The incidents of armed militants appearing in towns across Balochistan, whether around Khuzdar, somewhere in Kalat, or more recently in Mastung or Surab, are becoming increasingly frequent. Small groups of militants emerge, block roads, check vehicles, burn government installations, and, in a newer trend, loot banks and seize weapons from police or Levies stations before disappearing. In most cases, the law enforcement agencies (LEAs) on the ground surrender without resistance, and the forces dispatched to clear the area often arrive too late, resembling scenes from 1990s Bollywood films where the police never arrive on time.
Amid this new trend, a religious extremist group, the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Khorasan (IS-K), an offshoot of the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant/Syria (ISIL/ISIS), has threatened to target nationalist movements, whether peaceful or violent, as their version of Islam considers nationalism to be un-Islamic. However, it is quite evident that their decision stems from a recent violent clash with one of the Baloch separatist groups. As usual, Islam has become collateral damage in the pursuit of IS-K’s motives.
Is this the new normal for the people of Balochistan, for residents of towns like Surab, Khuzdar, Mastung, Kachhi, and Kalat, to live in constant fear of armed militants appearing at any time? Will the banks in these areas, their staff, and the money deposited in them, continue to remain unsafe? Is it good news or bad that IS-K has added groups like the Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC) and the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM), both nationalistic in nature, as well as violent separatist groups like the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) to its target list? Above all, where do we go from here? Each of these questions deserves a full-length research paper, and collectively, they could fill an entire volume. However, this brief piece aims to offer a surface-level understanding of these questions and explore the answers that best align with logic.
The answer to the first question is yes, this does appear to be the new normal in Balochistan. The distance between Mastung and Quetta is only about 50 kilometers, roughly an hour’s drive. If both Baloch separatists and IS-K have been frequently involved in terrorist activities in Mastung, it is quite evident that Quetta could be targeted at any time. In fact, there have been two recent incidents in Quetta, in which nearly a dozen people were injured and two lost their lives on the spot.
Therefore, it appears to be a matter of chance as to when either of these groups might strike anywhere in Balochistan, including the provincial capital, Quetta. Their presence can be expected at any time, particularly the separatists. However, IS-K is even more ferocious in nature, often targeting large crowds, even in places of worship such as mosques and churches.
The answer to the second question also appears to be yes, for now, since looting banks has become a new strategy adopted by a separatist group, BLA. The irony lies in the fact that the bank robbery in Surab was celebrated, as shown in a video clip where, after armed men successfully broke into the bank, bystanders were seen cheering them on. This is deeply concerning, as it suggests that some locals may have started viewing these militants as celebrities, whether out of admiration, desperation, or hatred toward others.
While the bank staff have remained unharmed during these lootings, the money kept in these banks is understandably no longer safe. The security systems in place are insufficient to prevent such robberies, and the inability of the security forces on the ground to respond effectively only creates a more favorable environment for these groups to operate.
To prevent further descent into chaos, it is imperative for the state to reassert its authority and include the people of Balochistan as genuine stakeholders in their own future. The road ahead is undeniably complex, but decisive, inclusive, and rights-based action is the only way to reverse this trajectory.
The answer to the third question is neither clearly good nor entirely bad— it appears to contain elements of both. On one hand, the clash between the separatists and IS-K may keep them engaged in conflict with each other, potentially weakening both groups. It is likely that they will expose each other’s operational information, which could help prevent future attacks. Their rivalry is expected to intensify with each confrontation, potentially transforming them into fierce adversaries. There is even a possibility that IS-K may begin targeting separatist hideouts in Afghanistan, while the separatists may try to outmaneuver IS-K in areas of Balochistan where they maintain stronger influence and are in greater command. Nonetheless, the chances for reconciliation between the two are viable.
However, these benefits for the state come packaged with certain unavoidable drawbacks. IS-K is a ferocious group that does not differentiate between combatants and civilians, armed or unarmed, children or women, and will seek to attack or damage any nationalist movement that poses a threat to its version of Islam or is un-Islamic for it. Such attacks can cause widespread damage and loss of life, especially since the followers of BYC and PTM are numerous in the province and their freedom to assemble can be curtailed overnight.
The answer to the last question is that Balochistan becomes more complex from here on. The growing challenge to the writ of the state in much of Balochistan, the increasing insecurity of the savings and investments of its citizens, and the deadly clash between two armed militant groups all lead Balochistan toward a seemingly fatal outcome, at least apparently.
In sum, Balochistan today stands at a critical juncture, where the convergence of violent separatism, religious extremism, and institutional fragility has created a perilous environment for its people. The normalization of militant presence, the glorification of unlawful acts, and the inability of LEAs to respond effectively reflect a broader collapse of governance and public trust. While the clash between IS-K and Baloch separatist groups may offer short-term tactical advantages to the state, the long-term consequences of unchecked violence, civilian vulnerability, and ideological polarization are far more alarming.
To prevent further descent into chaos, it is imperative for the state to reassert its authority and include the people of Balochistan as genuine stakeholders in their own future. The road ahead is undeniably complex, but decisive, inclusive, and rights-based action is the only way to reverse this trajectory.
