The idea of deploying an international stabilisation force in Gaza may sound reassuring to a world exhausted by images of destruction, displacement and despair. On paper, it promises security, humanitarian access and a path toward rebuilding shattered institutions. But history urges caution. A stabilisation force cannot succeed merely because it is authorised; it succeeds only when it is legitimate, adequately supported and politically sustained. Without these elements, such missions risk becoming symbols of international failure rather than instruments of peace.
The recent proposal discussed at the United Nations already carries heavy baggage. Analysts, diplomats and regional observers have raised serious concerns about legitimacy, mandate, funding and political commitment. These are not procedural technicalities. They are fundamental questions that determine whether an international force stabilises a conflict or quietly collapses under its own contradictions.
At the heart of the debate lies the issue of legitimacy, a foundation that cannot be skipped or improvised. Who asked for such a force? Who accepts it? And on whose behalf will it operate? International forces work only when local populations see them as protectors, not overseers. In Gaza’s case, this legitimacy gap is glaring. Palestinians have not been meaningfully consulted on the structure, role or political framework of such a force. Without clear Palestinian consent and representation, any external deployment risks being viewed as imposed rather than invited.
Security without political ownership rarely brings peace. Instead, it deepens resentment. Gaza’s people have lived through repeated cycles of external control, broken promises and abandoned reconstruction plans. Introducing another international presence without addressing governance, representation and self-determination would repeat a familiar mistake: treating symptoms while ignoring causes.
History, moreover, is warning loudly. International stabilisation missions have failed repeatedly when political backing from major powers faded. Afghanistan stands as a stark example. Billions were spent, institutions were built, and security forces were trained— only for the entire structure to collapse once international attention shifted and funding dried up. The lesson is simple and unforgiving: a stabilisation force cannot succeed if it becomes politically isolated or underfunded. Grand mandates mean little without long-term commitment.
Complex environments like Gaza require sustained engagement measured in years, not months. Yet there is little evidence so far that major powers are prepared to make such enduring commitments. Launching a mission is easy. Sustaining it is not. History shows that the international community excels at the former and struggles with the latter.
The real question is not whether the world should help Gaza, but how. If major powers are serious, they must demonstrate it through sustained commitment, political courage and respect for Palestinian agency. Anything less risks repeating a familiar and costly pattern: ambitious beginnings followed by silent withdrawal. Gaza does not need another temporary fix. It needs a credible path toward dignity, security and self-determination. Stabilisation, if it is to mean anything at all, must serve that goal— not replace it.
This leads to another troubling aspect: selective commitment by major powers. Many support the idea of stabilisation rhetorically, but hesitate when it comes to deploying troops, guaranteeing funding or assuming political responsibility. The result is a dangerous gap between ambition and capacity. Stabilisation cannot be outsourced to vague coalitions or under-resourced contingents. It requires clear command structures, robust financing and credible enforcement mechanisms. Stabilisation without sacrifice is not strategy; it is avoidance. Major powers cannot expect stability in Gaza while remaining unwilling to bear the costs of achieving it.
Pakistan’s own response to the proposed stabilisation force highlights these political complexities. Islamabad supported the recent Security Council resolution that authorises the force, but only after insisting that key concerns be addressed; Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar has publicly said Pakistan is ready to contribute troops under a clearly defined peacekeeping mandate, yet firmly rejected any role in disarming Palestinian groups— insisting that such tasks belong to Palestinian authorities themselves and not international troops. Pakistan’s position reflects both its principled support for Palestinian self-determination and the domestic political sensitivities of sending troops to a theatre involving Israel, a state Pakistan does not recognise. Pakistan is reportedly under pressure as Washington urges Islamabad to contribute troops, a move that analysts warn could provoke significant backlash at home from pro-Palestinian and anti-US constituencies. Their stance illustrates how fragile international political backing can be when broader strategic and domestic factors collide.
Meanwhile, the humanitarian reality on the ground continues to deteriorate. Gaza’s crisis is immediate and overwhelming. Millions remain displaced. Basic services have collapsed. Disease, hunger and insecurity are daily realities. Any stabilisation effort that does not place humanitarian access and rapid reconstruction at its core will fail both morally and politically.
There is also a real danger that a poorly designed, security-first mission could actually hinder humanitarian work. Confused chains of authority, militarised aid corridors and overlapping mandates risk slowing relief rather than enabling it. Stabilisation must facilitate humanitarian action, not complicate it. If the international presence is perceived as prioritising control over care, public trust will evaporate quickly.
Regional and political realities further complicate the picture. No stabilisation effort can succeed in isolation from its neighbourhood. Neighbouring states, particularly Egypt, will play decisive roles in border management, humanitarian access and political coordination. Without regional buy-in, the operational space for any international force will remain constrained and fragile.
Equally unresolved is Gaza’s political future itself. A stabilisation force cannot substitute for a political settlement. It cannot determine governance structures, resolve internal Palestinian divisions or impose legitimacy from outside. At best, it can create space for a political process. At worst, it can freeze an unjust and unstable status quo. Security imposed without a political roadmap becomes containment, not resolution.
This does not mean international involvement should be dismissed. Gaza urgently needs support. But the sequence matters. Legitimacy must come before deployment. Palestinian voices— political representatives, civil society and local institutions— must be central rather than symbolic. Commitments must be genuine and long-term, backed by multi-year financing and sustained diplomatic engagement.
The mission’s objectives must also remain realistic. A phased approach that begins with humanitarian stabilisation and reconstruction, rather than ambitious security engineering, may prove more credible. Transparency, accountability and independent monitoring are essential to prevent quiet mission drift and political abandonment.
The debate over a Gaza stabilisation force should therefore be approached with caution, not haste. Good intentions cannot compensate for weak foundations. An underfunded, politically fragile and locally contested mission will not stabilise Gaza; it will deepen mistrust and prolong suffering.
The real question is not whether the world should help Gaza, but how. If major powers are serious, they must demonstrate it through sustained commitment, political courage and respect for Palestinian agency. Anything less risks repeating a familiar and costly pattern: ambitious beginnings followed by silent withdrawal.
Gaza does not need another temporary fix. It needs a credible path toward dignity, security and self-determination. Stabilisation, if it is to mean anything at all, must serve that goal— not replace it.
