The UN Security Council has just approved a US-sponsored resolution to deploy an International Stabilisation Force (ISF) and establish a transitional “Board of Peace” in Gaza. On paper, this appears to be a breakthrough. In reality, it is a blueprint for uncertainty, fragile legitimacy, and rushed optics. Stability is being proclaimed, yet its foundation remains precarious. What the world is celebrating may, in effect, be a premature attempt to engineer order over a ceasefire still swinging in mid-air.
The resolution entrusts foreign troops with responsibilities that are ambiguously defined. It lacks a classical UN peacekeeping mandate, clear command structures, or operational autonomy. The ISF is to act “in consultation” with regional powers, but Palestinian institutions are largely sidelined. Borders, humanitarian corridors, and arms control regimes remain unresolved. A presence without authority is not peacekeeping; it is theatre. Troop contributors, uncertain of their legal remit or chain of command, may find themselves trapped in a politically contested mission before it even begins.
Accountability mechanisms are conspicuously absent. Without a robust fact-finding and evidence-preservation structure, the ISF risks complicity in impunity. Stabilisation without justice is not stabilisation; it is a veneer for inaction. Protection of civilians cannot be decoupled from mechanisms that enforce accountability, document violations, and safeguard the dignity and rights of those most affected by conflict. Failure to embed these responsibilities could convert the mission into yet another instrument of political expediency.
Crucially, Palestinians must not be relegated to spectators in the management of their own future. The transition framework must embed the Palestinian Authority, local governance structures, and civil society as enforceable decision-makers, not symbolic advisers. Stabilisation without sovereignty is not peace; it is supervision masquerading as progress. The legitimacy and effectiveness of the ISF will hinge entirely on the extent to which it empowers Palestinians to exercise agency over reconstruction, governance, and protection. Without this, even the most well-resourced mission risks being perceived as an occupying presence rather than a protective force.
Regional reactions underscore these risks. Troop-contributing states demand clarity, neutrality, and operational transparency. Other states, while supporting the ceasefire, warn against arrangements resembling external control dressed as assistance. These concerns reflect a fundamental truth: legitimacy cannot be conjured through majority votes, procedural abstentions, or diplomatic theatrics. It is earned only when those whose lives are most affected retain meaningful authority over the processes shaping their future.
A credible stabilisation plan must therefore be narrow, precise, and phased. Civilian protection and unhindered humanitarian access should be the immediate priorities. Command structures must be transparent, rules of engagement clearly published, and authority over border crossings firmly established to guarantee delivery of aid and prevent politicisation. Accountability mechanisms, including independent monitoring and reporting, are indispensable from day one. And any governance transition must be anchored in demonstrable Palestinian consent. Attempting to expand the mission beyond these core priorities before the foundation is secure risks converting the ISF into a symbolic or destabilising presence.
Operational coherence is equally critical. The current resolution fails to clarify how contributors will coordinate, who will exercise ultimate command, or how the ISF will interface with both Israeli authorities and Palestinian institutions. Any ambiguity in authority, compounded by competing veto powers or political interference, could paralyse the mission. An under-equipped, fragmented force will not only fail to deliver protection and reconstruction but may also exacerbate insecurity, inadvertently deepening local mistrust.
Furthermore, legitimacy is inseparable from justice. The ISF must not only facilitate civilian protection but also document abuses, preserve evidence, and uphold international standards. Without these measures, stabilisation becomes an exercise in optics, allowing violations to be concealed and undermining the credibility of the UN and contributing states. In this context, Palestinian participation is non-negotiable: a mission cannot claim success if it overrides the political and civic agency of the population it is meant to protect.
Finally, the broader political architecture matters. The U.S.-designed framework, if implemented without meaningful consultation, risks creating friction not only with Palestinians but also among regional actors. Countries willing to provide troops may hesitate, while others may question the
legitimacy of a board perceived as externally imposed. Hasty imposition of multi-year governance and military structures could generate resistance, weaken operational coherence, and ultimately derail the very stability the Council seeks to secure.
In essence, the ISF represents an opportunity to protect civilians and facilitate reconstruction, but only if its mandate is narrow, clear, accountable, and anchored in Palestinian agency. Stability cannot be engineered through procedural votes or superficial consensus. It must be earned through justice, clarity, and empowerment. Anything less risks transforming Gaza’s “stabilisation” into externally controlled oversight, perpetuating cycles of mistrust and leaving the civilian population vulnerable once more.
