Did the Reformists negotiate dismantling of resistance?

Trajectory of events suggests gradual deconstruction

Iranians have accorded a farewell to the Supreme Leader who steered the direction of the theocratic state for almost 37 years, as the word goes, especially among the reformist camp in the Iranian political scene; who felt that many of their plans for the post-1979 Iran were frustrated by none else, but the Supreme Leader.

The mass of Iranians, we might see weeping profusely along the path of the state funeral, first in Tehran, then, Qom and after Iraq finally in the Holy city of Mashad, are the ones, whose hearts and minds resonated with the era of the man, who started as a student cleric with failing eyesight helped by high-number glasses, who was later a student with another senior cleric, Ayatollah Khomeini, an experience which was the turning point of his life.

Amir Taheri, a veteran Iranian journalist in his book The Spirit of God listed Khamenei and Rafsanjani as the ones added by Mortaza Mothari, the Khomeini confidante during a meeting organized to ponder the 1978 agitation against the Shah. That addition in a post-Maghrib meeting was another turning point which put the young Khamenei on the path, which culminated in a violent end at the hands of the literal rain of Tomahawk missiles on his residence. 

The current dismantling of the resistance coupled with sketchy information on the ongoing negotiations, lack of transparency in reporting as well as in debating; ironically when the Iranian constitution under article 76 allows the parliament to investigate any such MoU, or has the power to accept for adoption or reject it as per the article 77, or allowing the members of parliament to air their views in accordance, all point to a sort of coup which the slain leader termed as the Pahlavi protest; though the grand finale was overseen by the reformista. It will be a miracle if the vanguard is able to resist and make a return to the centrestage

However, there is another mass of Iranians, who might well be using the vacations due to the funeral for recreation and cooking celebratory food. To quote an unnamed Iran observer who monitored the 1979 movement from the closest quarters since the inception; said that ‘It would be a painful sight to see many Iranians crying for the departed leader, while many actually were celebrating his departure’. 

These celebratory gunfire or torchlight marches did not happen in significant instances in Iran, as the full-fledged war overtook events; however, the distractors bided their time intelligently and actually dismantled the system from within, while claiming to be safeguarding it. As already explained on these very pages, the way things are shaping actually points to the dismantling of what can be called the Iranian-built infrastructure which was erected to create constant attrition for the Israeli state besides acting as the most effective foreign policy arm of the Iranian theocratic nation state. That dismantling has taken place and can be felt through the actions as well as the turn of the events. 

However, what is explained and analyzed here are the factors, which were responsible for that dismantling of the setups as if the understandings have been reached at the executive level and does have the executive approval if not a leakage of the vital information. The analysis does not dwell on any conspiracy theory, but understanding of a trajectory of events which explains that the March 2026 war and the assassination of the kingpin of the system was the well thought out strategy which was not formulated by the foolish monarchists’, who in the western capitals might not have the grey matter to differentiate between an expatriate Shia Muslim or an Iranian citizen commemorating Karbala, but rather by people well entrenched in the system, to orchestrate a chain of events, which finally produces the desired results. 

Before going to the background, it is imperative to note that the way the Lebanese and Iraqi governments have swiftly moved against the Hezbollah and resistance groups in Iraq, speaks of not just the pressure from the USA, but rather it looks more like a nod from a ‘transformed Tehran’ which is willing to dance to the tunes as and when prompted. Despite a near war situation when the Lebanese front showed signs of heating up, the analyst did point out in the concluding paragraph that it is possible that the red line over Lebanon too diminishes gradually.

That is actually happening. The IDF presence in south of Lebanon is showing no signs of let up or withdrawal, yet, one sees an absence of any retaliatory act or even statement for the Iranian side as to why the USA is not reining in the IDF effectively. A scan of the diplomatic developments suggests that other stakeholders like Syria are apparently more active than the Iranians. The Iranians are even pushing their proxies like the Hezbollah chief Sheikh Naim Qasim to be content with whatever is happening, suggesting a gradual surrender.

A look at Iraq shows that the midnight swoop which started in the Green Zone in Baghdad and in the south of Iraq. which is predominantly a Shia-majority area, has graduated into the disarmament of the pro-Iranian groups. It is ironic that the day after the swoop, the reformist Iranian foreign minister was in Baghdad apparently for the setting up of the funeral of slain supreme leader in Iraq; while actually green lighting the Iraqi authorities about the resistance groups, with regards to whom the Iraqi government was already under pressure, yet now got the go-ahead from the Iranians too. 

A cursory look at the resistance map clearly illustrates that except for the Yemeni Houthis, most of the groups affiliated to Tehran have been neutralized in a manner that in the case any new battlefield is set up, the Iranians do not enjoy the tactical edge they used to have. With the controlled explosion of the Hezbollah tunnel housing the arsenal, it can be safely concluded that the Iranians have either contemplated that there is not going to be another war or they have made an understanding that they would not do anything.

The Iranian reformist government at the moment draws numerous parallels with the first PPP government of 1988/89 when the formation of the cabinet was soon to followed by the controlled decimation of the Sikh movement by the then Rajiv government, reportedly based on the leads provided. The current dismantling generates no confusion as the reformist faction seems to be in complete control of the affairs of the state.

Here it might look accusatory, but the fact remains that the slaughter of the IRGC in June 2025 up to March 2026, inclusive of the minds like Ali Larijani, who if alive could have been a much tougher negotiator, was in a way blessing for the Zarif Group, as to what they want to do now. The open field accorded to the post-Bayat Rahbari negotiating team was further made conducive on the count that the parliament was unable to function on account of being adjourned indefinitely. 

Here it is important to note that towards the end of the month of March, when the US President issued his famous ‘civilization’ threat, there was a simultaneous whispering campaign about ‘sensible people within the Iranian power corridors’. Many news outlets, inclusive of the compromised ones in the neighbouring states, who incidentally were also involved in the US-inspired controlled negotiation process, did not mince words to include the incumbent speaker of the Iranian parliament to be amongst the negotiating team as well as the one who has backed the negotiation initiative.

The turn of events, first in Islamabad and now in Doha, all seem to authenticate the air of suspicion about the main individuals of the Iranian negotiating team. It is pertinent to note that a reformist outlet like Fararo reported a statement by the former mayor of capital Tehran, who has been reformist by orientation, stating that the indefinite closure of the parliament was in fact a blessing for the negotiations and the MoU to take off. 

The fruits of that negotiation have been in fact what is the caption of the academic analysis presented here. The first phase, when the likes of Hasan Nasrullah and Yahya Sinwar were killed by the IDF, was triggered by credible signs from the reformist administration to the concerned external observers that if they laid their hand on Hezbollah or for that matter the Hamas leadership there would be no response. Recently a statement by the son of Ayatollah Jannati, the head of the election watchdog Guardian Council, Ali Jannati, carried by Twitter on a news outlet ‘Abdi Media’ somewhat confirms the fact that the planned retaliation by Iran was blocked two times by none other than the incumbent president. 

The current dismantling of the resistance coupled with sketchy information on the ongoing negotiations, lack of transparency in reporting as well as in debating; ironically when the Iranian constitution under article 76 allows the parliament to investigate any such MoU, or has the power to accept for adoption or reject it as per the article 77, or allowing the members of parliament to air their views in accordance, all point to a sort of coup which the slain leader termed as the Pahlavi protest; though the grand finale was overseen by the reformista. It will be a miracle if the vanguard is able to resist and make a return to the centrestage.