AT PENPOINT
The conviction of PTI founder Imran Khan in the second Toshakhana case might well be compared to a tightening of the screws, prior to the really big blow to him, his trial for the 9 May 2023 incidents, which had provided the worst blow to the party it has suffered, before or since. The government seems to be running out of charges on which to try him, but the question of whether he should be tried by a military or civilian court now seems moot.
The procession of those convicted by civilian anti-terrorist courts is long enough for prosecutors to feel that they might be able to get a conviction even he was tried before a civilian court. Another strand of the noose that is being woven for him was revealed in the statement by the DG ISPR that Lt Gen (retd) Faiz Hameed, the former DG ISI and Corps Commander Peshawar, was yet to face a court martial for his role in the May 9 incidents.
After that court martial takes place, the evidence may then become available of what is called by Imran’s opponents, that the protests against Imran’s arrest were actually a cover for an attempted coup against the leadership of the Army and the government. The most common defence offered is that Imran was in jail when the protests took place, and that the protests were spontaneous. The counter to that is that the arrest was actually a signal for certain planned actions to be carried out. That planning is supposed to have had Imran’s participation. If proved, it would make him part of a criminal conspiracy, and would leave him liable to even more sentences.
If his sentences run concurrently, as they should, every fresh sentence has to commence when it is delivered. Up to one-third of sentences are remitted because of remissions by the President for all prisoners on such special occasions as Eid or Independence Day. Assuming that Imran was not excluded from such remissions (as could be done by the President), and assuming the usual remissions for good conduct (which could only be denied if there was evidence of bad conduct, such as an escape attempt, disobeying the jail staff or fighting with other prisoners), he would not get out of fail until he had served about two-thirds of his last sentence, provided it did not overlap with an earlier but longer sentence. The latest sentence, delivered this month, at 17 years is the longest he has been given so far, which means he could be in jail for the next 11 years, so that he would have served out all his sentences.
As he has not been tried for the May 9 cases, he may end up spending a really long time in jail. His trial may not be over till the end of next year. He might then have to serve a 10-year sentence, which has been the standard sentence handed down to PTI leaders so far in May 9 cases. That means just under seven years would have to be served, which means completion of the sentence before the latest anti-corruption court sentence. On the other hand, it is possible that Imran might get a heavier sentence than 10 years, and he might receive separate sentences for different incidents. There would still be some grounds which would allow him to claim concurrent serving of the sentence, but just because a case can be made out does not mean it has to be accepted.
If cases can be brought to trial when he is nearing release, he can probably be kept imprisoned virtually indefinitely, with a new sentence handed down as soon as he approaches release. However, even if that tactic is not used, he is likely to spend some years in jail. If he does serve another 11 years, he will be 83 when he is finally released. That assumes he does not get more than 10 years in any May 9 case. It is possible that he will get life sentences, which are treated as a 20-year sentence, meaning he would have to serve 14 years from the date of sentencing. Assuming sentencing in 2026, that would mean release in 2040, at which point he will be 87.
The PTI has found itself being painted into a corner, or perhaps rather painting itself. One of the main fears is that just as the year now ending has failed to produce any good news, the coming year might not either, unless it does something different. Though its trademark has been disruption, it has not achieved any of its own goals. Worst of all, not only has Imran remained in jail, but the government seems to have thrown away the key.
Apart from his vast age at that point, it is not a safe assumption that he will still be alive. He is very fit for a jailbird of his age, because he has spent his lifetime taking care of himself, and has continued to maintain a rigorous fitness regime in jail, that should be the envy of free men half his age, It is a tribute to both his exercise and diet regimens that the possibility of his being alive at that age not only exist, but are quite bright.
However, in this time, there will have been three general elections, assuming that the present trend of elections being held only on the expiry of the five-year term continues. In fact. In 2040, when Imran re-emerges back into the cold harsh daylight, a general election will have been
held the year before, and the PTI might well be in the opposition. The example of Mian Nawaz Sharif should illustrate that legal bars to contesting elections are removed without too much difficulty. However, there will then be the tough choice of waiting it out till 2044, at which time Imran will be over 90, or allowing someone else become Prime Minister.
The PTI may have become reduced to a political platform for Imran, but it should not be forgotten it remains an electoral party, with its leadership cadres at least using it to obtain access to political power and elected offices. These people do not have patience to remain in the opposition for a long time, and need a pathway back to power quickly.
While a lot of PTI supporters are those who felt Imran had the solution to the country’s problems, a lot of them were ‘electables’, who followed the PTI because it afforded them a path to power. Those are the people who are creating the pressure on Imran to find a solution that takes them out of the opposition. It should be noted that the PTI brought a large number of neophytes into politics, and they are now seeking a continued presence in politics. They are also the ones who want Imran to find a way back.
The kind of traditional politicians now in the Tehrik Tahafuz Ain Pakistan, like Mahmud Khan Achakzai and MustafaNawaz Khokhar, have pressed for talks. There is some movement towards talks, which is the political way of resolving matters. However, the PTI is trying to avoid them, with Imran leading the way. The PTI seems to feel that its success so far has lain in its obduracy. His refusal to talk has so far served him well, and has united his base behind him.
It has led to criticism when he was in office, and to talk now would mean having to walk back on many of the narratives which the PTI is using to keep its base together: the anti-politician, anti-Army narrative which vociferously claims the May 9 incidents were committed by agents provocateurs, that the Army and the military conspired to throw the PTI out of office. The PTA proposal that Imran’s release is not an essential must be taken note of, as a sort of acknowledgement of a kind of failure, that the pressure for his release has not been built up.
The PTI has found itself being painted into a corner, or perhaps rather painting itself. One of the main fears is that just as the year now ending has failed to produce any good news, the coming year might not either, unless it does something different. Though its trademark has been disruption, it has not achieved any of its own goals. Worst of all, not only has Imran remained in jail, but the government seems to have thrown away the key.
