Peace under duress

As the funeral procession in Iran ends, renewed US-led CENTCOM escalation targets the Mashhad-Tehran rail line. The article examines how “deal under pressure” threatens JCPOA talks.

Naqi Akbar

July 11, 2026

8 min read
Peace under duress

Peace makers wonder what went wrong 

 As the funeral of the slain supreme leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran trailed towards its last destination, the holy city of Masghad; many parts of the country were hit by renewed escalation from the CENTCOM as the US President was reported departing the NATO summit on his older version of the ‘Air Force 1’ as against the one presented by the Qatari royal family; signalling that the conflict has finally scaled the escalation ladder; somewhat despite the willingness not to do that.

As reports stream in, the railway track between the holy city of Mashad in the Khorasan province to the capital city Tehran has been hit by the USAF, and it has been suspended for any traffic to and fro. The selection of the target itself speaks of the body language of the Trump Administration, which seems to be gradually getting out of the aura of a deal being finalized between the USA and Iran; that too on the US terms. The rule of ‘deal under pressure’; seems to have returned with a vengeance with the selection of targets showing signs of deliberate snub to the other party. 

Sensing that the deal was going to collapse soon, the Pakistani political leadership rushed in a frantic show of helplessness to save what could have been the only diplomatic trophy they worked on very hard, making somewhat divergent political trends and ideologies sit on one table and hammer out details for a peaceful coexistence. It has been an uphill task, which seems to be going down the drain as the US leadership gets restless on the single count that four months forward, the Trump Administration is going to have the first taste of what the electorate thinks of it; any impression that the war effort, which must have already caused a ‘budgetary deficit’ was not worth must be on Trump’s head. The escalation,wfich  looks like a frantic effort to get to in practical terms, as what has been reported in the press as Trump’s frequent slips of tongue, where he just stops short of saying that the system in place in Iran needs to be packed up with one final push.

Now it seems that the street pressure built up during the last one week of public participation can be an asset in the hands of the opponents of the new JCPOA under the incumbent reformist administration. The parliament. already wary of its own speaker joining the reformist camp. and the street power can be the two nodes which can help the IRGC, the elusive leadership and the radicals to make a comeback, not through any extraconstitutional path, but with the mechanics of the system in place. The coming days might not see as much fireworks between the USA and Iran; as within Iran; over what path the theocratic state takes way forward; for the peacemakers for now; ‘it was a tea well served’

Leaving the grievances of the peacemakers aside, the ground situation is exactly what was the trajectory of the events; the role of the major players and the real intent of each one of the players in the field. The Americans under an overwhelming shadow of Israeli influence have been trained and taught not to allow the existence of the Iranian nuclear programme. 

The reformists never having had the courage to say that, have quietly agreed to that stance, though through the decades have been mumbling, whether the audience has been the supreme leader on one side and the Americans on the other side of the fence. The result of that mumbling has been the two strikes which took place on 13 June 2025 and again on February 28, which resulted ‘carefully’ in the destruction of the key ‘regime targets’.

In June the IRGC was specifically targeted and its upper tiers of leadership as well as the technical elite were done away with.  The target scheme clearly indicated that the operation was a regime change one, with hardcore of the regime likely to be slaughtered while the mainstream army and air force were generally left intact.  Here it is important to note that Trump has been outrageously frank in his discourse that there are two sets of the Iranian leadership, one whom he can talk to, the other which he calls ‘unreasonable’. His admission in a way also confirms that the Iranian corridors of power too are a divided house, for all practical purposes.

The February 2026 strikes, then, had the Supreme Leader targeted in the opening salvo followed by strikes which both targeted the top leadership, minus the reformist president, speaker of the Majlis as well as the reformist politicians. To what extent the CENTCOM and IDF were talking to the Iranians asking for submission can be gauged from the last tweet by the national security adviser Ali Larijani, who quoted Imam Husain as saying ‘death with honour was better than a dishonourable existence with the oppressors’; suggesting strongly that the various regime figures were being approached for surrender in one way or another.

A few days later, the house where he was staying was tracked with the help of IDF moles on the ground and he was killed in a massive air strike. The coordination between the moles and the aggressing party can be gauged from the fact that a local assassination squad was not employed; rather, the air force from the USA or IDF was engaged to do the needful.

The basic point not to be missed was that the current surviving Iranian political cream was not agreeing with resisting pressure from USA as advocated by the slain supreme leader, rather they wanted to talk to the USA, even if it meant quick results. The politicians were clever to carry on the theatrics like most of the passengers in the flight to Islamabad contained the school bags recovered from the Minab massacre by the CENTCOM forces. However, they were not ready to frame queries about the targeted assassinations of the government figures by the combined US and IDF onslaught. 

The reporting of the on ground political situation in Iran might look misleading; however, what has been observed is that the society seems to be divided along the pro- and anti-negotiation lines. The government-allied politicians are taking swipes as what were the statements of the late Supreme Leader about talks with the USA and these politicians are arguing ‘the leader was enough, what was the use of parliament and cabinet’, meant and they spilled the beans that the reformists were not happy with the slain leader and did not entirely mind when he was dead. 

That simmering impression has been the buzzword of the opponents of negotiations with the Americans. A civilization or culture embedded in traditions of Hafez, Saadi, Rumi and Shams Tabraiz, avoiding abuse and displaying displeasure poetically, they have employed the hardest word ‘Khayn’ or the dishonest or ‘ watan farosh’, the seller of the homeland, not degenerating to a volley of abuse which is the part and parcel of the south Asian political discourse. 

However, the evolving gestation period of 30 to 60 days for the maturity of the deal seems to be fast slipping away. The IRGC for all practical purposes has not escalated, in fact restrained itself to the tit-for-tat strikes. Rather the onslaught has been generally directed towards the regional allies of CENTCOM and the bases in the Gulf. The escalatory rounds are minimized in principle by the already compliant reformist administration as well as the IRGC. However, the game plan is taling shape where even the supporters of the dialogue with the USA have no other option but to join the street.

The reason for joining the street is not the change of heart, rather it is a political adjustment suggesting that they are adjusting to the street sentiment as the emotions and the tensions run high. The real test for the reformist administration practically starts now. With the indefinite mourning period almost over with the burial of the supreme leader's mortal remains in the holy shrine in Mashad, the real business and real politics starts now.

Uptil now there has been a semblance of unity, despite the fact that there have been many instances of mismatch between the IRGC and the reform camp; like the one-sided apology of the President in the opening hours of IRGC retaliation to the regional players or the near surrender on Lebanon by the reformists, which was averted, but sense prevailed under the stress of ongoing war.

Now it seems that the street pressure built up during the last one week of public participation can be an asset in the hands of the opponents of the new JCPOA under the incumbent reformist administration. The parliament. already wary of its own speaker joining the reformist camp. and the street power can be the two nodes which can help the IRGC, the elusive leadership and the radicals to make a comeback, not through any extraconstitutional path, but with the mechanics of the system in place. The coming days might not see as much fireworks between the USA and Iran; as within Iran; over what path the theocratic state takes way forward; for the peacemakers for now; ‘it was a tea well served’.

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Naqi Akbar

The writer is a freelance columnist

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