Assured second strike between India and Pakistan 

Impact on strategic stability in South Asia

The second-strike principle which is the assurance that the state that they will respond with likely nuclear retaliation should they be hit in the first strike has proved to be a key pillar in the nuclear-weaponized world deterrence strategy. The essence of strategic stability is a debate whether one of the sides can actually afford enjoying their diverse conventional arsenals and nuclear weapons in South Asia whereby India and Pakistan have large conventional arsenals and nuclear weapons.

Although the nuclear arsenal of India has been stated to bear a high second strike capability in a situation involving its nuclear submarine fleet, the nuclear capability of Pakistan has been argued to be more crippled, posing questions of credibility to its deterring capability. Since India has an assured second-strike capability due to the developed ballistic-missile submarine (SSBN) force, it can contribute to a critical role in the sphere of strategic stability, and the fact that Pakistan had a developing submarine capability puts Pakistan in a disadvantage, which will create an unstable presence in the region. The modern literature supports this fact through the promotion of the idea that the asymmetry of the second-striking resilience can be the characteristic of India, the strategic calculus, and the nuclear posture of the Pakistani scenario perhaps. 

THE SOUTH ASIA STRATEGIC LOGIC OF THE SECOND STRIKE: The deterrent argument is based on the fact of the so-called balanced arm, the utility of the first strike will decline when both parties assume that any nuclear attack will be countered by a devastating retaliation. The strategy of minimum credible deterrence and strategic stability that India seeks involves a second-strike guarantee and Pakistan has long been concerned about second-strike guarantees, and a deterrence guarantee, which does not always involve effective capability. A nuclear triad which includes terrestrial missiles, airplanes and submarines is survivable and versatile. The submarine force is the strongest in India bearing in mind that the SSBNs are the most survivable. 

INDIAN SUBMARINE 2ND STRIKE CAPABILITY: The concept of second-strike credibility is reflected in the physical aspect through the SSBN fleet of India, the so-called Killer-class (the INS Arihant, the INS Kalvari, the INS Khanderi, the INS Sindhuvir, the INS Viraat). All these ships have ten K-15 (SS-26) or future K-4 (SS-26) submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), with a range of 750-1500 km. It is undetected and unbeaten because of the 10m tactical warhead of the K-15 and also nuclear propulsion plant.

The given analysis has helped to justify this asymmetry by stating that the Pakistan nuclear policy should be developed in such a way that the plausible second-strike capability should be factored in otherwise the strategic stability of the region would continue to be threatened. Finally, though not the least, is the maturation of the deterrence position of the two parties in South Asia into the special focus on the construction of the credible and survivable nuclear delivery systems that will not serve the instigation and prevention purposes.

The operational preparedness was manifested in the successful test of the SLBM of the INS Arihant, which was conducted in 2016. In addition, K-4 with the range of 1,500km developed by India will be able to cover more in terms of strategy and the submarines will be able to patrol beyond the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea. The doctrine of the navy strategy that is entrenched in the Nuclear Doctrine: A Policy Manual (Indian Ministry of External Affairs) identifies the SSBN as the final deterrent factor, which ensures survival at the national level. 

PAKISTAN, NAVAL AND SECOND STRIKE CAPABILITY: To a great extent, the Pakistan naval nuclear posture is conventional based. The navy has neither operational, nor strategic, platform of deterrence and it has only a land-based missile system which is largely the Shaheen-III MIRV missile with a range of approximately 1500km and the Raad with a short range ballistic missile. As far as Pakistan has recently also had the means to procure the PNS Mehran and PNS Jinnah ballistic missile submarines (BMSs), they have not been equipped with nuclear missiles. The traditional diesel-electric types of Karaka (K- 15) of the Pakistani Navy do not have the nuclear propulsion or the SLBMs. The nuclear second strike by Pakistan according to modern estimation by experts like Dr. Amir Hasan (centre of Strategic Studies, Islamabad) is at the infantile stage and heavily reliant on the survival possibility which is doubtful largely pegged on the pre-emptive attack which is not so appealing. The magnificent underwater platform is not strong enough that places the Pakistan deterrence in a bad position with the powerful underwater capability of India. 

IMPLICATIONS FOR STRATEGIC STABILITY: The asymmetry of the capabilities of second strike is transformed to the asymmetry of the strategy. The PINI SSBNs can survive the initial attack and retaliate with the help of safe under-sea bases and India can rightly expect the credible deterrent effect. With no equal platform, Pakistan will have an increased probability to be targeted without any response and it will affect its choice to either one-way escalation or pre-emptive nuclear options.

The current risk analysis like the South Asian Strategic outlook (2024) notes that the restrictions on the second strike of Pakistan are one of the handicapping that could be employed to motivate India to develop a strategic first strike position in case it feels threatened. Moreover, the existence of plausible second-strike platforms will destroy the very stability that deterrence is considered to maintain.Also, the existence of plausible second-strike platforms would enable the enlargement of the security space. The Indian SSBNs are urging Pakistan to possess a strong conventional deterrent and spend more on missile defence as well as the early-warning mechanism. The aspect of the fear of the first strike unimpeachably leads to restraint that will comply with the concept of the mutually assured destruction (MAD). In relative terms, the second inferior strike of Pakistan decreases the deterrence impact and could contribute to more nuclear flashpoints and a higher chance of a misscalculation, which is an issue that is expressed by the Institute of War and Peace Reporting (2023). 

The new developments in the field of geopolitics have cemented second-strike capability. The launching of K-4 missile by India in 2023 and the creation of more advanced SSBNs indicate the increase in the power of the Indian underwater deterrent. In the meantime, there was an announcement of a traditional platform of the Agosta 90B of Pakistan, which indicated that it was not competitive to India about the survivability in the provision of nuclear. According to the view of analysts like Dr. Qamar Hussain (International Crisis Group), Pakistan needs to revise its nuclear policy, according to which it focuses on firepower, into the turnover of credibility in survivable platforms.

Besides this, another factor that will affect the diplomatic relations would be the perception of the international community on the Pakistan nuclear posture. The importance of the second-striking capability is indirectly hinted in the UN Security Council resolution on nuclear risk reduction 2026 which is supportive of the expansion of the transparency and confidence-building measures. The refusal of Pakistan to use nuclear submarines can be taken as the indicator of the weakening of the deterrence in the form of asking foreign forces to disarm it or assuring it that it would be safe. 

The Indian sub-continent has a cardinal aspect of strategic stability which is the existence of plausible survivable second strike capability. It also decreases the nuclear first strike probability due to the advanced SSBN fleet of the Indian that has a high level of SBMLs. That is why, currently, Pakistan lacks such a platform, and its deterrence is not strong, relying on the traditional image of the force and limited reach of missiles and, potentially, lead to a more attack-oriented stance. 

The given analysis has helped to justify this asymmetry by stating that the Pakistan nuclear policy should be developed in such a way that the plausible second-strike capability should be factored in otherwise the strategic stability of the region would continue to be threatened. Finally, though not the least, is the maturation of the deterrence position of the two parties in South Asia into the special focus on the construction of the credible and survivable nuclear delivery systems that will not serve the instigation and prevention purposes. 

 Author is scholar at National Defense University Pursuing BS Strategic Studies and have keen Interest in region South Asia, Middle East, Major powers Geopolitics Nuclear Doctrines and International Politics.