underscore a fundamental reality in contemporary warfare: control of the skies is an indispensable prerequisite for successful military operations. This goal cannot be achieved without a sufficient and technologically advanced aircraft fleet— something the IAF currently lacks.
In sum, the sun is finally setting on the MiG-21, but without a swift and decisive course correction, it could potentially mark the dawn of a new era of vulnerability for the IAF in the region.
