Can dictatorship be an engine of growth?

Revisiting Ayub experiments in the third millennium!

Societies grow economically, socially and politically in a setup where the basic individual and collective rights of a populace are guaranteed by the Constitution of that land. In the case of Pakistan, the first 10 articles of the 1973 Constitution, now practically in abeyance,  guarantee these rights and spells out punishment for the entity or entities interfering with these guarantees. However, the ground realities seems to be to the contrary even after the formal promulgation of the Constitution in 1973.

In various nation-states, the social development in the political and economic domains has been gradual towards opening up. The leaderships of these nation-states have tried to make things easier for the development of a culture where people feel free to speak, debate, and disagree, without being picked up, banned or thrown out of the jobs.

To investigate these trends in the Pakistani context, treading a very dangerous path, any student of political economy needs to see how these experiments as spelt out in the headline of this article were executed and the public at large was made to feel that it is ‘normal’ or it is ‘business as usual’. That paradigm of development and the era referred for an investigation of the same is usually regarded as constituting the golden years of Pakistani development experience.

With the dialogue between the political forces and the common average person in complete disarray, the responsibility of bringing in awareness seems a hard road ahead. Pakistan, without mincing words can ill afford the ‘Egyptian’ roadmap. Traditionally, a democratic entity, whose inception was the outcome of 1946 elections, whose constitution was the outcome of an assembly elected in 1970; such a country is best served with adherence to the book. The ever changing and fast paced political developments shun away any positive vibes or hopes. It seems a long tunnel ahead, better understood metaphorically

Economists celebrate that period based on the growth rates experienced during that period. Business managers churned out by the IBA are nostalgic about the period, as the groups they were employed by grew astronomically. However, few have the bones to see what was the outcome of the development paradigm, which was faulty, right from its onset.

The development paradigm, discussed before many times, and being viewed from yet another angle; was based on a regimented social setup, with controlled prices, controlled democratic access and controlled media. Likewise, the banking system in place during the period and later strengthened in the course of time, was more suited to offer credit to the elite than to a vendor. To date, the banking sector finds it hard to encourage the SME, cottage or informal sectors, despite the claims and calls of the banking system for so-called ‘financial inclusion’.

Such a system was best suited for a zombie set-up like North Korea, Kemalist Turkey, Pahalvi Iran pre-1979 or a post-1979 Iran ruled by conservative administrations. Except for the North Korean experience, the other two societies sensed the gravity of the need for change and made tactical withdrawalS from the scene. The Turkish Islamists’ ascendency since 2002 in Turkey, the coming to terms with the grass root sentiment in Iran, despite calls from rigid elements within the Iranian clerical establishment to be assertive; trends indicate an adjustment to the realities.

Back to the Pakistani scenario; at the time of celebration of the ‘Decade of Development’ by the then ‘Ayub hybrid model’, everyone was happy in their governor’s offices and so in the chief secretary’s office or any office in the cantonment, except for the common Pakistani. That Pakistani felt alienated. That alienation was further heightened when the then ‘hybrid’ system’s chief economist, the late Dr Mehbubul Haq honestly confessed that the decade of development as spelt out in his paper ‘The seven sins of economic planning’ was nothing but the accumulation of wealth in a few hands or read ‘families’.

Practically, the growth rates were actually the growth of fortunes of the 22 families. With the collective bargaining mechanisms faulty from the onset, where the public sector and private sector managements with the support of the hybrid Ayub model ready to suppress dissent; the safety valve within the system was simply absent, to say the least.

The so-called seven sins of economic planning culminated in social unrest which in fact buried the paradigm of growth until the next unconstitutional intervention in the country. The relevance of the system regretfully lay in the short-term bonanzas these development paradigms were able to offer. The public opinion failed to see through the smokescreen that the bonanzas were managed shows and not the outcome of the natural working of the system, as is witnessed in the case of India, where the military establishment, despite being embroiled in fight against separatist insurgencies, is not allowed access to political or economic planning infrastructures.

The stable price paradigm during the Ayub era, the Gulf remittances bonanza during the Zia years, the Paris Club space and the smoke screen of ‘consumer financing mode of banking’ during the Musharraf years all created an impression of ‘false financial inclusion’,  that Pakistan was economically incompatible with the democracy based economic growth.

Few people saw through the fact, even recorded in the Kissinger Memorandum for President Nixon dated 28 April 1971 (available in the George Washington University National Security Archives) that Pakistan, apart from being confronted with insurgency in the Eastern wing, was also on the verge of default. The reason why a  left-wing government under Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto had to devalue the Rupee by 131 percent was the baggage the country’s economy accrued courtesy the development paradigm followed by the Ayub-led system, which favored liberal imports for the compliant industry leaders, even if it meant widening of the current account deficit.

Likewise, the closing Zia years were punctuated with ‘budget deficits’. However, all the pressure on budgetary discipline on part of the IMF was on the successive civilian setups under the PPP and PML(N). The end of the Musharraf- USA honeymoon too culminated in the calls for budgetary discipline, which were implemented in the form of withdrawal of subsidy on POL by the succeeding PPP government under Gillani.

All the scenarios were created during the Bonanza years, yet the cost was paid for by the democratic and constitutional setups. For a common person, not having the time to go deep into the background, a general impression was created that democracy brings in misery, while dictatorship brings bonanzas.

Quite recently, the hybrid experiences involving all the three political parties since 2018, seems to have emboldened the apologists for these bonanzas. These apologists, working overtime, seem to convince an equally bewildered public that good days are ahead, courtesy a few surgical strikes, while the ailments and the causes for the ailment are never removed, nor any serious effort demonstrated to undo the same.

As things stand, despite the fact that Pakistan seems to be governed by the 1973 Constitution, much of the day-to-day steps, the so-called bold initiatives, create more questions based on the dictates and oaths as written down in the constitution. Transgression into the domains not recommended based on lack of aptitude has already landed the country into trouble since its inception. Treatment of a political quagmire with a military response in 1971, cost the federation half of the federating unit, another separatist movement was given a fillip by another foolish act in 2006, when a respected leader was eliminated unceremoniously.

In the same manner, the business houses are mandated by the Directorate of Trade Organizations to provide advisory services in the form of ‘budget proposals’. These inputs are best inserted in the Finance Bills at federal and provincial budgetary exercises. Seeking solutions beyond the mandate along with other ‘unauthorized’ stakeholders have already cost the country too much.

With the dialogue between the political forces and the common average person in complete disarray, the responsibility of bringing in awareness seems a hard road ahead. Pakistan, without mincing words can ill afford the ‘Egyptian’ roadmap. Traditionally, a democratic entity, whose inception was the outcome of 1946 elections, whose constitution was the outcome of an assembly elected in 1970; such a country is best served with adherence to the book. The ever changing and fast paced political developments shun away any positive vibes or hopes. It seems a long tunnel ahead, better understood metaphorically.

Naqi Akbar
Naqi Akbar
The writer is a freelance columnist

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