By: Muntaha Jabbar
The recent escalation in Southern Syria demonstrates the fragility of peace constructed through coercion and resistance. The region, already plagued by deep-seated sectarian divisions, Israeli occupation, and Western dominance, has once again witnessed the collapse of the fragile peace that was anticipated following the fall of the Assad regime.
The long-standing dynastic and minority Alawite rule, which ended in December 2024 with the rise of the revolutionary movement led by Ahmad al-Sharaa, has ultimately failed to protect the rights of minority communities. The renewed stability has reopened the doors for external actors to exploit Syria’s internal sovereignty, using its people as shields for advancing their strategic goals as part of the broader Middle East.
The Druze and Bedouin communities are two significant sectarian groups in Syria, each with a deep-seated historical presence. Tracing the historical trajectories of these communities offers a critical analysis of their contemporary escalation and deep-rooted tensions. Understanding their distinct religious, political, and social evolution in the Middle East provides a valuable foundation for analyzing the root causes of their rivalry.
At the outset, the Druze are a distinct religious sect that emerged in the 10th century as a sectarian branch of Ismaili Islam. However, they do not identify themselves as Muslims because they do not believe in incarnation and are a closed-religious community, which does not accept converts, unlike Islam. Today, approximately 1 million Druze reside within Syria with additional presence in Lebanon, Israel, and the Golan Heights, an area annexed by Israel.
Contrary to that, Syria’s broader demographic landscape consists predominantly of Sunni Muslims, making up 70 per cent of the population. Whereas Alawites, an offshoot of Shia Muslims, constitute 3 percent of the total Syrian population. The Druze community has persistently advocated for minority rights, urging the Syrian government to uphold the inclusive and equitable policies for all sects.
In the Sweida district, where the tensions have recently escalated, the Druze form the overwhelming majority, making up 80 per cent of the population, followed by the Christian community, whereas Sunni Muslims represent a minority.
Moreover, during 2015 and 2018, Druze militias assumed the role of net security provider in Sweida, particularly in response to the ISIS incursions. In 2018, a devastating wave of attacks by ISIS took place, resulting in the deaths of nearly 200 Druze people. In the aftermath of these attacks, tensions between Druze communities and Syrian forces escalated, as the community resisted forced recruitment into the military and state encroachment on Druze. This period is considered to be a turning point in the Druze’s security posture, as they began to defend their territory from external threats and internal state control.
The growing autonomy and defiance led to a critical shift in the regime’s approach. A series of targeted assassinations of well-known Druze figures was directly attributed to state operatives, which intensified mistrust and a sense of separation. Druze people started to believe that the Assad regime is not only failing to safeguard minority rights, but actively weaponizing the security vacuum to undermine Druze autonomy and bring the region back under state control.
In contrast, the Bedouin tribes in Syria are predominantly Sunni Muslims, and they have experienced long-standing tensions with the Druze community. Traditionally, the Bedouin were primarily organized and engaged in herding livestock across the Badiya, the vast region of desert in central and eastern Syria. The term Bedouin is derived from an Arabic word, ‘badawi’, which literally means “desert dweller” and historically refers to a person with a pastoral and nomadic way of life.
Al-Sharaa wants to sell the idea that “Syria is stabilizing.” Still, recent intercommunal violencer and the death of approximately 940 Syrian people within a week show that old grievances are unresolved, tribal justice still reigns, and the social fabric in Syria is torn. It suggests that the Syrian civil war may be “over” militarily, but not socially and politically.
The conflict between Druze and Bedouin tribes escalated following a specific incident in the district of Sweida, when a Bedouin man set up a security checkpoint and assaulted a Druze vegetable vendor. This act of violence sparked a series of tit-for-tat retaliations, resulting in the detention of multiple Druze and Bedouin tribesmen. Druze people detained several Bedouin tribesmen, and in response, Bedouins detained and abducted several Druze community people, prompting counter-retaliation. The situation immediately turned into violent armed clashes between two historic communities, with further deaths of approximately 940 Syrian people.
Historically, the complex interplay of sectarian tensions, land disputes, competition over minority rights, marginalization, and longstanding perceived grievances has contributed to Syria’s fragmented political and social landscape. These underlying root causes continue to manifest sometimes in the form of revolution, sometimes in the form of armed clashes, and sometimes in the form of terrorism and external actors’ intervention, particularly in regions like Sweida, where fault lines between communities remain volatile.
Equally important, the ongoing clashes in Syria continue to open doors for external actors to assert their influence and shape the country’s future to serve their own strategic goals. Among these actors, Israel comes first to pursue its regional objectives, often aligned with its expansionist ambitions as part of the broader Middle East.
In the aftermath of recent clashes between Druze and Bedouin, Israel immediately struck the Syrian Ministry of Defence and declared support for Syrian Druze. Observers suggest that Israel seeks to deepen its ties with Syrian Druze, particularly to capitalize on the shared ethnic and religious identity, as the Druze community serves in the Israeli military. By projecting solidarity with Syrian Druze, Israel appears to be cultivating goodwill among local militias, ultimately aimed at establishing a pro-Israel buffer zone in Southern Syria.
Israel’s strategy is to expose Ahmad al-Sharaa’s inability to control the situation, while positioning itself as the true protector of human rights. This calculated narrative allows Israel to divert the public’s attention from human rights violations and crimes against humanity carried out by Israel in Gaza.
However, the recent instability in Syria demonstrates several critical weaknesses of Ahmad al-Sharaa’s government, both internally and externally in the eyes of international and regional actors.
First, the fact that tribal groups (Druze and Bedouin) are clashing, yet the government has failed to stop this escalation ladder, shows the weak grip on state sovereignty and territorial control. This undermines the central government’s claim of national unity and post-war stability and recovery.
Secondly, minorities have lost trust in the government, which was playing a neutral role in Syrian affairs. Now, they view the Syrian government either as ignorant or against them, eroding the loyalty, which is dangerous for a leader trying to rebuild a state after decades of civil war.
Thirdly, al-Sharaa is trying to position himself as a reformer or restorer of sustainable peace in Syria, but unfortunately, violence among tribes and historic communities, especially involving state-linked militias, contradicts that image of a reformer or restorer of peace.
Fourthly, as always, chaos in Syria opens windows for foreign interventions, including by Iran, Israel, Turkey, and even the USA, to intervene or gain influence for their strategic goals. A strong state would keep its borders tight and prevent any incursion from manipulating internal conflicts. Due to fragile peace and porous borders, we see Israeli Druze crossing the Syrian border from the South, Iranian proxies are ready to mobilize and take advantage of the situation for the Hezbollah channel, and the US and Turkish diplomacy is intensifying, all signs that al-Sharaa has no control over Syria.
Lastly, al-Sharaa wants to sell the idea that “Syria is stabilizing.” Still, recent intercommunal violence and the death of approximately 940 Syrian people within a week show that old grievances are unresolved, tribal justice still reigns, and the social fabric in Syria is torn. It suggests that the Syrian civil war may be “over” militarily, but not socially and politically.
The writer is a freelance columnist
