Growing concerns about India’s nuclear stockpile 

The Indian weapons programme is a threat for the whole world

India’s nuclear arsenal has grown alarmingly recently, facilitated and supported by its Western partners with wilful oversight. According to the Federation of American Scientists, India possessed 190 nuclear warheads as of January 2026, up from 180 the previous year. The SIPRI Yearbook 2026 revealed that India had zero deployed nuclear warheads in 2025 and 12 deployed in early 2026. It is an ominous development for regional and international strategic stability.

India has also been modernising its nuclear delivery systems, including canisterised missiles and platforms capable of carrying Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles. India has also been expanding its sea-based deterrent with the addition of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) such as INS Aridhaman, signalling qualitative growth alongside quantitative expansion. According to a 2025 FAS report, India’s nuclear stockpile had increased by 20 percent over the past five years. This upward trajectory affects South Asia as well as the already fragile global arms control architecture.

For decades, the international community has relied on non-proliferation mechanisms, especially on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to restrict the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons. However, India remains outside the NPT framework, has the fastest-growing weapons programmw in South Asia and has developed the dual-capable BrahMos missiles in collaboration with Russia. 

This growth has been boosted by the 2008 Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) waiver. Consequently, India is free to import nuclear fuel and technologies for its civil programme from any country, enabling New Delhi to use its domestic nuclear materials for weapons. India’s safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency excluded eight reactors, besides the two Fast Breeder Reactors. While granting the waiver, commercial considerations had influenced a number of important members, who sidestepped proliferation concerns of NSG, which was established in response to India’s first nuclear test in 1974. The selective application of its rules eroded the non-proliferation regime and impacted its credibility.

While India continues to describe its nuclear posture as based on Credible Minimum Deterrence, backed by a declared No-First-Use policy, the past decade’s developments suggest a gradual shift in posture: the increase in fissile material stockpile, advancements in dual-capable delivery systems, and the operationalisation of the nuclear triad indicate ambitions threatening regional and international peace and security. 

According to the 2024 assessment by the Nuclear Threat Initiative, India possessed an estimated 700 kg of weapons-grade Plutonium and approximately 5.3 tons of weapons-grade Highly Enriched Uranium. India’s 8 unsafeguarded nuclear reactors can produce up to 200 kg of weapons-grade Plutonium yearly. The International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM) has estimated that 4 kg is enough for one nuclear weapon. Considering this, in 2024, India could add approximately 50 Plutonium-based warheads annually to its existing stockpile, making it one of the world’s fastest-growing weapons programmes.

Coinciding with India’s fast-growing production is its advancing missile programme. India’s land-based nuclear missile capability has expanded in range and sophistication. The Agni-V Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, capable of ranges exceeding 5,000 km, with some assessments suggesting up to 8,000 km, places Europe, Africa, and the Far East within range. India is poised to test the Agni-VI ICBM, expected to have a 12,000-km range and MIRV capability. These developments are creating strategic uncertainties not just at the regional but also at the global level.

In a nuclearised region marked by recurring crises due to repeated military aggression by nuclear-armed India against nuclear-armed Pakistan, such unbridled expansion of nuclear and missile arsenal heightens instability and increases the risk of strategic miscalculations. India’s irresponsible nuclear behaviour, evidenced by military attacks on Pakistan in February 2019 and May 2025, should serve as a reminder to NSG members of the grave mistake of the 2008 waiver. None of them would remain safe once India’s nuclear arsenal grows further and its delivery systems are able to hit every world capital.

India’s sea-based nuclear capabilities have also evolved with the induction of Arihant-class SSBNs, armed with K-series Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles. The K-4 and K-5, with reported ranges of around 3,500 km and 5,000-6,000 km, respectively, and the projected K-6 with a planned range of 8,000 km, represent India’s expanding sea-based coercive nuclear posture. 

India’s expanding nuclear arsenal prevents it from supporting international non-proliferation efforts. On 31 October 2025, India was among the four states abstaining on the UN resolution on reaffirming the urgency of bringing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty into force and strengthening the global norms against nuclear testing. India’s abstention raises questions about its commitment to responsible nuclear stewardship. While advancing its weapons programme, it continues to avoid binding test prohibitions. India’s approach weakens the credibility of its normative claims.

In recent years, Western policy circles have attempted to construct a misplaced threat perception regarding Pakistan’s hypothetical ICBM capability. During the hearing of the US Senate Intelligence Committee on 18 March 2026, former Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard made an unsubstantiated claim about the threat to the USA by Pakistan’s non-existent ICBM programme. That India actually possesses ICBMs and SLBMs capable of targeting the USA was not mentioned. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme is India-specific and the maximum range of its delivery systems is 2,750 km, designed to cover all India, including its islands in the Bay of Bengal. 

In contrast, India has been actively developing long-range delivery systems with ranges of up to 16,000 km. Coupled with MIRV technology, ongoing advancements in hypersonic systems and rapid development of the SSBN fleet with SLBMs of 3,500-8,000 km, These allow India to project nuclear force well beyond its immediate neighbourhood. The amplification of a non-existent threat posed by Pakistan, while overlooking tangible developments in India’s long-range strike capabilities with potential to bring Europe and mainland US within striking range of its nuclear missiles, reflects troubling inconsistencies, double standards, biased threat assessment, discrimination and exceptionalism for geopolitical considerations.

The expansion of India’s nuclear arsenal and long-range dual-capable delivery systems has serious implications for the stability of deterrence beyond the region and international peace and security. The rapid growth in India’s warhead inventory, combined with advancements in missile technology, reflects an evolving posture enhancing strategic reach to become a global military power. 

In a nuclearised region marked by recurring crises due to repeated military aggression by nuclear-armed India against nuclear-armed Pakistan, such unbridled expansion of nuclear and missile arsenal heightens instability and increases the risk of strategic miscalculations. India’s irresponsible nuclear behaviour, evidenced by military attacks on Pakistan in February 2019 and May 2025, should serve as a reminder to NSG members of the grave mistake of the 2008 waiver. None of them would remain safe once India’s nuclear arsenal grows further and its delivery systems are able to hit every world capital.