Iran is in the grip of the worst unrest it has seen in years. Though this is not a new phenomenon, as the Islamic Republic regime has faced protests in the past and survived them, it is nevertheless battle hardened in this regard. However, this time the intensity of the protests, combined with the fragility of a government under immense economic pressure, cannot be easily ignored. To top it off, global geopolitics stirred by the Trump presidency is also proving to be a catalyst. Regardless of the outcome, it is interesting to examine that a conservative Iran is perhaps disliked by its own citizenry and the Iranian diaspora, but not necessarily by its neighbouring countries.
If we look at the big picture since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Iran’s neighbours, especially its Arab neighbours, appear to have been net gainers. Pre-revolutionary Iran was the staunchest ally of the USA in the region, one of the largest oil exporters, and a scientifically and technologically advanced country among its peers.
With the Khomeini-led revolution, Iran faced US-backed sanctions, political upheavals, and wars. Its economy became fragmented and its society deeply polarized. Saudi Arabia, although diplomatically opposed to the revolution, quietly earned centrestage as the main ally of the West in the region, a position that stood vacant after Iran’s abdication from that role. As a result, the stature and global importance of Saudi Arabia increased significantly.
The UAE, especially Dubai, has been one of the biggest beneficiaries of the cultural decline of Beirut in Lebanon and Karachi in Pakistan, but the major impetus came from Iran’s conversion from an open society into an ultra-orthodox and closed one. Dubai lacked what its twin Abu Dhabi possessed, oil, but it compensated by offering a culturally open environment with social liberties that had largely ceased to exist elsewhere in the region. It offered a vibrant nightlife and other attractions, drawing pleasure seeking tourists from across the region and beyond. On top of that, it became a dumping ground for money-rich elites from South Asia and the wider region. Perhaps the UAE may also not favour a secular Iran and would be content with the status quo there.
We need to remember that when something radically new happens, it initially creates awe and surprise. However, if that situation prevails for a longer duration, it creates a new set of beneficiaries who learn how to use the new realities to their advantage. This adaptation eventually becomes normalized, and any change to it is resisted, much like resistance to change before it.
The unfolding developments in Iran could give rise to highly perplexing situations, creating dilemmas few imagined possible. As noted at the beginning of this analysis, there is a contradiction between the interests of Iran’s neighbours and those of its protesters. Regardless of national pride, Iranians may not be able to remain immune to regional interference if the current status quo collapses. A transition to a democratic order in the absence of a credible interim authority would be extremely fragile. It is a complex situation, and it is likely to become even more volatile in the days ahead.
Similar arguments can be made in the context of Pakistan and Turkey. For Pakistan, the reasoning is fairly straightforward. It feels safer on its western border with Iran under the present power arrangement, because the emergence of a nationalist Iranian state with potentially deep ties to the USA and Israel could compromise Pakistan’s geopolitical relevance. So far, Pakistan has served US interests in the context of a radical regime in Afghanistan and a theocratic Iran that consistently chanted “marg bar America.” If this situation changes, Pakistan would need to reshuffle its priorities, which have been deeply entrenched in the status quo of a conservative Iran for nearly 50 years. To some extent, the same applies to Turkey. After emerging from periods of martial law, Turkey became a tourist hub and a necessary US ally within NATO, largely because it borders two major US rivals, Russia and Iran. If Iran is removed from that equation, Turkey loses a significant portion of its strategic importance.
China, too, could be potentially disadvantaged. It has relied on Iranian oil to meet its ever growing energy needs, particularly in scenarios where the USA might exert pressure through its influence over oil-producing countries in the region. So far, China could count on Iran as a reliable supplier in a worst-case scenario. However, if the current arrangements in Iran cannot be maintained, those oil lines could dry up at a mere cue from Washington. Therefore, China may also not be in favour of a major change in Iran.
Much more can be deduced about a potentially US-allied Iran and its repercussions across the region, and they are many. This does not imply that all regional actors are actively working to keep a cleric-ruled Iran in place. Rather, it is an inference drawn from the current geopolitical realities surrounding Iran.
If the current round of protests and agitation succeeds, there could be many regional strategic losers. The only clear net gainers would be the Iranians who seek change and, of course, the USA. Nonetheless, regardless of the aspirations of regional countries, Iranians, with their strong nationalist pride, may not welcome outside meddling in their internal affairs. But the reality is that revolutions or counter revolutions do not work that way, regardless of the intensity of protests or the unfortunate loss of human life.
From the protesters’ perspective, the target is well defined: the removal of the current regime. However, a country of 90 million people cannot function without an alternative governing structure. A mob cannot run day-to-day affairs. Governance requires leadership, which is currently absent. This has been an unfortunate pattern across much of the Middle East, where countries were largely ruled by dictatorships, whether religious or secular. Long periods of authoritarian rule silenced opposition so thoroughly that no viable alternative leadership emerged. As a result, when ruling individuals or groups disappeared or became incapacitated, no one else was prepared to govern. The world witnessed this in Libya, where after the fall of Gaddafi, no political party or organized structure existed to run the state. Power eventually fell into the hands of extremist groups operating in a nomadic fashion.
The unfolding developments in Iran could give rise to highly perplexing situations, creating dilemmas few imagined possible. As noted at the beginning of this analysis, there is a contradiction between the interests of Iran’s neighbours and those of its protesters. Regardless of national pride, Iranians may not be able to remain immune to regional interference if the current status quo collapses. A transition to a democratic order in the absence of a credible interim authority would be extremely fragile. It is a complex situation, and it is likely to become even more volatile in the days ahead.
