Arms Control between India and Pakistan

Prospects and Constraints

One year has passed since the guns fell silent following the brief and violent war sparked by the Pahalgam terrorist attack in April 2025, and South Asia is no safer for it. Given airspace closures remaining reciprocal, the Indus Water Treaty, which ensures Pakistan's food and energy security, on hold, and diplomatic channels closed, both militaries are racing to develop the next generation of precision-strike weapons, making the next crisis more difficult to contain before it becomes catastrophic.  

The most extensive use of force between the two nuclear neighbours since their 1998 tests occurred in May 2025, and the United States had to act quickly to put an end to it. Prior to a shaky ceasefire, Vice President JD Vance and U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio spoke with high-ranking officials on both sides. Analysts caution that the margin might be smaller next time. The war showed how quickly, in the absence of persistent diplomatic engagement, a localised terrorist act can turn into a risky military conflict between nuclear powers.  

Pakistan is believed to possess over 170 nuclear weapons, significantly more than the United States' 1999 estimate of 60–80 by 2020. With increasing long-range and sea-based second strike capacity, India's arsenal is still growing. Both nations are still making significant investments in modernisation initiatives aimed at enhancing survivability in times of conflict and bolstering deterrence.  

Pakistan uses tactical nuclear weapons to counter India's conventional supremacy; more so it has never announced a No First Use policy. Islamabad established the Army Rocket Force Command in August 2025. The Fatah-II ballistic missile, which has a 400-kilometer range, was tested by April 2026. A month later, the Fatah-IV cruise missile, which can hit targets 750 kilometres inside India, was introduced. These changes are indicative of Pakistan's focus on combat deterrence and quick reaction.  

India, on the other hand, is moving away from large-scale land gains and toward multi-domain, non-contact warfare, such as precision airstrikes and standoff weapons. The strategy lowers some escalation risks while increasing others, as seen in Operation Sindoor in May 2025. Even between governments with nuclear weapons, precision warfare may provide the impression that hostilities may be kept to a minimum. As long as India continues to modernise under what Islamabad perceives as a biased international order, a new arms race is seen unavoidable, according to open statements made by Pakistani leadership. 

There is a precarious nuclear confidence-building framework, despite the dismal forecast. Four important agreements have been in place between India and Pakistan since 1998: a bilateral hotline, early notice of missile tests, and a promise not to target one other's nuclear installations. Despite their thinness, these steps are precisely the kind of foundation that helped avoid mishaps during the Cold War.  

Academics contend that this architecture offers a base upon which a more durable structure could be constructed. A permanent verifiable ban on nuclear testing, increased transparency regarding doctrine and force posture, and nuclear risk-reduction centers based on Cold War models are among the proposals. In order to enhance communication during tense times, some analysts have also recommended institutionalised crisis-management procedures. The 2025 ceasefire, which was mediated under pressure from Washington, Riyadh, and Ankara, also showed that third-party mediation is still feasible in situations where bilateral channels have completely broken down. In times of crisis, international actors continue to be crucial in averting escalation.  

However, formal arms control faces significant challenges. Current confidence-boosting initiatives are reversible and have light penalties for infractions. Underlying issues remain politically untouchable on both sides, particularly Kashmir, which is made worse by Pakistan's alleged support for non-state groups and India's unwillingness to talk about its traditional stance.  

The most profound structural issue is the triangle dynamic involving China. Two hostile neighbours pose a nuclear threat to India; any bilateral agreement with Pakistan would ignore the China issue. Beijing and Islamabad signed a new military assistance agreement early in 2025 that included cutting-edge air defence systems. After Operation Sindoor, Chinese diplomats made clear their support for Pakistan's right to self-defence. It is strategically unfeasible for New Delhi to limit its forces only on a bilateral basis with Pakistan.  

Deep ambiguity surrounds the last significant strategic armaments agreement between the United States and Russia. Hypersonic missiles, AI-enabled systems, anti-satellite weapons, and cyberwarfare capabilities are examples of emerging technology that are developing more quickly than international regulations to control them, both influencing and upending South Asian dynamics. These tools speed up decision-making in emergency situations and raise the possibility of error.  

Political restrictions at home exacerbate the issue. Following Pahalgam, India's national sentiment became quite tough. Meaningful transparency is politically risky because Pakistan's military leadership has an institutional stake in the nuclear program. Any leader who suggests making major disclosures or exercising restraint runs the risk of being accused as being weak and facing electoral repercussions.  

Experts agree on a number of small but doable measures: establishing nuclear risk-reduction centers administered by experts with the authority to act in an emergency; extending the missile test notification agreement to include a broader range of systems; and resuming formal communication between nuclear establishments through Track 2 dialogue. Increased interaction between strategic specialists and former military personnel may also aid in preserving communication in the event that official diplomacy fails. Resolving Kashmir is not necessary for any of these. They all require persistent political will, which has been noticeably lacking thus far.  

The deeper lesson of 2025 might be the most depressing. South Asia's nuclear deterrence held—barely. The next crisis may not be as forgiving. A region where a single miscalculation could have far-reaching effects that no cease-fire could reverse cannot afford to treat weapons control as an ideal indefinitely. The disparity between what is politically feasible and what is strategically important has never been larger – or more perilous.