JCPOA; A Reformist Utopia or the National Imperative

Iran faces a Critical Tradeoff 

For the last week or so, the world media is on its toes and the analysts across the continents are sitting tense with fingers crossed, about what is going to transpire in the Middle East or precisely the Persian Gulf. There are ample chances that by the time the paper goes to the print a strike might have taken place or the other way round, the buildup continues. Military analysts cite that the type of preparation was last seen when the Iraq invasion was ordered by the then President Bush Jr.

Apparently the ground forces element is absent, which the US military planners hope to compensate through the expected uprising of the Iranians against the falling regime. It is becoming evidently clear that this time the USA is going for a complete kill, the overthrow of the Nezam and possibly followed by the installation of the new system of the government. The December/ January Street disturbances, already coined as a coup by the supreme leader of Iran, leave little doubt that for the system to survive, it is a do-or-die situation.

The final scenario, a fluid one which is emerging, seems that the West having read the decision disarray in Tehran is emboldened to threaten even more. Iran now is carrying an image courtesy the Reformists that it can be brought to its knees in one way or another. The blame rests much on the group failure to adjust to the new realities; just like if the Syrian file was a bad dream for the IRGC, the JCPOA was similarly the same for the Reform camp; the solution rests for the Reformist group is to recognize the faultlines in the present, not the ones already done with

Given the fact that the world remained aloof from what happened in the cases of Gaza and Venezuela, it is anyone’s guess that there will be a numb reaction from the world opinion, apart fro  some left wing protest demonstrations, which make little difference in the planning exercises of NATO, tied to the Pentagon, despite much ill talk on part of the POTUS and the lingering Greenland issue.

The core of the matter, regretfully other than the US resolve to knock down the Nezam, is the internal dissension in the Iranian leadership. Generally, it is presumed that the supreme leader has a final say in the matters. However, practically the political governments call the shots as and when they feel they need to make their presence felt. Towards that end, the birth of the reform movement in Iranian society is the turning point, which for good and bad has benefited Iran and also created a leadership chaos.

The emergence of the Reform factor in running Iran was heralded by the election of Khatami in 1997. Another landslide in 2001 allowed him to strengthen whatever gains the movement wanted to accrue in the process. In the domains of culture, the reform movement was able to make an impact, which benefited the Iranian image abroad to a greater extent. A country apparently run by theologians was able to make a place for itself in the field of art and cinema, which was recognized by the world without prejudice. Iranian cinema was able to attract the attention of the global cine festivals more than Lollywood or Bollywood, which working in apparently more liberal societies were not able to make it to the Oscars; a feat Iranians in recent cinematic history have repeatedly experienced.

Having done with that, the other issue, where the reform movement was adamant to make difference has been the era of foreign policy. The reform movement went against anything which elevated the Islamist character of the Nezam. The movement did not approve with wholesome heart, Iran’s infatuation with Pan-Islamist causes, especially the Palestine issue. The famous slogan ‘Iran first; not Gaza not Lebanon’ spelt out what the reformists wanted the Nezam to do in the first place.

In the same thrust, they felt that it was imperative that Iran should come out of its diplomatic isolation and shake hands with the USA. At this point, there is evidence that the mainstream leadership might not be averse to that, provided it was doing so on its terms. However, the reformists were of the opinion that such safeguards were not needed and all that was needed was an embrace with the West, whatever the costs of such embrace might be. 

The year 2002 was one such break point. Despite the covert Iranian cooperation with the USA in the Afghanistan war 2001 and a general calm in the relationship, the Bush speech calling Iran one of the Axis of Evil and the sudden disclosure of Iranian nuclear sites by an Iranian opposition group Mujahedine Khalq, caused the state of affairs which stands in Iran to this day.

Fast forward to the 2013-2015 period. The Iranian clerical establishment, learning from the devastating backlash of its intervention in 2009 presidential elections, allowed the reformists to take the centrestage in decision making, so long as it did not interfere with what the Nezam leaders called the national goals. That period was punctuated with massive Iranian intervention in Syria to save the pro-resistance Assad government, while on the other hand the reform government foreign minister and the deputy foreign minister Jawad Zarif and Abbas Araqchi were given a free hand to negotiate the JCPOA, which in simple words meant, Iran forewent its right for nuclear enrichment or it has made its programme transparent, in return for reintegration into the world financial system.

That arrangement worked well till the advent of Trump in US politics. Trump annulled the JCPOA unilaterally and pushed for the worst sanctions against the Iranian Nezam. The four years under Biden saw talks going off and on, despite the fact that a radical president in Iran Raeesi allowed these talks to take their logical route, and though they remained inconclusive.

Here comes the election of a reformist president in Iran July 2024. If the Nezam was under siege by the IDF and Pentagon over its overt support to the resistance from Hezbollah to Hamas, the reformist government was not willing to take into focus the new realities. Having made up its political fortunes on the back of the 2015 JCPOA, it felt the same can be done again. In September 2024, three months to go to the US elections, it unsuccessfully tried to court the outgoing Biden administration, in the process allowing the resistance. The Iranian stance on the eve of the UN assembly session was the most confusing, where instead of standing along the resistance, it opted to mend fences with the United States.

The election of Trump in November 2024 polls turned the tables for the time being however the reformist element could not resist talking to the US again. JCPOA negotiations started again and culminated in the June 13 strikes against regime and nuclear targets in Iran. It is worthy to note that despite the bad blood between the USA and Iran, the reformist president still issued statements supporting the resumption of dialogue.

Though there remained a stalemate in the talks; until the disturbances on Iranian streets brought the USA again on the stage, initially wishing intervention on behalf of the ‘struggling Iranian nation’ and later threatening Iran over a JCPOA which would be suitable for the West. That point is precisely where the reform group has failed to look beyond its political goals. As things stand, the world sees diverse signals coming out of the key capitals, Tehran says deal will be finalized, while Washington does not mince words and actions that it is going for the kill, once and for all. That dichotomy is very much the result of a leadership disarray, where the reformist government is not willing to read the writing on the wall. If for the senior leadership; the Rahbar, a calculated resistance is the key to maintain a military balance, the reformist government is indicating that it can still talk, by continuing in futile dialogue.

The final scenario, a fluid one which is emerging, seems that the West having read the decision disarray in Tehran is emboldened to threaten even more. Iran now is carrying an image courtesy the Reformists that it can be brought to its knees in one way or another. The blame rests much on the group failure to adjust to the new realities; just like if the Syrian file was a bad dream for the IRGC, the JCPOA was similarly the same for the Reform camp; the solution rests for the Reformist group is to recognize the faultlines in the present, not the ones already done with.