Afghanistan bleeds. So does the region.

“I want to scream again, and I remember that last time I felt this way, riding with Baba in the tank of the fuel truck, buried in the dark with other refugees. I want to tear myself from this place, from this reality, rise up like a cloud and float away, melt into this humid summer night and dissolve somewhere far, over the hills. But I am here, my legs blocks of concrete, my lungs empty of air, my throat burning. There will be no floating away. There will be no other reality tonight.”

Khaled Hosseini: “The Kite Runner”

Afghanistan presents a face of contrasts, oscillating between the extremes of trepidation and hope. In the confluence of developments, it is well-nigh impossible to bet definitely on one eventuality in preference to the other. Yet, as we drift on in time, the prospect of increased violence, even a brutal civil war for gaining control of Kabul, is becoming increasingly likelier.

In real terms, that would mean continuation of the conflict that started almost four decades ago, wreaking havoc, destruction and agony across the expanse of Afghanistan with millions escaping its brutality to neighbouring countries. Pakistan alone is looking after over three million refugees, a number that would swell further in the event of renewed displacement.

Even if Pakistan were to launch a renewed effort for peace in Afghanistan together with other regional countries and impress upon the warring groups that there is no alternative to engaging in a dialogue, the chances for its success look bleak. The compromise has to be mutual: the Kabul government cannot hang on to power indefinitely and the Taliban must realise the futility of a take-over through exercising brutal power, as that would not be a catalyst for peace. The formation of an interim government comprising all stakeholders may still be the best option to decide the future of Afghanistan with a spirit of mutual compromise. But, that may be the unlikeliest prospect in the face of the surge by the Taliban who are knocking at the Kabul gates

The Taliban have gained immensely in terms of territorial control over the last few weeks and their advance continues almost unhindered. The Afghan National Forces, in whom there was much faith reposed by the Kabul government, appear to be wilting before the ceaseless onslaught unleashed by the militants. There are reports of a large number of them having surrendered while others are defecting along with their weapons and equipment. This is an alarming development which, in the event the hostilities continued, could further expedite the demise of the fabrication in Kabul. Under such circumstances, the fall of the capital which was projected to take place a year from now, could happen much earlier. But other than a militant victory, is there any other option left to consider at this stage of the battle when a total Taliban control looks imminent?

After the recent visit of the Afghan leadership to Washington where they were told to take decisions on their own for the world to follow, the ones occupying the wobbly citadel of power have run out of options. With their army wilting and their support base, if ever there was any, depleting, their chances of hanging on to power are diminishing by the day. In such a situation, it is almost impossible to understand the obduracy of the incumbent government to insist on continuing to play the delaying game. I am saying so because that is the impression one gathers from the manner they have approached the possibility of negotiations with the Taliban– most reluctantly and that, too, with preconditions everyone knows would be rejected by the adversary. This is tantamount to conveying their unwillingness to engage in a substantive and meaningful dialogue, preferring instead to go for an elusive victory in the battlefield.

Pakistan has long been pleading for a negotiated settlement of the crisis that would be led and owned by the Afghans. Barring India, which is playing the spoiler, this has been the stance of all regional countries also which, on different occasions, have expressed their opposition to a violent take-over. That was the rationale for convening the Doha talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban so that they could make a genuine effort to reach a mutually acceptable compromise. Unfortunately, after months of futile interaction, there has been little progress and the adversaries have remained locked in mundane technicalities: whether Afghanistan should be an Islamic Democratic Republic or an Islamic Emirate? This also reflected the lack of interest of the beleaguered Afghan government to reach a settlement as it has often expressed its unwillingness to relinquish charge to make way for an interim government including the Taliban that would decide how Afghanistan would be governed.

It must, however, be conceded that there is enormous difference between the situation that prevailed when the Doha dialogue was initiated and now, when there is a speedy Taliban charge for the capital. Earlier, the Kabul government could also bank on the presence of the US troops in the country, which is not the case now as the last of their fighters have already left. So, it is the Afghan government alone that has to stem the Taliban tide. The question is whether that is possible at all? If not, which seems to be getting more obvious by the day, what is it that the Afghan government is aiming for by refusing to engage in an all-encompassing dialogue and, instead, prolonging a war which, by all indications, it has already lost?

The strains of logic that one can still exercise in these gruelling times have little to answer by way of any substantive gain for the Kabul government in continuing to fight. They are losing in the face of a relentless Taliban offensive. With troops of the Afghan National Army crossing over to the opponents at an alarming pace, the chances for them to hold on have practically vanished. The local militias which some of the more die-hard opponents of the Taliban have raised in the last few months are not equipped either with the necessary armaments or resolve to offer any sustainable resistance. They can, at best, continue fighting semi-guerrilla battles in the hinterland, but they would not be able to engage in an open confrontation with the advancing forces which are soon likely to encircle the capital.

With increasing tensions with the USA in the wake of its refusal to give it bases for continued operations inside Afghanistan, Pakistan has demonstrated that it wants to stay away from the ensuing battle for power in Afghanistan. As it has repeatedly said in the past, this is a matter which must be settled by the Afghans themselves. Simultaneously, it has pledged support and facilitation to make an agreement possible between the warring groups. That, it appears, may not be sufficient to avoid a catastrophic bloodbath of which it will have to bear the major brunt in the shape of increased instability across its western border and the possible influx of refugees.

The contribution of the spoilers in bringing matters to this pass cannot be understated. This has reflected often in the shape of venomous statements attributed to Afghan leaders who are holding key positions in the administration. The prospect of a Northern Alliance-like coalition is dangled in front of the incumbent government with the plea that they should hang in there. The recent formation of some militias is a key development in this regard. This can potentially lead to fragmentation of the country along ethnic lines and the conflict may rage on for much longer to the detriment of Afghanistan and the larger region, most importantly Pakistan.

At a recent discussion concerning Afghanistan, the question regarding Pakistan’s options was debated: what is it that it should or should not do? There was unanimity that it should not become a party to the ongoing conflict in any way, but it also cannot afford to sit back and let its Western neighbour plunge into an inferno of death and destruction. This is the tightrope that Pakistan walks, and there appears no easy way out of the impasse.

Even if Pakistan were to launch a renewed effort for peace in Afghanistan together with other regional countries and impress upon the warring groups that there is no alternative to engaging in a dialogue, the chances for its success look bleak. The compromise has to be mutual: the Kabul government cannot hang on to power indefinitely and the Taliban must realise the futility of a take-over through exercising brutal power, as that would not be a catalyst for peace. The formation of an interim government comprising all stakeholders may still be the best option to decide the future of Afghanistan with a spirit of mutual compromise. But, that may be the unlikeliest prospect in the face of the surge by the Taliban who are knocking at the Kabul gates.