- India went for a test after the Chinese test made it panic
Since the early 1960s the environment stands nuclearised. Both China and Pakistan possess nuclear weapons and delivery systems to pose a nuclear threat across the length and breadth of India. A substantive amount of nuclear technology moved from US to Pakistan. Such a In situation the basic controversy of nuclear asymmetry was not likely to be resolved through disarmament in the predictable future and the only option left for India was to “exercise” the option of a nuclear deterrent.
In addition, the humiliating defeat at the hands of China in 1962 awakened India to the new realities of military power as a major factor in international politics and inter-state relations. Even at that moment Nehru, who inherited the traditions of Gandhian non-violence, relied on the principle of a minimum of military power to maintain internal law and order and safeguard the country’s security against any external threat.
However, the developments in the nuclear sphere necessitated the shift in India’s defence policy. Especially, in context of the India-China war Nehru admitted it had stalled the pace of development. In fact, he felt that the Chinese attack was primarily meant to derail India in its journey towards economic growth. The setback had opened the eyes of the powers that be, leading to modernisation of the armed forces and induction of advanced weaponry in all three. But as earlier Nehru, despite pressures, was firm about peaceful uses of atomic energy and in the event of Chinese nuclear threat or blackmail, he hoped the USA would provide India a “nuclear umbrella”.
At last Homi Bhabha, the founder architect of India’s nuclear establishment, had to reassure the nation, that, given the political green signal, India’s scientific community could explode a nuclear bomb in 18 months
After Nehru died in May 1963, Lal Bahadur Shastri succeeded him. As a result of India-China war of 1962 but particularly after 16 October 1964 when China exploded its first nuclear device, the people of India began to agitate over the likely nuclear threat of China could. The Chinese tests showed considerable sophistication but the more worrying fact was that they have all the basic facilitie,s like manpower requirements and raw-material requirements for a sustained weapons programme. The Chinese explosion provided the greatest incentive for self-reliance in defence production and hardly a week after, Mrs Indira Gandhi, then Information Minister, said in an interview with French Television in Paris on 22 October 1964, ‘‘India is in a position to produce the bomb within 18 months. But we should not deviate from our stand and should use atomic energy for peaceful purposes only.’’ Further, during the Lok Sabha debate on foreign affairs, in November 1964, members of different parties demanded a change in the Government’s “no-bomb policy”. The indication was given on 27 November 1964 by Shashtri. Sharing the concern of members over the Chinese blast, he said the government’s present stand should not be regarded as permanent. He said, ‘‘I cannot say that the present policy is deep-rooted, that it cannot be set aside, that it can never be changed…….and an individual may have certain static policy…. But in the political field we cannot do so. Here situations alter, changes take place and I have to move our policy accordingly. If there is need to amend what we have said even we will say all right, let us go ahead and do so.”
It was in that kind of situation that India, under Shastri’s premiership, initiated the nuclear explosion programme in 1965 later carried out by Mrs. Gandhi’s Government. But unfortunately, given the strength of India’s general anti-bomb orientation, the untimely deaths of both Lal Bahadur Shashtri and Bhabha during 1966, followed by the economic difficulties and Vikram Sarabhai’s opposition to pursue this scheme; India’s nuclear programme got delayed by many more years.
On the other hand, earlier, by the end of the 1950s when the prospects of successful negotiations on disarmament were once again getting dark, many non-aligned nations like India, Yugoslavia, Egypt, Ghana and Indonesia mounted the pressure of their demand to activating the UN General Assembly in respect of disarmament. Also, in the wake of the Chinese explosion the world powers became aware of the implications of nuclear device. A treaty banning all nuclear tests except those held underground was signed in Moscow on 5 August 1963, by the USA, the USSR and Great Britain. India also signed the treaty on 5 August 1963. But this treaty did not bring about a breakthrough in relations to the problem of disarmament. It had only a limited value for it failed to secure a ban on all nuclear tests by not covering the underground tests and limiting itself only to tests on the ground, in water and in atmosphere. There was certainly a lot of use despite the ban on these. India too, despite signing it, had opposed it as an unequal and discriminatory instrument conferring unequal privileges on the powers then possessing equal weapons, and imposing one-sided restrictions on the non-nuclear weapon powers. In this regard, India favoured “genuine disarmament… ‘and not just those arms control measures which suit the convenience of the major military powers.” In its capacity as a responsible member of the world body, India’s representative while participating in the initial debates in the UN General Assembly on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in November 1965, stressed the need to establish ‘‘an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear powers. Earlier India had hoped that the 1963 Test Ban Treaty would encourage steps towards a complete and comprehensive disarmament.
Thus, the regional and global environment prevailing in 1960s compelled India to be ready for nuclearisation. In addition, China’s first atomic test had indeed unleashed a national uproar which was to kickstart India’s first serious debate in favour of building nuclear weapons. The 69th annual session of the Indian National Congress, which followed the Chinese test in January 1965, witnessed a heated debate on the issue. Again, on 1st S e p t e m be r 1965, over 100 MPs from various parties submitted to the government a joint memorandum demanding a prompt and immediate decision to develop nuclear weapons. The annual session of the Indian Science Congress in 1966 passed a resolution making the same demand.
At last Homi Bhabha, the founder architect of India’s nuclear establishment, had to reassure the nation, that, given the political green signal, India’s scientific community could explode a nuclear bomb in 18 months. And it is in this context that Shastri was to sanction the proposal put forward by Bhabha on investigating a Subterranean Nuclear Explosion Project. This can be seen as the earliest signal of a pro-bomb tilt in India’s nuclear policy. By the end of 1966, there was unanimous support for a nuclear weapons programme. Further developments on the discriminatory aspects of the No n- Proliferation Treaty of 1968 which India rejected, New Delhi had decided to sustain its independence in international security by allowing it for the development of the peaceful nuclear explosion technology.
