The decisive variable

Lack of defensive air shield remained a handicap for the Iranians

Today; May 10, is one year after the US-brokered ceasefire has been in effect, despite disturbing noises from New Delhi. There have been talks of Sindoor 2.0, but on ground it has been peaceful all along. Foreign affairs analysts can site the international variable, the Trump variable; as the POTUS has proven to be the most efficient public relations manager to the Chengdu Corporation, whose JF 17 and J-10 were the defensive strike packages in the wee hours of 7 May 2025 which gave the manufacturers of Sukhoi, Rafale and Mirage 2000 a run for their money.  ,For the next few months, the total of jets downed by the PAF escalated from 5 to 11, thanks to Trump, who would be quoting the air combat now and then; with or without the context.

A dispassionate look from the viewpoint of the man on the street would reveal that the defensive shield, which Pakistan was able to develop, maintain and improve was the reason that the conflict between the two warring neighbours did not escalate beyond the four days intense fighting, much of which was between the air forces. It may be pointed out that the deterrence developed by the PAF has been something exclusive to that particular arm of the armed forces. Right from the days of requisition of Sabre jets by the late Air Marshal Noor Khan, who made it a point to reject a low performance jet like F-84 offered rather suggested by the USA for purchase from the US military assistance funds  and insisted to the then military dictator, Ayub Khan, to reject the F-84  in favor of the legendary F-86; to the development of the indigenous combat jet the Thunder.

These analyses at this point of time might not yield any results, but these are the lessons not to be forgotten. It is high time if the turn of events is to benefit the Iranians, they need to reconsider their defence strategies, by replicating regional experiences and customizing them accordingly. Again, the analysis is not a doomsday verdict but an important takeaway for another day, another battle lineup

It may be pointed out that the PAF’s defining performance in the early hours of the September 1965 conflict actually frustrated what was likely to be the occupation of the major city of Lahore by the Indian army. Those familiar with the map of Lahore and the canal which passes through the city can vouch for the fact that all the Indians had to manage was to get on to the road towards the city, pass through Harbanspura locality and reach the heart of the city along the Upper Mall Road. It was in fact an easy ride for them; but the six-pack sortie of the PAF reversed the plans, not just for today, but rather defined the 1965 conflict in its essence. 

The 1971 conflict was basically an insurgency where any operational efficiency might not have translated into something tangible, as the odds were simply not on the side of the Pakistani nation state. The Afghan war was basically a sublet war where the jets provided were handed over with much reluctance, unbecoming of a military deal. Kargil was again an operational hotch-potch.

The February 2019 and May 2025 conflicts could be regarded as the redefinition of the airpower dynamics for Pakistan in its restricted scenario; which remains India-centric to the essence. From the 1965 all-US-built air force, the PAF transitioned  to a mix of French and Chinese and US gadgetry in 1971, when according to the 1971 file available with the George Washington University Archive, Pakistan had no F-104 operational enough for interception and had to get the Jordanian one for the rest of the days of the war.

It might be a news to many that the lack of spares for the F-86 Sabres after the 1965 War prompted Pakistan to seek good offices of the deposed Shah of Iran to get F-86s from the phased-out lot of German Air Force, when it was next to impossible for the Pakistanis to get anywhere near the US weapon system.

As of the air battles like ‘Swift Retort’ in 2019 and ‘Bunyanum Marsoos’ in 2025, any third-party observer can safely conclude that the strike package was all indigenously Pakistani, locally built Thunders and refurbished Mirages. It would be of interest as per the data in the public domain that the strike package on the fateful night of May 6/7 2025 was all Chinese made with no F-16s to be seen or observed.

After the observations with regard to the Pakistani experience where the PAF had a parity in resource and technology with the perceived enemy, the case study of Iran raises questiona about what can be called a one-sided strategy followed by the Iranian leadership especially after the new millennium. It may be pointed out that the 1979 revolution in Iran left the new anti-US system with a complete flurry of US-made air weapon systems. It had the best of interceptors like F-14, fighter-bombers like the F-4 Phantom, ground attack capable jet like the F-5 Northrop and ground attack Cobra gunship helicopters.

That equipment, despite the technical hiccups and difficulty in the availability of hardware and spares, were kept operational by IRIAF as well as IRGC Air Force. It may be recalled that the 1991 Iraq invasion by the USA caused the Baathist government to transfer much of the assets to the Iranian airbases. Later they were confiscated as part of the war reparations. That gadgetry was predominantly Russian built; Sukhois as well as advanced Migs and military transports like the IL-76. In a way Iranian graduated into the new generation aircraft not in a big way, but were more or less updated till the first decade of the 2000 millennium.

That period was punctuated with missile programme development, specifically by the IRGC aerospace force; the subsidiary of the IRGC-AF. The missile programme development paid off in a big way in the scenarios after the 7 October 2023 Hamas incursion into the occupied territory. The engagements during that period were usually symbolic and retaliatory strikes where the degree of escalation was more or less absent. The True Promise campaigns by the IRGC were more or less safe bets; with not much damage to the Iranian infrastructure.

The paradigm based on missile development was guided by assumptions that the refueling of jets flying to  the Israeli mainland would be a risky bet, so the ICBM was the best option available. The military planners while giving weightage to the offensive capability; meaning an ICBM were a good substitute for buying or developing an aircraft which has to be refueled and has a lesser chance of bombing the enemy concentrations. What was missing in the strategy regrettably was the complete absence of advanced air defence in the form of missile batteries and also the absence of any third- or fourth-generation combat jet, which is at least capable in a defensive posture if not an offensive one.

The June 2025 engagement was more or less a beginner strike from the USAF and IDF. Most of the bombing and decapitation strikes were done by the IDF with the USA coming over only for symbolic strikes on nuclear facilities. The February 2026 strike packages were more ruthless; in terms of real time intelligence for precision decapitation as well as the complete coordination of the USAF and IDF, to the point that leaders like Larijani and the upper echelons of the IRGC were not hunted by the hired assassins which the USA could have found in hundreds amongst the dissident Iranians, but combat jets were used to do the job.

While the Gaza related strikes did not expose the need to have such assets in the IRIAF, even June 2025 damage was managed somehow or another, the February 28 to April 7 scorched earth policy jointly pursued by the IDF and USAF needed such weapon systems which were fortunately in place in Pakistan. 

The IDF had complete air superiority over the Iranian air space. A superiority which could have been dented if the one-sided concentration on the missile programme had not been pursued. As things stand, the hopes for peace are fragile and there is already a whispering in Iranian society that there are few options, either destruction in a renewed campaign or capitulation by giving up too much. 

These analyses at this point of time might not yield any results, but these are the lessons not to be forgotten. It is high time if the turn of events is to benefit the Iranians, they need to reconsider their defence strategies, by replicating regional experiences and customizing them accordingly. Again, the analysis is not a doomsday verdict but an important takeaway for another day, another battle lineup.