Prior to the 1971 war with India, the tri-service coordination was nonexistent resulting in weak jointness in military operation and a painful setback. The Pakistan Navy came to know the D-Day and H-Hour when the Army and the Air Force had already launched their operations. As a result, the PN could not take the initiative as it did in the 1965 war with India when it attacked an Indian coastal setup. Then the Indian Navy had to go on the defensive and anchored its aircraft carrier in the Bombay harbour. But in the 197i war, the Navy had to return its ships back to the Karachi harbour and suffered losses by the Indian air attacks. The three service chiefs operated on their own. They directly reported to the Ministry of Defence and the head of government.
After the ceasefire, then President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto constituted a Commission headed by Chief Justice Hamoodur Rehman to inquire into the circumstances that resulted in the catastrophe of 1971 war. The Commission in its findings pointed out the lack of jointness in the tri-service coordination and recommended the setting up of a Joint Services Headquarters and the appointment of a Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC).
I was then serving as Communication Officer in GHQ. When I voluntarily appeared before the Commission to record my statement, and there was some discussion between Justice Hamoodur Rehman and a retired general who was assisting the Commission regarding the lack of tri-service coordination during the war.
Future wars will be multidomain involving cyber, space, hybrid, and AI assisted. Only a very close cooperation between the armed services will enable them to confront the ever-increasing dangers
Then on the recommendations of the Commission, the Government introduced the Joint Staff (JS) Headquarters. A Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee was constituted which was to be headed by a chairman, a four-star general from the Army or equivalent from the Navy or the Air Force. However, the CJCSC was not vested with any command authority over the three services. He served as Principal Military Advisor to the Government on national security. The appointment was ceremonial and only that of a coordinator. With such a system in place, disagreements between the three services were inevitable, especially when supremacy of the civilian government and civil-military relations was weak.
Today’s conflicts are complex. Wars are fought simultaneously over land, sea, air, cyber and space. The recent conflict with India proved that precision strikes against the enemy targets were crucial to gain advantage. This can only be achieved with effective tri-service coordination, which is paramount to responding decisively to diverse and rapidly evolving threats.
Only with jointness can the armed forces be enabled to acquire the capacity of joint planning, training and operating together. Mere coordination (as was before the 27th Amendment) was a loose system which lacked efficiency and effectiveness. Coordination merged with integration brings unity of effort which is so essential for an upper hand against the adversary. Creating the position of Chief of the Defense Forces will be instrumental in tri-service integration. Several countries having such setups are good examples. In UK the Chief of Defense Staff (CDS) is the professional head of armed forces and the Principal Advisor to the government. It is the highest military appointment in UK. The CDS is based in the Ministry of Defense and works alongside the Permanent Under Secretary, the Ministry’s Senior Civil Servant. Almost similar arrangements are in Canada, India, China, Japan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and European Countries. In the USA the Chairperson of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) is responsible for cross-service coordination and does not have direct command but according to the US military doctrine, jointness is the key to success in military operations. There is seamless integration across all services. The system is synergetic.
In Pakistan, for various reasons, like unstable governments, unprincipled politics, and the upper hand of the defence establishment, successive governments failed to create an integrated system of defence. As a result, the tri-service jointness remained ineffective.
Creating the position of CDF, although a good strategic decision, is the first step in jointness. His terms of service should be laid down. For harmonious tri-service relationships, the CDF should not concurrently be the commander of the army, navy or air force. It should be a separate office. The previous Headquarters of the CJCSC should be upgraded to CDF Headquarters. For a close relationship between the three services, Deputy CDFs from the Navy and Air Force should be appointed. The system should be rotational among the three services. Most importantly, a comprehensive joint doctrine for tri-service planning and operations must be formulated.
Future wars will be multidomain involving cyber, space, hybrid, and AI assisted. Only a very close cooperation between the armed services will enable them to confront the ever-increasing dangers.
The writer is a freelance columnist
