AJIT Doval, India’s powerful national security adviser and one of the most influential figures in shaping New Delhi’s strategic thinking, recently remarked that the recent political upheavals in Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka had their roots in fragile administrative structures and weak political institutions.
At first glance, his statement might seem like a detached geopolitical analysis of a seasoned intelligence officer commenting on the fragility of his neighbourhood. However, if India truly applies that same lens of analysis to itself, Doval’s comment transforms from an observation into a subtle act of self-critique because in South Asia’s complex political ecosystem, no country operates in isolation. Each nation’s internal stability or instability is shaped, at least to some extent, by its neighbours’ policies, alliances and ambitions.
South Asia remains one of the most politically volatile regions in the world, with people often perceiving the state not as a protector, but as a distant power structure aligned with the political elite. Having said that, governance failure in South Asia cannot be explained solely through internal shortcomings. The region’s interdependence has a lot to do with this. India, by virtue of its size and influence, often plays a decisive role in shaping the political environment around it.
India’s role is uniquely consequential because it aspires to lead South Asia as the largest democracy and the most influential economic power. But leadership entails moral responsibility. When India selectively champions democracy abroad while accommodating authoritarian tendencies among friendly regimes, it sends, at best, mixed signals.
If India is genuinely seeking to be the ‘protector’ of peace and stability in South Asia, its foreign policy must evolve beyond transactional pragmatism. True stability cannot be built on suppression or political monopolisation. It arises from participatory governance, transparency and respect for its neighbours.
India’s diplomacy needs a shift from influence-based engagement to principle-based partnership. Supporting a government simply because it aligns with short-term strategic goals may yield temporary benefits, but it undermines India’s soft power and moral authority. On the other hand, supporting democratic processes even when outcomes seem uncertain strengthens India’s image as a trustworthy and ethical regional power.
Bangladesh’s experience carries an essential lesson: no government can indefinitely survive on external validation once it loses the trust of its people. External support, instead of stabilising such a government, often deepens its alienation from the people. When political change finally comes, the supporting power faces diplomatic embarrassment and reputational damage.
As far as India is concerned, this is a moment for self-reflection. Does New Delhi wish to be a true champion of democratic ideals in the region, or merely a beneficiary of power-centric politics? Doval was right when he said that weak governance leads to the fall of governments. But in South Asia, the story does not end there. The weakness of governance is often nurtured not just by internal actors, but also by those external powers that find short-term comfort in maintaining the status quo. New Delhi would do well to remember that in the volatile geography of South Asia, a neighbour’s turmoil is never a distant fire.
SHAHIDUL ALAM SWAPAN
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND
