Iran’s change of guard

The World and Iran Itself to adjust to the post-Khamenei period

Going by the voices across the international arena, the current conflict between the Iran and the joint coalition of IDF-NATO-Pentagon is likely to be prolonged one; however; there are ample chances that despite the stalemate position the conflict is taking with each passing day; an end to hostilities might take weeks or months from, or even days if ground variables play into; can be thought of.

It depends largely upon how the warring sides perceive the gains or the losses, vice versa. For the western world, it will not be a business as usual, as it will be dealing for the first time with the generation Z groomed in the shadow of the movement called the Islamic Revolution. How Iran itself reacts to that change of guard, is an interesting debate to delve into. 

Here it may be pointed out that despite the image of an unrelenting dictator, the late Supreme Leader was open to bending in favour of the younger generation. The first standpoint was the 2009 elections mismanagement. The radical camp’s uneasiness with the reformist camp led by Mir Hosain Mousavi precipitated a difficult situation, where for the first time in the modern Iranian history, the election results were followed by disturbances.

Despite the fact the damage was done, the system did not react erratically. The president elected was allowed to complete his term. In 2013, the reformist vote was allowed to take its logical part. As the result, that period was unique in the context that if the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps wanted to wage a war in Syria, the reform government facilitated them. On the other hand, the JCPOA team, which included the now incumbent foreign minister, had the complete backing of the Nezam as well as the IRGC to get the best deal from the then Democratic administration.

The next elections in 2017 were a tight finish between Rouhani the reform candidate and Raeesi the principalist candidate. Rouhani was finally elected as the head of the next administration. It was purely his bad luck that Trump in his first term unilaterally tore up the JCPOA deal. Fast forward to the 2024 elections. The election went to the next round and there was again a close finish between the principalist Jalili and the reformist Pezeshkian. There was much scepticism that, given the atmosphere of radicalism due to the ongoing Gaza conflict and the killing of Raeesi under suspicious circumstances, there were sinister forces at work. However, the reformist vote was not blocked and finally their candidate took oath as the president of the next administration.

On the sidelines, the eruption of the Mahsa Amini issue in 2022 and the stances taken by the late Supreme Leader, where he went on to declare that those ladies, who did not observe the customary hijab were supportive of the Nezam, was in fact an indication that the clerical system was open to adaptation and readjustment with the younger generation.

Consequently, one of the things the new reformist administration in 2024, among other things, did was to do away with the Morality Police powers. As a result, it is not uncommon now to see in the rallies in support of the Nezam to see women young and old, not wearing the trademark hijab, even though they are supportive of the system. Recent demonstrations after the killing of the Supreme Leader and in support of the new one, too have been characterized by the presence of an equal number of casually dressed womenfolk.

Given the assumption that the gradual reorientation of the system is already in place, visible through a bolder treatment of the social issues in the creative art scene, which might have pushed been under the rug otherwise. The screening of movies like Old Bachelor (2025) or in the serial Aban (2025), where unconventional relationships are being portrayed, it can be well imagined that a new leader, though at the time of writing he is injured and incapacitated at a safe place, being barely 56 years old; unlike the conventional grand Ayatollahs of Qom and Najaf, is likely to grab the pulse of the younger generation and continue with the reorientation. A few analysts are not wrong in branding him the Iranian Revolution’s own version of Saudi Crown Prince and PM Muhammad Bin Salman. Given the fact that the IRGC is likely to back him, the new Iran might be a different Iran, to say the least.

The new realities are based on that firm assumption that after a radical period under Ayatollah Khomeini, the Khamenei era was characterized more by peace and reconstruction. Post-Khomeini Iran had situations a number of times , where it could have gone to war with the USA while siding with Saddam in 1991, a request for help from the Baath which was rejected by him, war with Afghanistan and Pakistan in 1998 over the Mazar Sharif episode, in 2001 and 2003 to 2013 when there were numerous situations where the founder of revolution Khomeini might have preferred war, Khamenei preferred diplomacy. As a matter of fact, the two recent wars with the Israeli state, in June 2025 and that which is raging now, were not started by the Iranians, rather the international image growing out of the developments on ground has been of Iran betrayed and then aggressed upon, and not the other way round. 

It remains to be seen how things shape up when things are in control of the new leadership, rather at the commencement of the new era. The Iranian ideological state had graduated into a different era in the midst of a bloody war; where the preamble for the new social contract has been written with blood; as the proverb doing rounds in Iran makes clearer: “ This country will not become a homeland, unless an Akhund (religious scholar) is shrouded and buried”; Ali Khamenei provided that instance. The change will come from within, not what the diaspora wished and sold to Republicans to act.

While the late Rahbar on one hand was open to reform within the system, he was never seething with a sabre-rattling posture with anyone. The 2024 Pakistani air  strikes in January when there was a misunderstanding between the two states over Jaish al Adal, an Iranian extremist group, and BLA, a Pakistani Baluch separatist group, over which Iran fired missiles on Jaish hide outs, the PAF strikes were never answered and a damage control strategy was followed by the sitting administration, most likely with the intervention of the late Supreme Leader.

Obviously, despite the talk of following the slain leader in all respects, by the new individuals in place; the ascension of Mujtaba Khamenei is in fact that revolution which has taken place genuinely within the system, despite the out of context willful thought processes espoused by the Trump Administration. It might be too early for the analysts to read the new leader’s mind right now, but the fact remains that being a younger member of the establishment, having inroads into the IRGC and the reformist camp, Iran is set to review what has been pending in terms of a constitutional revisit.

To begin with, the issue of Wilayat Faqeeh is likely to draw the attention of the Nezam. The new leader once on his feet can be instrumental based on popular will to call into question the current powers of the Wilayat Faqeeh  and if they are found to be intrusive, might find the constitutional way to review them. The other way round it can become more intrusive with sugar coated treatment of the policy framework reviewed and put into place.

Secondly, with the social adjustment already in place, the new supreme leader and the IRGC deep state would not like to lose sight of the fact that after the 2009 election trouble, the Mahsa Amini related rioting, the CIA/Mossad-inspired riots and near possibility of a regime change, averted just due to the overwhelming presence on the streets in the support of the Nezam, the Nezam needs a revisit in all domains.

It remains to be seen how things shape up when things are in control of the new leadership, rather at the commencement of the new era. The Iranian ideological state had graduated into a different era in the midst of a bloody war; where the preamble for the new social contract has been written with blood; as the proverb doing rounds in Iran makes clearer: “ This country will not become a homeland, unless an Akhund (religious scholar) is shrouded and buried”; Ali Khamenei provided that instance. The change will come from within, not what the diaspora wished and sold to Republicans to act.