The Indus Waters Treaty has been one of the most resilient agreements in South Asia. Signed in 1960 between President Ayub Khan and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, it survived multiple wars, moments of extreme hostility and a complete breakdown of diplomatic relations. Even in October 1965, weeks after the two nations had fought a full-scale war, India honoured its obligation and paid an installment of £6.2 million to Pakistan under the treaty’s financial commitments. This history demonstrates the treaty’s strength as a legal framework and as a stabilising instrument in a region prone to conflict.
Today that legacy is being undermined. India has unilaterally announced that it will hold the treaty in abeyance, a decision that has no basis in international law. On August 24, New Delhi routed urgent flood warnings to Pakistan through diplomatic channels instead of the Indus Waters Commission, the institution specifically mandated under the treaty to handle such communications. This may appear as a minor procedural deviation, but it carries deeper implications. It signals that India is prepared to bypass formal mechanisms in order to use water cooperation as a tool of political leverage.
The dangers of this approach are evident. Punjab is on high alert as floodwaters surge along the Sutlej River, with thousands already evacuated. The Indian High Commission in Islamabad recently shared warnings of high flows from Jammu’s Tawi River into the Chenab. Pakistan, in turn, has stressed that these alerts must be communicated under the terms of the treaty, not on humanitarian grounds alone. In moments of natural disaster, predictability and institutional trust are as important as the data being shared. Departures from the treaty framework risk confusion and mismanagement at precisely the times when coordination is most essential.
India’s decision to suspend compliance with the treaty after the April attack in Pahalgam represents a worrying use of brinkmanship. Blaming Pakistan without evidence and then linking that allegation to a treaty that governs critical water resources blurs the line between security disputes and humanitarian obligations. By treating water as another front in its confrontation with Pakistan, India risks setting a precedent that could destabilise not only bilateral relations but also regional water governance at large.
The Indus Waters Treaty is not perfect, but it has endured because it separates politics from resource sharing. Its durability has served both countries by reducing the likelihood of conflict over rivers that sustain millions of lives. To erode this system now, in an era of climate-driven floods and droughts, is profoundly short-sighted. South Asia already faces mounting pressures from erratic monsoons, glacial melt and increasing demand on scarce water. Weakening one of the world’s most successful water-sharing agreements for short-term political gain threatens to compound these risks.
India should recommit itself to the treaty in both letter and spirit. That means channelling all flood warnings and technical communications through the Indus Waters Commission, honouring existing dispute-resolution mechanisms, and recognising that the stability of this agreement is in the interest of both nations. The Indus Rivers are not tools of pressure. They are lifelines for millions who cannot afford to be caught in the crossfire of diplomatic gamesmanship.
