Decapitated yet resilient

The imposed war tests the limit of the theocratic state

It has been almost two months since the USA attacked Iran; the USA was tactically supported by the IDF in terms of firepower. Its disregard for collateral damage receded into an uneasy ceasefire followed by practically one round of talk between the warring parties and later discreet signalling for the negotiations as well as indirect exchange of scripts through the good offices of Pakistan. 

As things stand, the interior minister of Pakistan has undertaken a number of visits to Tehran, in what can be an effort to speed post the developments towards a permanent ceasefire. For the Pakistani establishment it is the stake of avoiding a devastating conflict just in the neighbourhood, whose escalation can potentially bring Pakistan face to face with very hard choices.

While that has been a third party assessment of the situation, a peek into the first three months after the decapitation campaign jointly launched by the IDF and Pentagon, reveals that these three months have been an equally testing times for the theocratic state, not just in the domain of military response to the aggression or pressure tactics, but the resilience of the system itself, against internal and external challenges, rather pressure tactics employed by the enemies.

The system of government in force in Iran in fact has the potential to draw the attention of the students of political science and religious movements; as to how it has been able; firstly, to survive, sustain and lastly maintain itself. Among the generally theocratic models the world knows have been largely drawn from what transpired in the west; more precisely in Europe and particularly in the case of the Vatican. The Christian world is more or less composed of devout believers, yet the issues of the state are generally kept away from the affairs of the religion. The Vatican is a state city; yet its hold over the whole Christian world is not binding. 

Compared to that, the experiment in Iran is unique. It does not even resemble its forerunner the Safavis. The Safavi were Sufis degenerating into a monarchy. They brought the Shia faith and its clergy from the South Lebanese enclave of Jabal Amil. The arrival of these clerics in Iran, their interaction with the seminaries in Najaf in south Iraq, and later their immigration to the Indian subcontinent during the Mughal era, in fact laid the foundation of the Shia faith in the whole area, which is now termed the Shia Crescent by geo political observers. Here it is important to note that the clergy were highly respected figures in the society, a fact which was not ignored by the last Pahlavi monarch Mohammad Raza, who despite strong repulsion for Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, in 1964 could not hang him as the 1905 constitution disallowed any disrespect to the senior cleric.

The type of theocracy is unique on another count; its peer comparison with the larger Sunni world’s most prominent dynasty, Ottomans, who were religious but in no way anything close to the theocratic model. The Morsi government was subservient to the national constitution. It did not elevate the status of the Al-Azhar seminary. Likewise, the Iraqi state, despite a very imposing influence of the Shia seminaries; had no system of government which binds the setup to consult the Najaf powerbase. In simple words, the incumbent Ayatollah Sistani has no constitutional say in the day-to-day affairs and even interpretation of the system at large.  

Compared to that both the tenures of the Taliban, in 1996-2001 and now in power since 2021, can be termed as something close to the rule of clerics visualized by their Persian-speaking Iranian brothers. It may be recalled that despite the geopolitical linkages of the Taliban with the regional states; when the issue of handling over Osama Bin Laden to the USA over alleged links with 9/11 attacks came up, the reclusive Mullah Omar did not decide it on his own, rather the news creeds of that time point to the congregation of Ulema and clergy to decide about the fate of the Al Qaeda leader.

Fast track to 2021, the hold of clergy seems to be the same; but less intrusive, when compared in the unlikely domain of cricket. It may be pointed out that despite a general distaste for sports amongst the clergy, the Afghan cricket team might have a greater freedom of action when playing abroad. While the dissident Iranian footballers like Ali Karimi make it a point not to recite the Iranian national anthem to show their disdain for the ‘Nezam’, the Afghan cricket team and the Afghan government were a more tolerant breed, the Taliban allowing them to get best training in other countries; and also have the liberty to recite the Afghan anthem composed during Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani time in the tournaments, with the government in Kabul in complete knowledge of the happening.

Given the assumption that the regime change project as declared by US President Donald Trump himself has taken another shape, and includes compliant people willing to talk to the USA, the posturing by either the radical faction; or even the supreme leader, itself is indicative that the core is not ready to give in without a fight. It would not be out of context to say that the slain leader was too shown the door in peacetime by the reformists in the same manner. Here the choices for Mujtaba are even grave. In the next few days, signalling within Iran and in the external domain will finalize, if the regime or the Nezam or the movement has capitulated or is still calling the shots.

It might not be out of context to say that the intrusive Pakistani cricket board and highly politicized Bangladeshi cricket board failed to inspire the players in a somewhat secular terms of reference, while the cricket team under the Taliban proved to have a greater freedom of action.   

Intruding too far into the comparisons, the Iranian model practiced since 1979 has not just survived the military conflict, rather it has survived the strictest test of internal world and the external world. To begin with, the Iranian creative scene has grown under the new cultural context under the watchful eyes of the theocratic system. It has not been just the rule of law, like the binding upon the directors and producers of the serials and movie to submit their under development drafts to the ‘Irshad’ ministry, it has been possible on the count that the generation which grew up with the 1979 movement and now old to middle aged in profile understood the spirit of the movement and were able to forward the same to the audience.

The 1979 movement was able to relate to the audience in a manner that it was not an ideological lecture encapsulated into a drama serial or a movie, a type of art form prevalent in India under Modi like Kashmir Files and movies with similar names; or the Pakistani drama experience, where everything needs to be interpreted either in a ‘geopolitical context’ or has to have the issue of ‘terrorism’ as the pet theme.  Likewise, many Islamic movements take a skeptical view of women playing musical instruments. In the Iranian theocratic republic, it is possible; on the premise that it is done under the prevalent injunctions of the belief moderated through Ijtihad.

The issue of Hijab courtesy Mahsa Amini case in 2022,  which almost developed into a mass protest, was the high point challenging regime legitimacy, which was contained not just by repression, as is generally perceived; but a system stepping back empathetically. 

The resilience can further be felt the way the system has tried to steer itself despite pressures from the external sources and support for the same pressure from the internal actors. It goes without saying much that the reformist administration has been eyeing normalization of relations with the USA, when the IDF and CENTCOM were all set to pounce upon Iran in June 2025, and again similar stances were taken when the February 28 fateful strike against the Bayat Rahbari took place, in literal sense leaving the Nezam without any head. 

The May 21 supreme leader direct order disallowing the transfer of the nuclear material from Iran to any other country and the muted refutation of the same by the ‘official sources’ as a matter of fact shows the political powderkeg the system is tolerating, yet ignoring. With a military threat looming which can even take out the current supreme leader in whatever shape he is, a threat more empathetically felt by a retired Pakistani general, who dismissed the US Vice-President J.D. Vance’s remarks about the slow Iranian response, arguing that if Iran made the mistake of exposing Mujtaba Khomeini’s coordinates, they would not relent even for a second to target him. 

Given the assumption that the regime change project as declared by US President Donald Trump himself has taken another shape, and includes compliant people willing to talk to the USA, the posturing by either the radical faction; or even the supreme leader, itself is indicative that the core is not ready to give in without a fight. It would not be out of context to say that the slain leader was too shown the door in peacetime by the reformists in the same manner. Here the choices for Mujtaba are even grave. In the next few days, signalling within Iran and in the external domain will finalize, if the regime or the Nezam or the movement has capitulated or is still calling the shots.