What precipitated the US exit from Afghanistan?

The situation in Afghanistan is in a state of flux. Even before the vacation of the notorious Bagram Airbase, the Taliban have been encircling major Afghan cities under hostile rule. Though well trained and well armed, the Afghan troops usually preferred to take to heels rather than ferociously resist the Taliban onslaughts.

The US President, in an interview, said that he decided to exit from Afghanistan as the objective of taking out Osama bin Laden had been achieved, besides damaging Al-Qaeda. The European troops had already left Afghanistan quietly. Thus, the Afghan government is now faced with the grim challenge of facing the Taliban with about 25,000 troops and 650 US marines. The USA is now more concerned about rescuing about 50,000 contractors (translators, informants and their ilk).

In an interview, the US President boasted that the USA  had achieved the main objective of taking out Osama bin Laden and damaing Al-Qaeda. The affluent Afghans, in search of a better future, feel cheated. They thought that the USA longed for warding off obscurantism and transforming the Afghan society into a vibrant enlightened polity.

They question the costs of war in money and human toll. The USA spent US$2.261 trillion on the Afghan war from 2001 to April 2021. About 174, 868 lives were lost. They included US military 2442, contractors 3846, other/allied troops 1144, Afghan troops and police69000, Taliban 51,191, and Afghan civilians 47,245.

American mothers were unwilling to contribute anymore aluminum caskets to Arlington Cemetery. American mothers became war weary after receiving 58,200 bodybags during the Vietnam war. The majority of Americans believe the USA failed to achieve its goals in Afghanistan (PEW Research Center poll). They were fed up with wars started by US presidents. This issue exerted an impact on presidential elections also.

The Afghan government presumed that the Americans would never leave Afghanistan, or strike a deal with the Taliban. The government never prepared itself to make the most of the training and equipment the USA provided. It never tried to become a viable force after the American exit.

The Afghan government failed to notice the Taliban had become flexible during the course of war, striking compromises with not only the Americans but also the Northern Alliance. The Taliban were no longer fully under Pakistan’s influence. They held negotiations even with India, to Pakistan’s disenchantment.

Will there be no spill-over effect of Taliban–enforced Sharia on modernist Pakistan?  How would the rebellious Pakistani Taliban and recalcitrant elements in Balochistan react to the US exit? Will the Ashraf Ghani government and other puppets reconcile, at heart, to the US exit?

The Americans, on the other hand, struck many compromises with the Taliban. They began to ignore SOS calls from the government troops under Taliban fire. Devoid of air cover, the Taliban used to begin each day with about 20 to 40 Afghan casualties.

The Afghan debacle is the cumulative outcome of Afghan government’s across-the-board mismanagement and the shifting goalposts of US objectives.

The Taliban see the USA as an aggressor.  They draw inspiration from the Holy Quran, Chapter 22:39-40: `Permission to fight is given to those on whom war is made, because they are oppressed . . . those who are driven from their homes without a just cause except that they say: Our Lord is Allah.”

Taliban fighters say `The Americans have the watches, but we have the time’. The Taliban’s thinking is akin to Vo Nguyen Giap’s.   ‘I could lose every battle and still win the war.  US Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara had worked out that I was controlling the frequency and scale of engagements to keep my losses just below the birth rate. That way the Vietnamese could fight for ever.’ (Nigel Cawthorner, Victory: 100 Great Military Commanders).

Afghan President Ashraf Ghani admitted on 60 Minutes, ‘without US and NATO support’, his government would fall in six months. `It would fall within six days’ (Newsweek Nov. 24-Dec. 6, 2018).  With the Pak-Afghan border fenced, over 30, 000 fleeing `traitors’ (besides troops and Blackwater contractors) may have to be airlifted to Oman, Qatar and Bahrain through airborne brigades and the US 5th Fleet, if the Taliban win. Over 60 percent physical area, and over 90 percent ideological areas, is already under Taliban influence.

History is on the Taliban’s side. The USA’s 18,000 troops and 27,000 contractors proved to be handy prey. Despite the lure of dollars in elite leaders, the majority of Afghans nurture an independent mind and loathe foreign dominance.

In 1842, 16,000 British troops evaporated. In 1942 (WWII), British again failed to civilize (gun-point democratize) Afghanistan. Britain realized `masterly inactivity’ is the best policy vis-à-vis Afghanistan.

Afghanistan is commonly called the graveyard of empires. Several rulers tried to overpower it. , But it was in vain. They had to bite the dust. Alexander the Great had to beat a hasty retreat.Genghis Khan lost a son while besieging Bamian.  In the 19th century Britain, at the height of imperial power, invaded Afghanistan. It was humbled. It never again attacked Afghanistan taking refuge under their strategy of ‘Masterly Inactivity’.

The USSR rushed its troops there in aid of the tottering Afghan government. In retaliation, the USA and its allies cobbled together a resistance, mujahideen. The USSR had its nose bloodied on Afghan soil. It retreated. Meanwhile, several component countries under Soviet umbrella rebelled. The USSR  broke into several independent republics, confining the Union to Russia.  A Taliban government emerged after the Soviet departure.

The sole superpower, the USA, attacked Afghanistan to oust the Taliban. The ostensible reason was that the Taliban had sheltered Osama bin Laden, mastermind of  the 9/11 attacks. The Taliban had no answer to incessant aerial bombing. Their government collapsed. For a while it looked as if the Afghan invincibility had been proved to be a myth. After decades of fighting, it dawned on the USA that the Afghan intervention was a misadventure.

The puppet Afghan governments were more interested in making money than fighting the Taliban. Like US soldiers, Afghan trainees too realized it paid to connive at the Taliban presence and let farmers grow poppy.

Afghanistan became a kleptocratic state where every government posting and promotion depends on power and patronage.

Afghanistan produces 92 percent of the world’s opium, with the equivalent of at least 3,500 tonnes leaving the country each year. This racket was secured by drug kingpins like Ahmed Wali Karzai, the beloved brother of former president Hamid Karzai, and other influential persons. The essence of UNODC’s policy is that there is a causal (a priori or cause-and-effect relation) between poppy cultivation and the ongoing insurgency. The Afghan government handpicks pliable provincial governors for eradication of poppy. These governors feed fictitious figures to the UN agencies about their landmark achievements in rooting out poppy cultivation at its various stages. These focal nodal prodigies have created the euphoria that government-controlled provinces are poppy-free.

Aside from euphoric reviews, poppy cultivation in Afghanistan is flourishing by leaps and bounds. The governors are motivated more by self-interest than national objectives. They are minting money from all quarters.  Afghanistan has a predominantly agrarian economy. Opium production contributes 35 percent of Afghanistan’s GDP while cereal crops only about 27 percent. There is no industrial structure worth the name, and despite its tall claims, India has not been able to lay tangible industrial infrastructure to boost the Afghan economy. Afghanistan is one of the world’s least developed countries and the poorest in Asia. In terms of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, the majority of the country’s population is concerned about physical needs (food, clothing and shelter).

Poppy cultivation is the main avenue of physical security. There is a symbiotic relation between the people’s need for socio-economic security and poppy cultivation. The majority of the population is preoccupied with how to survive by ensuring food security by getting employed in poppy cultivation. Yet, they find it difficult to make ends meet.

Peace in Afghanistan may remain elusive for quite some time due to a complex situation. It has too many stakeholders.  Besides the USA, Pakistan and The Taliban, India (Chahbahar Port), Iran, China and Turkey (Turkmen-Turkic community) have stakes in Afghanistan. The Afghan economy is in shambles, and needs support. . Could the USA spend $43 billion (it would save annually from exit) on Afghanistan’s development?  Could China, India, Iran and Turkey together (besides the USA) start a new Marshall Plan in war-ravaged Afghanistan to avoid a clash of interest? What about the post-exit 250,000-strong Afghan army and the Taliban? Will there be no spill-over effect of Taliban–enforced Sharia on modernist Pakistan?  How would the rebellious Pakistani Taliban and recalcitrant elements in Balochistan react to the US exit? Will the Ashraf Ghani government and other puppets reconcile, at heart, to the US exit?