AT PENPOINT
PTI chief Imran Khan has been responsible for bringing Army generals into discourse. Popular leaders, it seems, have the effect of bringing some sacred cow or the other into the public domain.
Two of the classes supposed to have been part of Field Marshal Ayub Khan’s ruling coalition, landowners and industrialists were broken by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. It can be argued that he didn’t really break them, and that they made a comeback under Ziaul Haq, but that class obloquy has not been seen since, until the PTI went after the military.
That may seem counterintuitive, because the military belongs to the same urban middle-class from which the PTI draws its support. However, this ignores how, in origin, the military officer class is rural. It could be argued that the Pakistani urban class, not just middle but lower and upper, is overwhelmingly rural in origin. This is consistent with census data, which shows an urbanizing population. That means people from villages moving to cities in large numbers.
It might explain why the PTI has such strong support among the urban intelligentsia, particularly the military and civil salariat, and especially the youth. While people move to urban areas in search of employment, their children are not as fully meshed into the rural social structure as their parents, being born and bred in cities, and going back only for holidays. They lack the sort of rootedness their parents have, and find it in the PTI.
There is also an important political element. Parents may have moved, but their votes are still enrolled back home. That plugs them into the sort of biradri networks that looks after them in the Big Bad City. Their children do not have a deep affiliation with the village, are not be as firmly plugged into the network. However, their vote is still inscribed in the village with their parents’, and they thus provide the PTI votebank throughout the province.
However, one effect of the mass attempt to combat urban anomie is to develop a hyper nationalistic narrative. There is also observable the targeting of whoever seemed powerful, the feudal lord and the industrialist under the first two martial laws. Now the military is seen as being powerful. The PTI, like others earlier, uses the rhetoric of abolition, but needs the same tools to rule. It thus appeals to its base in trying to tear it down.
The problem seems to be the danger that the COAS’ true role might be misconstrued. Nothing makes an officer bent towards martial law, nor against it. The PM should remember that the military promotion system makes it likely that any of those making it to lieutenant-general will be able to handle the task
One result is that there has never been as intense a discussion on the next COAS as before. Looking back only as far as the last time Gen Qamar Javed Bajwa’s tenure was to expire, back in 2019, there was no discussion of those in line to succeed him, General Bajwa’s tenure being extended, and a new Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee being promoted. There was nothing like the intense discussion of personalities as at present. As it is, whoever is chosen, he has been labeled as not on merit by Imran, while there will be an unfair shadow cast on those who didn’t make it.
A retired Indian lieutenant-general once said to this writer that he had reached the highest rank one could on merit; there was only one higher post, and that was a matter of luck. That applies here too. It is not just a matter of the eye of the politician resting on you, but of when you were commissioned, what were the exigencies of service, even who you married.
As a matter of fact, these posts exist the world over, in developed democracies, but are not reported upon because there is no real public interest, except in limited and specialised circles.
In publications catering to them, usually learned journals or limited-circulation specialised magazines. Only these contain any discussion of appointments, and the persons getting them, or of those not.
One reason is that these posts are not political in the sense that they could be a prelude to a takeover. They are political, in that the political leadership wants someone it can work with. A US Chief of Naval Operations (as the USN’s top post is designated) once complained that he had no time to command the Navy, because all of his time seemed to go to lobbying Congress for funds Not only does that lobbying included testifying before a Congress Committee, but also holding briefings for small groups of Congressmen and meeting individuals.
However, in Pakistan, this has led to a deep interest, perhaps an unhealthy one, is the post of COAS. Somewhere along the line has come the realisation that he obtains most of his political leverage through the two intelligence agencies he controls, Military Intelligence and the Inter-Services Intelligence. MI is purely under the COAS, being headed by a Director General who reports to the Chief of General Staff, who in turn reports to the COAS. The DG ISI reports to the PM, but he is posted after being made available by the COAS from the lieutenant-generals available. In effect, the COAS has as much influence over him as over any other lieutenant-general.
The episode of Lt Gen (retd) Shamsur Rehman Kallu might be remembered. As PM in her first tenure, Benazir Bhutto pulled General Kallu out of retirement and appointed him DG ISI, rejecting the lieutenant-general chosen by the COAS. However, in her next two tenures, she went along with that choice.
Imran has gone below the level of DG ISI, and has named the DG ‘C’, a major general, as responsible for the attack on him. Earlier, he had named a brigadier, the ISI station commander Islamabad, as responsible along with the DG ‘C’, for the torture in custody of Azam Swati. It is no longer a matter of sacred cows, but of laying bare the personnel of the ISI.
Intelligence agencies make it a rule to keep identities secret. So do military organisations. Military theorists, going back to Sun Tzu, the 6th century BC Chinese general, have spoken of the need to understand the enemy commander. This applies to intelligence organisations as well, and much effort and money is expended to find out not just about the structure, but also the personnel of rival organisations. To have the name of the DG’C’ revealed is a freebie for the ISI’s rivals.
It is perhaps bad enough that the DG ISI felt obliged to make a public appearance at the press conference that preceded the Long March. That was answered by the repeated naming of the DG ‘C’. Then came the assassination bid, and the attempt to have him involved by being nominated in the FIR. The desire of Ch Pervez Elahi to remain on the same page as the establishment can be seen by the Punjab Police’s refusal to nominate him in any FIR, and its ultimately registering an FIR of its own volition, omitting him.
The discussion of the COAS down is because of their political role. The COAS would not be the focus of attention if there had not been four martial laws. The military seems to have realised that having a political role means getting the sort of scrutiny that politicians have learnt to live with.
The problem seems to be the danger that the COAS’ true role might be misconstrued. Nothing makes an officer bent towards martial law, nor against it. The PM should remember that the military promotion system makes it likely that any of those making it to lieutenant-general will be able to handle the task.
