Pakistan’s missiles do not threaten the USA 

Mischief or sloppy analysis?

The recent claims, reportedly echoed by US National Intelligence Director Tulsi Gabbard in the 2026 U.S. Annual Threat Assessment, suggesting that Pakistan’s missile programme could evolve into a “significant threat” to the USA, demand serious scrutiny— not because they reveal an emerging danger, but because they exemplify how strategic assessments can drift into conjecture, exaggeration, and, at times, deliberate threat inflation.

At the heart of this narrative lies a fundamental misrepresentation of both Pakistan’s actual capabilities and its strategic intent.

To begin with, the technical premise itself is deeply flawed. Pakistan’s most advanced missile, Shaheen-III, has a maximum range of approximately 2,750 km. This clearly places it within the category of a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM). In contrast, an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) requires a minimum range of around 5,500 km, with most operational systems extending well beyond 10,000 km— distances necessary to reach the continental USA.

The geographical reality is stark and undeniable: the distance between Pakistan and the US mainland exceeds 11,000 km. Bridging this gap is not a matter of incremental improvement but of a completely different technological threshold, involving advanced propulsion systems, re-entry vehicle technology, guidance precision, and extensive testing infrastructure —none of which Pakistan has demonstrated at an intercontinental level.

Thus, to suggest that Pakistan currently poses, or is on the verge of posing, a missile threat to the USA is not an analytical conclusion— it is a speculative leap.

More importantly, such claims ignore the foundational logic of Pakistan’s nuclear and missile doctrine, which has remained consistent for decades: credible minimum deterrence against India. Pakistan’s strategic posture is neither ambiguous nor expansionist. It is explicitly designed to maintain balance within South Asia, where conventional asymmetry vis-à-vis India necessitates a robust deterrent.

The development of the Shaheen-III itself underscores this regional focus. Its range was calibrated to ensure coverage of specific Indian territories, including distant island bases, thereby closing perceived deterrence gaps. There is no doctrinal shift, no policy articulation, and no operational deployment pattern that suggests even a remote orientation towards extra-regional, let alone transcontinental, targeting.

In this context, invoking the spectre of Pakistan targeting the USA is not just unrealistic— it borders on the absurd. It assumes that Pakistan would invest vast financial, technological, and strategic capital to develop capabilities aimed at a country with which it has no direct military confrontation, no territorial disputes, and no immediate deterrence requirements.

Pakistan’s missile programme, like that of any sovereign state, warrants observation and analysis. But it must be evaluated within its correct strategic context— that of a regional deterrent shaped by specific geopolitical realities. To portray it as a looming intercontinental threat to the USA is not just inaccurate; it is intellectually indefensible.

Such reasoning defies both strategic logic and resource rationality.

What, then, explains this persistent tendency to inflate Pakistan’s missile capabilities into a global threat narrative?

The answer may lie less in South Asia and more within Washington’s own strategic ecosystem. The portrayal of emerging or exaggerated threats has long served as a mechanism to justify defence spending, sustain military-industrial momentum, and reinforce geopolitical narratives. In this framework, countries like Pakistan can, at times, be recast— not based on current realities, but on hypothetical future trajectories—as convenient additions to an expanding threat matrix.

This is what may aptly be termed the “budgetary bogeyman” phenomenon— where speculative capabilities are elevated into imminent dangers to serve institutional or political ends.

However, such framing carries consequences. It risks distorting policy priorities, misallocating strategic focus, and undermining the credibility of intelligence assessments. When distinctions between capability and intent, or between present reality and future possibility, are blurred, the result is not enhanced security but analytical confusion.

It is also important to note that even within Western strategic circles, there is no consensus supporting the alarmist view. Most serious analyses acknowledge that while Pakistan continues to modernize its missile arsenal, its trajectory remains firmly rooted in regional deterrence dynamics, not global power projection.

Equally significant is the absence of any credible evidence suggesting that Pakistan is actively pursuing an ICBM programme aimed at the United States. Technological development in the missile domain is not easily concealed; it leaves clear signatures in testing patterns, infrastructure expansion, and doctrinal shifts. None of these indicators point toward an imminent or even medium-term Pakistani capability to strike the U.S. homeland.

To ignore these realities is to substitute evidence with assumption.

Furthermore, such allegations risk complicating an already delicate strategic environment. South Asia remains a nuclearized region with deeply entrenched rivalries. Introducing exaggerated external threat perceptions into this equation can inadvertently heighten tensions, encourage arms racing narratives, and divert attention from more pressing regional stability concerns.

In an era where precision in language is as important as precision in weaponry, strategic assessments must resist the temptation of sensationalism. Figures like Tulsi Gabbard, and institutions responsible for shaping global threat perceptions, carry a responsibility to ensure that their assertions are grounded in verifiable facts, not speculative extrapolations.

Pakistan’s missile programme, like that of any sovereign state, warrants observation and analysis. But it must be evaluated within its correct strategic context— that of a regional deterrent shaped by specific geopolitical realities. To portray it as a looming intercontinental threat to the USA is not just inaccurate; it is intellectually indefensible.

In the final analysis, the issue is not whether Pakistan’s capabilities should be assessed— they should. The issue is whether such assessments should be credible, proportionate, and evidence-based.

On that count, the current rhetoric falls short.

And in doing so, it tells us less about Pakistan’s intentions, and more about the enduring allure of manufactured threats in global strategic discourse.