A tale of two factions

The hardliners versus the peace party

AT PENPOINT

Across the US media landscape, there is a lively debate going on as to whether the USA has won or lost in its war against Iran. This seems strange, for it seems to ignore the second attack on Iran by the USA, for the two combatants are still engaging in exchanges of bombings of cities by the USA and missile attacks on US bases in the Gulf. It may be remembered that other wars have entered that rather sad stage when the fighting goes on even though one side no longer has any chance of victory. In both world wars, fighting went on for months after the failure of the last German offensive.

This may be seen as that stage where the losing side still retains a cohesive military machine. The alternative is to seek a ceasefire, to be followed by a surrender and a cessation of hostilities. Though the June Memorandum of Understanding confirmed a ceasefire, it was not accompanied by a sense that either side had lost. Certainly, neither side admitted it to themselves.

Only now, with a second (third, if one counts the 2024 bombings) trial of strength, has it become obvious that there is a drift into a war of attrition, with neither side able to launch a decisive blow. The USA is reduced to depending on the pragmatists on the Iranians winning the debate with the hardliners, while Iran is left to waiting for the same.

The indications are that the favoured US solution, a ground invasion, looks increasingly less likely, as the US military and political establishment has come to realize afresh that while the only solution to the US need to bring Iran to heel, it is prohibitively costly, and the USA may not have what it takes.

Iran, or more precisely Iran’s regime, has survived. That is the salient fact that the USA cannot accept. It will not do what the USA wants, both on its nuclear programme and on its missiles, not to mention that it sets a bad example. The Gulf monarchies remain concerned about their own survival, and to what extent the USA contributes to this. Moving towards Iran, it seems to them that their most vital interest, the ability to export their oil, is no longer being protected, and perhaps cannot be.

There is the problem that unlike the USA, Iran cannot guarantee the safe export of Gulf oil on its own. This can, in US eyes, only be done if the USA brings Iran on board, which implies a regime in Iran willing to cooperate with the USA. This is all the more necessary considering that the USA would like the future arrangement to include Israel. That implies that the Israeli outrage against Iran, which made it push the USA towards this war, is not so much the Iranian nuclear programme, as its probable refusal to cooperate with Israel.

Another reason Israel is enraged with Iran to the extent that it killed its Supreme Leader is that it provides such a bad example, one which makes all of Israel's  gains through the Abraham Accords worthless. For a long time, Iran and Turkey were the only Muslim countries to recognize Israel, but after the 1979 Revolution, it also became the only one to de-recognize it.

If Iran aspires to the leadership of maintaining its present course of independence, if it aspires to the leadership of the Muslim world, its sectarianism must be abandoned, or at least modified. Can it retain its current stance if it  retains that sectarian colour? That is a question that the Iranian people alone can answer. They have been steadfast so far in supporting the hardliners; how much farther can they go for staying out of the US orbit?

It is not Iran alone that the USA resents, but the powers it sees Iran as the stalking-horse for, China and Russia. The failure of US sanctions on Iran would indicate that any on China would have the same absence of effect. It has also been a case of misery loving company, with the three having developed mechanisms to bypass sanctions, and constructing a rudimentary financial architecture to act as an alternative to, and perhaps even replace, The Bretton Woods system the USA constructed after World War II. Perhaps as much, if not more, that its supposed nuclear programme, Iran’s willingness to accept non-dollar payments for its oil has irritated the USA, because it could mean the end of the dollar’s position as the world’s reserve currency.

Trump has managed to overuse the sanctions weapon to the extent that it has led to the creation of an alternate financial universe. At the moment, it has only three members, but it is likely to expand, as the USA has probably not done using sanctions despite the evidence that they do not work.

It is also worth noting that Iran has observed certain US red lines since the resumption of US bombing. There have been no attacks on Israel, even though it has continued to attack Hezbollah targets in Lebanon. There have also been no attacks on US naval vessels, even though that is a threat the USA has also got. The US military bases in the Gulf that have been hit do not include either the Bahrain or Qatar bases, which are major naval headquarters. Even as the USA hurtles further up the escalation ladder, Iran is trying to exercise restraint.

This has left open the door to diplomacy, and has also revealed that the internal debate continues in Iran, between the hardliners and the pro-deal party. It cannot be doubted that Iran, particularly the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, has the ability to launch missile attacks on US naval assets, particularly after the return of the USS Abraham Lincoln to base for repairs, indicating that there had been just such an attack. That no further attacks have taken place indicates that Iran is holding back, indicating that the pro-negotiation party has enough influence over the hardliners to hold them back.

The pro-negotiation party believes that the economic penalty is high, and the pain being inflicted on the Iranian people should not be tolerated any longer. It iAAAAs willing to join an arrangement with the USA to ensure the security of the Gulf, including the opening of the Hormuz Strait. That would only be possible if Israel were to give its approval to the Iranian regime.

Iran seems likely to be forced to cooperate with either the Gulf regimes and the USA, or with the people of the Gulf countries, without the USA. It should not be forgotten that the USA wants Iran and Israel to work with the dynasties ruling the Gulf. The populations of these countries have not demonstrated any of the national unity Iranians have because they do not have the same sentiment towards their regime. The recent death of the ex-Emir of Qatar provides an example of how the Gulf monarchies view their regimes, as opposed to the Iranian outpouring of grief for the slain Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

Recently, Iranian President Masoud Peceshkian and Pakistani PM Shehbaz Sharif agreed to the need for Muslim unity. That may have seemed a trite sentiment, safe because of the sectarian differences between the Arab and Ajami worlds. However, it should not be forgotten that it was an ajami rebellion that brought the Abbasi dynasty to the throne.

If Iran aspires to the leadership of maintaining its present course of independence, if it aspires to the leadership of the Muslim world, its sectarianism must be abandoned, or at least modified. Can it retain its current stance if it  retains that sectarian colour? That is a question that the Iranian people alone can answer. They have been steadfast so far in supporting the hardliners; how much farther can they go for staying out of the US orbit?