AT PENPOINT
While the recent by-election results have been good enough for PTI chief Imran Khan to feel that he is still in the game, they have not been outstanding enough for him to avoid launching a Long March-cum-sit-in on Islamabad.
The Long March is not something that Imran wants to launch. He has not got an adequate response to the various protests he has announced, and the crowds have been relatively sparse, indicating that party supporters might be willing to turn out for a show of strength, they are not willing to turn out for city-level protests.
One of the major handicaps that Imran has to overcome is the memory of the May 25 Long March, which was, not to put too fine a word on it, a failure. Though there was much high drama, and though the PTI workers and police clashed all day long, it was called off because not enough people had turned up.
The model Imran is following is the 2014 Dharna. Three major factors behind that Dharna are missing: the finances then were in place, for the feeding and staying of the protesters, and the assistance of certain institutions, and the presence of a hard core of PAT workers, who actually proved the basis of the Dharna.
Imran hopes to substitute at least the first by control of two provincial governments, but the indications are that the funds are not forthcoming. Iman may have sympathizers in the institutions, but they are unable to put the resources of the institutions at the disposal of the PTI as they allegedly did in 2014. Neither of the provincial governments is able to provide the sort of dedicated cadres PAT did.
Apart from resources, the success of the Long March will depend on people from outside Islamabad being put on road transport. The KP government can be relied on for this, and the Punjab government can be expected to refrain from the kind of arrests and anti-March activity by the police. Will that be enough? That depends on what view of May 25 one takes. The PTI believes it was subjected to a massive crackdown in Punjab that prevented vast crowds reaching Islamabad; opponents feel that the breakdown of law and order throughout the province was avoided.
Another big difference between the 2014 Dharna and this Long March is the much sharper focus of the earlier one, which is probably leading to the delay. In 2014, the aim was to introduce Imran Khan, to allow him to communicate his message, and to build the trust of the electorate in him to the point where it would vote him to power. Oh yes, the dharna demanded fresh elections. In that respect, it failed. This time around a fresh election is basically the only demand.
At that time, the demand was unreasonable because it basically asked for a replay of the 2013 election. Now, it is more reasonable, but while it is now more reasonable because it is premature by less than a year, its urgency has apparently increased. If the polls are held immediately, there is just enough time for the new government to appoint the next COAS. There was no such incentive in 2013.
The problem with the Long March is that it is meant as a bargaining chip, and because of that, no one really has the last word in deciding its timing. The goalposts are in the custody of Imran Khan, but what constitutes a goal, will be decided elsewhere. That is probably why Imran is dithering. After all, after this, he has no more cards in his hand.
Imran has accepted this as his motive by saying that the thieves and dacoits of the PDM should not appoint the COAS. He got into hot water because of the implication that there were three-star officers available who would ignore corruption in exchange for promotion, because he or they are not patriotic enough and lacked sufficient spine. If indeed such an officer is available, then the question would arise of how such a person rose to a rank where he would be eligible to be appointed COAS. Imran, by the way, has not pressed this point, which would require the putting forward a plan of reform for military education and promotions.
However, it seems central to Imran’s political plans that he should be able to select the new COAS. It is widely assumed that he has a particular individual in mind. However, by assuming that that individual would be loyal to him would be to ignore basic human psychology. An individual who has spent his entire adult life in a particular institution, one which has given him respect and self-worth, cannot be expected to prefer any other institution, if there is a conflict between the two. Imran’s assumptions about the malleability of senior officers is thus unfounded.
It should also be noted that he does not want to make the appointment because he has any plans for the Army. The sole purpose is because he wants to use the Army in an accountability role, and so that the right sort of officer becomes the DGISI, and perhaps the DGMI. It should not be forgotten that Imran did not want the previous DGISI changed, not because of the Afghan situation, but because he had got some inkling of the no-confidence motion that was coming against him.
However, that does not stop him having an influence on politics, and making politics follow that skewed logic. The by-election results, if they had been decisive enough, would have allowed them to substitute for a Long March, but now all they have done is made a Long March likelier. One advantage is that Imran does not need to make an overwhelming show of force, merely one that is better than that of May 25.
At the same time, one of the factors said to be holding him back is the threat of the release of scandalous videos. Imran himself has accused his opponents of using ‘deep fake’ technology to make such videos. The spate of audio leaks have been accompanied by the leaker posting descriptions of those videos.
The videos have been spoken about for some time, but they have not been made public. That some sort of videos exist seems more than likely. Whether real or fake, they are likely to be damaging. Fear of them being so clearly genuine and so explicit that they turn off PTI supporters may be a good explanation why Imran refuses to name a date for the Long March.
That the Long March should be avoided is something the PTI tacitly admits. However, is it something to be avoided no matter what the cost, or is it something to be carried out when no other options remain? The Long March is meant to deliver fresh elections and the appointment of the next COAS by a new government. Anyone acting to stop the Long March would do so only if concerned about the Parliament running to full term.
Though the Constitution allows for a premature dissolution of Parliament, and though a tradition developed in the UK of sitting governments choosing the date for dissolution, it seems that the military would prefer a more stable system, where Parliaments run to their full term. It might be remembered that no Prime Minister since 1985 has gone much beyond three years. The original provision of the Eighth Amendment allowed the President not just to dissolve the National Assembly, but to sack only the government. That was unacceptable even to the tame partyless National Assembly elected in 1988.
Who not only wants Parliament to run full-term, and thus does not want any Long March, but possesses audios and videos which are being used to blackmail Imran? It is perhaps only the institution which he wants to bend to his will.
The problem with the Long March is that it is meant as a bargaining chip, and because of that, no one really has the last word in deciding its timing. The goalposts are in the custody of Imran Khan, but what constitutes a goal, will be decided elsewhere. That is probably why Imran is dithering. After all, after this, he has no more cards in his hand.
