New Iran, new Middle East

Much depends on when the dust settles

To say that the reformists in their frenzy ushered in a new phase in Iranian history will not be an exaggeration, firstly through precipitating a turn of events, which prompted and convinced the opponents of the theocratic regime in Iran to contemplate surgical strikes and then through pushing for a renewed JCPOA, not just a ceasefire; which for all practical purposes would have been a ‘no go area’ if the slain Supreme Leader had been alive today. 

It may be pointed out that the international pressure on the ceasefire was meticulously mixed up with the new version of JCPOA; presenting to the Iranian audience as well as the world at large that if the hostilities were not stopped it was a do-or-die situation for the region in general and the Iranian state in particular. Unconsciously the reformists played the cloak and dagger, or carrot and stick, policy for the US President.

To put it more clearly, the scrapping of the JCPOA by the first Trump Administration in 2017 left the reformists with no selling points for their electorate. 2021, the conservatives were able to have their president who oversaw the start of the Gaza war. The untimely or planned demise of the conservative administration President and the ushering in of a reformist administration under a weak president in July 2024 meant that the administration would be controlled from behind the scenes.

Despite the fact that the last reformist administration under Rouhani took care to take along the supreme leader; there was a very different administration witnessed during the summer of 2025 and the spring of 2026, when each so-called agreement and understanding was followed by the decapitation strikes, whether it was the setting sun of the 12 June 2025 afternoon or the early hours of February 28.

The 2026 strike was the one which almost dismantled the system, to the point that it was the presence of the 1979 movement on the street which saved the day for the Nezam to continue in whatever form it could. However, it was evident that things will be different going forward; in terms of how the Islamic republic will take its path, in terms of the domestic policy, the foreign policy and above all its original colour; or tone.

The drift is visible and that is very much felt by the stakeholders, especially the titular Supreme Leader. The term titular very ruthlessly depicts the changing ground realities for the Islamic republic in the coming days. For movements similar yo the one in Iran; whether it was the Russian Revolution or the Chinese, it is a confirmed trajectory of events that such movements are best neutralized from within.

The queries and questions raised might be benign, but they hit at the very basics of the principal foundations of any state. It was Mikhail Gorbachev who was practically instrumental in metaphorically signing the final demise of the Soviet Socialist system in 1990-91, Boris Yeltsin like Massoud Pezeshkian of 2026 only formally presided over the quiet obituary. 

As of the start of the JCPOA 2 process, the reservations from the Supreme Leader have been projected as the ones, which are apparently mild in nature, where the Leader is telling the people that he has allowed the President room to negotiate under the assumption that he takes care of the foundation principal preamble of the state. As a matter of fact, the Supreme Leader does not seems to be the only one, despite not being visible to the general public, who has reservations to the recipe of economic progress as visualized by the ‘Zarif cartel’, rather a revolutionary vanguard mostly referred to as ‘conservative’ has been vocal to what the reform group intends to do in the face of the aggression which was facilitated in the first place by the insiders.

There is a whispering anger within Iran, which feels that the war was only a first step towards the regime change, with very targeted strikes at the prime regime figures, when not even one reformist figure was targeted; all those targeted were either the Supreme Leader, or a veteran revolutionary-turned-diplomat like Larijani, and the cream of the IRGC, first in the June 2025 strikes and whatever was left in the February 2026 strikes.

What has happened during the last few weeks in the reformist circles with the connivance of the so-called radical members of the government is a changed Iran; not in terms that it is more open to the world; rather it seems that many a red lines might be compromised in manner that the much awaited regime change has taken place, not through the planning of the Monarchists, rather by a deceptive policy adopted by the reformists in the administration as well as in the society.  For the onlookers, it’s new Iran; a turbaned man in a three-piece suit.

During the heat of the battle, it was likely to be an illogical step to call for peace. The reform group through a meticulously designed media strategy created an environment where a section of the public was convinced that ‘as Iran has won, it is time to go for peace’. That section of public was made to believe that whatever might be offered it should be regarded as the reward of the sacrifices, even if it means doing away with the ideals of the movement, which in the first place were responsible for the cutting edge, for which the 1979 movement is known. 

Taking advantage of the peculiar nature of the developing world states, where the man on the street is deliberately kept ill-informed or the truth shared with him or her is twisted to suit the state’s purpose, the crowds in turn were confused and were predictably divided between the two groups. The radical group looked at the deals with the USA singularly with the slain leader's glasses, that the deal was harmful to the strategic interests of Iran. The other group of countrymen in all sincerity felt that the negotiating team was true to the national interests.

It was no coincidence that the pro-deal reformists or the born-again reformists took care not to alienate the radical lobby in any sense. The radical group's very potent demand throughout the last two months has been to call the parliament sessions to be resumed so that the deal is discussed in totality.

What happened within the so-called radical front in the shape of the old comrades of the assassinated IRCG commander Qaem Soleimani was that the parliament sessions were adjourned indefinitely. Here it is pertinent to note that the former reformist mayor of Tehran during the early years of a reformist president Khatami did not mince words to say that if the parliament has been allowed to speak, the Zarif group could not have been able to advance that much into formalizing peace with the USA as has been possible now.

As things stand now, the Iranian nation state direction has changed radically, not towards a more radical posture as the word ‘radical’ might misguide the reader, rather the new Iran visualized by the reformists is now the finally on the anvil, with the 30 to 60 days period trumpeted as the one where things can move towards any conclusion.

What is now apparent is that after nearly three decades of politics, the reform group has finally caused the dent within the Iranian nation, which will expand in the coming days to the point where, the radical nation state as visualized by the 1979 revolution might take a back seat for all practical purposes. 

Starting from Lebanon, which was called the final red line for the Iranians, daily news creeds now make a point that Iranians despite all the claims are not reacting to the IDF incursions. It may be pointed out the missile programme and other involvements in the region from the Iranian side courtesy the Quds force are the new red lines. However, an analysis of the situation from August 2024 onwards shows that what happened now was set in motion much earlier.

The blunt statements of the Hezbollah chief’s old friend, Muhammad Ali Hussaini, in September 2024 might have looked offensive to many, but he was correct in his assessment that the resistance was gradually being sold to the opponents in a manner that their coordinates were compromised with increasing frequency. Going forward, what is being apologetically still being discussed like continued IDF incursions into Lebanon is likely to be soon treated as the new normal.

What has happened during the last few weeks in the reformist circles with the connivance of the so-called radical members of the government is a changed Iran; not in terms that it is more open to the world; rather it seems that many a red lines might be compromised in manner that the much awaited regime change has taken place, not through the planning of the Monarchists, rather by a deceptive policy adopted by the reformists in the administration as well as in the society.  For the onlookers, it’s new Iran; a turbaned man in a three-piece suit.