Saudi-UAE policy in a post-Assad Syria

The fall of the Assad regime in Syria has created a unique and complex geopolitical challenge for Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. While these states have long viewed Bashar al-Assad as an ally of their regional adversary, Iran, his downfall has paradoxically introduced new threats. The decline of Iranian influence in the Levant, a long-sought objective of Saudi and Emirati foreign policy, has resulted in an unintended consequence: the empowerment of Sunni Islamist groups in Syria, some of which share ideological affinities with movements that Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have historically opposed and repressed.

The collapse of Assad’s regime has left a power vacuum that has been rapidly filled by Sunni Islamist factions, particularly those backed by Turkey and Qatar. This shift presents a dilemma for Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which have spent considerable resources suppressing such movements domestically and regionally. Traditionally, these Gulf states have viewed Iran and its network of Shiite militias, including Hezbollah and various Iraqi groups, as the primary existential threat to their influence.

The weakening of Iran’s position in Syria initially seemed to be a strategic victory, but the emergence of a government led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and other Sunni Islamist factions has forced a recalibration of their regional policies. The recent visit of Syria’s new administration— represented by Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani, Defense Minister Murhaf Abu Qasra, and intelligence chief Anas Khattab— to Saudi Arabia marks a significant shift.

The visit, the first of its kind, suggests a pragmatic Saudi approach aimed at engaging with the new power structures in Syria. This engagement is underscored by Saudi humanitarian aid shipments, including 60 trucks and six planes filled with essential supplies. Such measures indicate Riyadh’s cautious but necessary accommodation of Syria’s new leadership.

Prior to the fall of Assad, Saudi Arabia and the UAE had been moving toward a rapprochement with the Syrian leader in an attempt to detach him from Iran’s influence. The reopening of Riyadh’s embassy in Damascus in September 2023 and Assad’s visits to the UAE and Saudi Arabia earlier that year were clear indicators of this strategy.

However, the rapid collapse of the Assad government disrupted this trajectory, leaving Riyadh and Abu Dhabi with a new set of challenges. The shift in Syria’s political landscape has highlighted the limitations of Saudi and Emirati influence in the region. While they had hoped that Assad might distance himself from Tehran, the reality was that his regime’s survival was heavily dependent on Iranian support. Once Iran’s position weakened, Turkey-backed factions swiftly filled the void. Saudi Arabia and the UAE now find themselves dealing with an empowered Sunni Islamist government, a scenario they had long sought to prevent.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s primary concern is that Syria’s new Sunni Islamist government could inspire similar movements in other parts of the Arab world. Jordan and Egypt, two key regional allies, have long struggled with the influence of Islamist groups.

A successful Sunni Islamist administration in Syria could embolden groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, which has a significant presence in both countries. This prospect is particularly troubling for Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, which have invested heavily in suppressing Islamist movements through political and financial means. The situation also exacerbates tensions with Turkey and Qatar, both of which have historically supported Sunni Islamist factions.

As the situation in Syria continues to evolve, Saudi Arabia and the UAE will have to navigate a complex web of alliances and rivalries. Their short-term strategy of engagement and financial influence may provide some leverage, but the long-term challenge of balancing against both Shiite and Sunni Islamist forces remains unresolved. Whether they can successfully manage this delicate balance will determine their future role in shaping the Middle East’s geopolitical landscape.

Turkey, under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has consistently backed the Syrian opposition and has provided military, financial, and logistical support to various rebel factions. Qatar, meanwhile, has maintained its support for Islamist movements across the region, including in Libya and Egypt. The rise of a Turkey- and Qatar-backed government in Syria represents a significant setback for Saudi and Emirati regional ambitions.

Given these challenges, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are pursuing a strategy of engagement and containment. By engaging with Syria’s new leadership, they hope to exert influence over its policies and limit the extent of Turkish and Qatari control. Financial aid and diplomatic outreach serve as key tools in this strategy, providing Riyadh and Abu Dhabi with leverage over the fledgling government. At the same time, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are likely to intensify their efforts to counter Islamist influence in other parts of the region.

Increased support for Egypt and Jordan, both of which have taken a hardline stance against Islamist groups, could be one avenue for containing the ideological and political spillover from Syria. Additionally, the Gulf states may seek to bolster their alliances with other regional actors, such as Israel and Greece, which share their concerns about Turkish expansionism and Islamist influence. The fall of Assad underscores the broader geosectarian struggle that has defined Middle Eastern politics for decades. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have traditionally viewed Iran and its Shiite allies as their primary geopolitical rivals.

However, the events in Syria have demonstrated that Sunni Islamist groups, particularly those aligned with Turkey and Qatar, represent an equally significant challenge. This presents a strategic conundrum: countering one adversary often strengthens the other. The Gulf states’ efforts to weaken Iran have inadvertently facilitated the rise of Sunni Islamist forces, creating a new set of challenges. This cyclical dynamic suggests that Riyadh and Abu Dhabi will have to navigate a delicate balance between opposing both Shiite and Sunni Islamist influences while avoiding policies that inadvertently strengthen one side over the other.

In the short term, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are likely to continue their engagement with Syria’s new government while simultaneously seeking ways to limit Turkish and Qatari influence. Financial incentives, diplomatic outreach, and strategic alliances will be the primary tools in this effort. However, in the long term, the Gulf states face a more fundamental challenge: how to escape the cycle of strengthening one adversary by countering another.

One potential avenue is fostering alternative political movements within Syria that align more closely with Saudi and Emirati interests. This could involve supporting secular opposition groups or moderate factions within the new government. However, such efforts will be complicated by the entrenched influence of Turkey and Qatar, both of which have a head start in shaping Syria’s political landscape.

Another potential strategy involves deepening alliances with regional partners who share concerns about Islamist influence. Strengthening ties with Egypt, Jordan, and even Israel could provide additional leverage against Turkish and Qatari-backed factions. However, such alliances come with their own set of geopolitical complexities and risks.

Ultimately, Saudi Arabia and the UAE must acknowledge that Syria will remain a fluid and unpredictable theater for years to come. Their ability to shape its future will depend on their willingness to adapt to shifting dynamics and engage in pragmatic diplomacy. While they have succeeded in containing domestic Islamist threats, the regional landscape presents a far more complex challenge. The question remains whether they can navigate this new reality without inadvertently strengthening one adversary at the expense of another.

The fall of the Assad regime has upended the strategic calculations of Saudi Arabia and the UAE. While they have long sought to weaken Iranian influence in Syria, the unintended consequence has been the rise of Sunni Islamist factions that they have historically opposed. This new reality forces Riyadh and Abu Dhabi to reassess their regional policies and engage with actors they previously sought to suppress.

As the situation in Syria continues to evolve, Saudi Arabia and the UAE will have to navigate a complex web of alliances and rivalries. Their short-term strategy of engagement and financial influence may provide some leverage, but the long-term challenge of balancing against both Shiite and Sunni Islamist forces remains unresolved. Whether they can successfully manage this delicate balance will determine their future role in shaping the Middle East’s geopolitical landscape.