2025 has two major conflicts in the first half of the calendar year whose impact would be felt still as the year closes; the India Pakistan conflict which ended in a stalemate only to be recharged from the Indian side in the last quarter of the year; and the other conflict was the fall out of the Gaza conflict, the limited war between the most known backer of HAMAS: the Islamic Republic of Iran or more pointedly the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and the Israeli Defence Forces led by Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu.
While from a distance and as reported in wire creeds; the IDF struck when the Iranian nuclear negotiators were in session for the revival of JCPOA with the active nod from the USA; a deep-down fact check revealed that it was in fact a sort of ‘Regime Change” operation in Iran. Given the fact that the vital security layers were compromised in the capital city Tehran; no official from the Reformist administration; led on the face by the President Phizishkian while actually steered from background by former foreign minister Jawad Zarif; were targeted in assassination operations, rather it was the officials from the IRGC, not the regular army, who were targeted by the IDF/Mossad operatives.
It remains to be seen if the regime actually falls or a stalemate continues between the two Irans; the Iran preferring to remain true to its ideological roots or the Iran fervently trying to catch up with the latest global trends. Of major impact will be to what extent the Supreme Leader is able to drag out the average life cycle; after which a power grab might be the first stage of ‘regime change’ or a perpetual civil conflict
Foremost among them was Hosain Bagheri an old IRGC hand and at the time of assassination the overall head of the Iranian armed forces, Hosain Salami; the IRGC chief, Amir Ali Hajizadeh, the IRGC space force or missile chief, were killed in a meeting which was compromised by moles inside the IRGC.
The pause between the initial losses and the later missile onslaught on Israel by the IRGC tried to create a balance between the warring factions somewhat; however, the Iranian theocratic regime came out of the 12-day war much shaken; only able to keep a sort of semblance of being in control if not giving away control altogether.
The reasons for that position emanated from the hard fact that the ascension of the reformist government in Iran after the snap elections in June 2024 as the result of death of radical President Raeesi in May 2024 under mysterious circumstances; the Iranian backed resistance infrastructures rapidly waned away to the point that on the first night of the swearing in of the reformist, the resistance lost its most potent icon; Ismael Haniya, in an operation masterminded by Mossad which actually left little of the mortal remains of the Hamas leader.
Later, when the IRGC sought the supreme leader’s approval for a retaliation operation, it was vetoed by the reformist president. The over ruling or bypassing of the supreme leader’s dictates could be construed as the first sign of the erosion of the power of the actual power centres of the Islamic regime; the IRGC and the supreme leader.
Later the Iranians did undertake strike operations which were more of a formality and less of making any lasting impact on the firepower of the IDF. While the reformist control was usually associated with the cultural aspect, the year 2025 was different as the military muscle of the IRGC took a direct hit, not just in the form of prevailing upon the decision-making process, but also signalled a weakening of the republic in the long run.
Despite tall claims by the Iranians and the IRGC that they will strike Israel again decisively; as the year ends; except for a few alerts; hyped or fake; there are no tangible indications that Iran is planning any first strike on IDF; rather the scenario still reeks of Iran waiting to be struck and then retaliate as per its available firepower.
The weakening of the republic automatically precipitated the coming out of the rat holes of many claimants to what these emerging leaders called the new Iran; foremost amongst them the heir to the Pahlavi dynasty. The heir wasted no time in identifying with the IDF to make sure his claims were materialized. His desperation could be gauged from the hard fact that while the last Pahlavi monarch Muhammad Raza took into consideration the Muslim and Shia sensitivities of the Iranian nation; visiting shrines in Iraq and keeping a good rapport with the senior Shia clergy sans Khomeini, the new claimant had no qualms in reaching out to the IDF validation by praying at the Wailing Wall in occupied Jerusalem among other things.
However, while his ideological somersaults did not go unnoticed by the Americans and Israelis alike, the real change in the character of the Islamic republic has been in fact been effected by the reformist group more effectively. To begin with the reformist government refused to enforce a properly drafted Hijab law or restore the Irshad patrolling; a term for enforcement of Islamic Hijab in the society. The result has been a more objective picture of Iran; those opting for Hijab take Hijab; while those opposing it may come out in the streets; however, for the regime it has been a sign of weakening of its authority in the society. That weakening has been triggered partially by the shrinking of the Iranian geopolitical influence in the region; which has rather mercilessly decapitated partially with the help of clever IDF strategy and partially with the cooperation of the disgruntled elements within the movement and Iran.
Likewise, in the domain of creative arts; the censors maintained by the same Irshad ministry were found to be lax gradually. An Iranian serial “Aban” in the first half of 2025 dealt with the subject of relationships previously frowned upon and its censors were liberal by traditional post-1979 Iranian standards. It showed the husband in a negative light while the intruder into the matrimonial union was shown as all powerful; a clear emphasis of accepting the changing value system or at least treating it as a ‘new normal’.
If that was not enough a recently released movie Peer Pisar or ‘Bachelor Oldman’ has one subtle kissing scene where renowned Iranian actress Laila Hatemi leans inside the car window to kiss Hamed Behdad, another crossing into the new normal. Taking a wholesome view of the society, the Iranian system has always prided itself on two counts, its support for Palestine and having a parallel value system for the creative arts; where it had the ability to express things without degenerating into the western creative value systems, seems to be slipping away fast.
In that scenario; if there is a debate of regime change in Iran; practically with the ascension of the reform group, the regime change has been already affected in essence; a neutralized supreme leader; allowed only a few speeches, the IRGC with blocked funds; creative art monitored without any government or system writ.
What might need to be done from the IDF, the USA and EU perspective is just the physical decapitation of the system; which can take place if the above-mentioned entities are sure enough that the Iranian system has been weakened from within.
It remains to be seen if the regime actually falls or a stalemate continues between the two Irans; the Iran preferring to remain true to its ideological roots or the Iran fervently trying to catch up with the latest global trends. Of major impact will be to what extent the Supreme Leader is able to drag out the average life cycle; after which a power grab might be the first stage of ‘regime change’ or a perpetual civil conflict.
