The Pakistan-India relationship has long been one of the most volatile and enduring rivalries in international politics, marked by recurring military tensions, historical animosity, and deeply entrenched security concerns.
One of the most useful frameworks to analyse this relationship is Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver’s Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT), which posits that security is primarily regional, and that states within a specific geographical area tend to form a ‘security complex’ in which their security concerns are so interlinked that they cannot be resolved independently of each other.
The Pakistan-India conflict is a textbook example of a regional security complex, with the two neighbouring countries locked in a historical pattern of mutual threat perception, historical antagonism, and strategic competition.
At the core of RSCT lies the idea that geographical proximity matters. States that are close to one another tend to affect each other’s security more directly than those far away. Seen through the RSCT lens, the long-standing Kashmir issue exemplifies how security concerns within a region can, and do, become self-reinforcing and persistent over decades.
The mutual threat perceptions are deeply institutionalised in both states’ military doctrines and political rhetoric, making it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to break the cycle of hostility.
Yet another dimension of RSCT is the influence of external powers. While the theory primarily focusses on regional dynamics, it also recognises the role of global powers in shaping regional security complexes.
In our case, external actors, such as the United States, China and Russia, have played significant roles. These external influences often end up exacerbating rather than mitigating regional tensions by providing diplomatic backing, arms and ammunition as well as strategic cover that only reinforces the security dilemma.
The nuclearisation of the Pakistan-India conflict further deepens the complexity of this security complex. RSCT explains how regional security dynamics persist even under the shadow of nuclear deter-rence. Instead of stabilising the region, the presence of nuclear weapons has led to the proliferation of low-intensity conflicts and border skirmishes.
These engagements are often seen as attempts to test the thresholds of nuclear deterrence, but without triggering a full-scale war. RSCT explains how nuclear weapons fail to eliminate regional security competition. In fact, they merely alter its form.
RSCT also provides insight into why peace efforts between Pakistan and India have repeatedly failed. Any unilateral move towards de-escalation is viewed with suspicion. Trust is minimal, and domestic political considerations often override rational strategic calculations. The situation is made even worse often by the presence of non-state actors.
RSCT suggests that for a sustainable resolution, the two countries have no option but to promote direct, bilateral diplomacy with the aim of transforming the entire regional security architec-ture that currently sustains the conflict.
UROOSA MEHBOOB
KARACHI
