Dangerous phase sets in as battle lines get clearer

Geopolitical observers warn a dangerous escalation could lead to a US ground offensive as talks diminish. The shifting battle lines—from airbase use to IRGC strategy—set the next weeks as decisive.

Naqi Akbar

July 26, 2026

7 min read
Dangerous phase sets in as battle lines get clearer

Preparing for a US ground offensive

The somewhat unusual statements coming out of the Pakistani Foreign Office, the much talked about media reporting advisory for the Pakistani journalist community, the escalation along all the fronts with chances of talks diminishing and even the moderates in the Iranian corridors of power talking like radicals all point out to the ominous development; that of an escalation, which might not be the controlled like the last one, but can spiral into a decisive mode, where both the warring parties might be as the war finally winds down faced with the new realities. 

The last one year has been a prelude to what is being felt by geopolitical observers in the last one week. The line-up of the forces has been generally felt to be the USA and Israel, with participation of the Gulf found to be cosmetic. It was what happened during the 12-day war in June 2025, when much of the strikes were joint efforts by the CENTCOM and the IDF.

A lot depends upon the leadership, the IRGC and the parliament to make their presence felt in a manner that a national strategy for defence is formulated, which has the street backing of bypassing the reformist indecision. The next few days or weeks can be decisive as to which directions the geo strategic developments take their logical or guided route. The region can head for another Camp David and consequent total victory for the Abraham Accords or can escalate an attrition, about whom no one can predict, when it will settle down sooner or later

However, the 40-day war in March 2026, completely altered the battleline. It was generally felt that the Udaid airbase in Qatar would be used for the sorties. Instead, the Bahraini electronic guidance and surveillance centres and the UAE infrastructure coupled with the array of the Royal Saudi Air Force bases in the Najd area proved to be the infrastructure from which the USAF managed much of its aerial campaign.

Any aeroplane watcher, especially exposed to the Flight Radar app, can testify that many of the refueling tankers from the USAF, not able to park on the Qatar, UAE , Bahrain and even in the Saudi AFB, where in one instance five refuelling aircraft were damaged by an Iranian onslaught, mostly would take off from the Ben Gurion international airport, now a vast parking lot of the USAF refueling tankers, later loiter around Saudi Arabian air space; standby for refuelling any combat sorties , and if there  were no plans for the day, return to Ben Gurion finally. 

During that time, the calls for peace from the feeble-minded Iranian reformists as well as the pro-US band of negotiators, prominent among them the Pakistanis, caused Qatar to join Pakistan in advocating what the international observers can cite as a US wishlist, which was even tactically approved by the reformists; old as well as new-born.

The mishandling of the negotiations processes jointly by the pro-negotiation people in Iran; who started throwing their weight around; stifling even from the democratic standard dissenting voices within Iran; to the loose talk now and then by US President Donald Trump, the environment of peace talks soon dissipated to the extent that in no time the escalation from both sides went up to the point that for many it looked like a return to war. Two factors. The radicalization of the Iranian street after the week-long funeral of slain Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, followed by again the loud thinking by Trump precipitated enough ill will that the reformists in Iran even have to join hands with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, even while pleading lack of control over the IRGC in the selection of the targets, to creating an impression that the reformist government was not dead, leaking stories in the international media that it was Iran in the week ending July 19 that wanted the 10 days truce; giving long planned interviews to compliant anchors, creating an impression that the government was not in cahoots with the USA rather it was the victim itself. 

The coordinated plans of the departure of the Western diplomats, the radical talk by the Pakistani Foreign Office, making hard worded threats to the Iran-backed Houthi Yemeni faction, while the other faction is supported by the Saudis; in a way issuing statements on behalf of the Saudi faction, besides encouraging the Twitter handles and affiliated handles to take on what can be diplomatically called guilt shaming Iran. The latter stance is in deep contrast to the harsh fact that only a month ago there was an air of cordiality between Iran and Pakistan to such an extent that the Iranian state broadcaster even created a song in praise of Pakistan, praising the political and specifically the Pakistani military leadership. The stories, which were even authenticated by the Iranians for the sake of goodwill with Pakistan that the IDF had their eyes even on the moderate Iranian negotiators were created or planted; the jargons familiar with journalists; to sway or guide an opinion towards a goal, motive or an impression.

Here it may be pointed out that as if it is part of a concerted campaign, the Jerusalem Post and Reuters seem to be competing with each other to either frame the Iranian state or at least the IRGC for literally all the ills of this world.

For an objective analyst, the participation of Qatar and Pakistan was faulty on that single count that the two nations were cozy with Washington, and their objectivity and impartiality was open to question. As the events turned towards escalation gradually, the battle lines seem to be getting clearer with the passage of time; and the perceived role of the countries like Turkey and Pakistan in the precipitating conflict. With defence pacts being formalized at the shortest possible time; it strongly suggests that the pace is not accidental, rather it is a strategic lining up of the forces in the region in general and Middle East in particular.

Compared to the 1980 to 1988 conflict between Saddam-led Iraq and Khomeini-led Iran, when the diplomatic niceties were taken into consideration, the current conflict has been characterized by an utter disregard of them, strongly suggesting a greater depreciation in the leadership standards all along. If one complains about Trump, the Arab states have proven to be at best rent seekers controlled by the USA, rather than having any gray matter of their own. Similarly, the tale of South Asia has been no different, whether it is New Delhi or Islamabad.

The emerging scenario is more of an Iran on one side with rag tag resistance on its side; while the already armed to teeth states from the Arabian Sea to the Suez Canal are supposed to heed to the call from Trump. Here what is of concern is that so far, the Iranian response is much muted than coordinated. If there are news flashes of the perceived ground offensive orchestrated by the US, the US forces are regularly pounding the southern Iran belt, the Arab-majority Khuzestan province, the Sunni-majority Hormozgan and Baluchistan provinces, in a manner which can be called a scorched earth policy aimed at creating a desperate uprising against Tehran. 

On the other hand, while the IRGC might be allowed by the reformists to issue inflammatory statements of pride, they are only engaging in a tit-for-tat strategy, hitting the local bases from where the strikes originated. For apparent reasons, the AFBs in Jordan, Kuwait and Bahrain are getting pounded by the Iranian military without any tangible impact on the US strategy. From a distance it looks like that is an utter lack of will on part of the reformists to fight out, rather they are still looking for a ceasefire and are holding any meaningful fire to balance the situation.

Given the fact that the Iranian side looks pretty indecisive in tackling the US plans, the emerging scenario strongly points to a ground offensive in the near future, which regretfully will be undertaken on US terms and Iranian government and the military seems to be bogged down in lack of will and escalating trends of indecision.

A lot depends upon the leadership, the IRGC and the parliament to make their presence felt in a manner that a national strategy for defence is formulated, which has the street backing of bypassing the reformist indecision. The next few days or weeks can be decisive as to which directions the geo strategic developments take their logical or guided route. The region can head for another Camp David and consequent total victory for the Abraham Accords or can escalate an attrition, about whom no one can predict, when it will settle down sooner or later.

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Naqi Akbar

The writer is a freelance columnist

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