- The decision 20 years was a choice between sanctions and security
After the nuclear tests conducted by India on 11 May 1998, Pakistan’s nuclear testing in response to its neighbour was a foregone conclusion. A country much smaller in geographical, military and economic terms than its neighbour which had a far-right BJP government in place, was left with little or no option but to follow the path of its rival to establish parity.
There were hawks in the cabinet as well as pro-restraint members but as the fourth week of May approached pro-restraint members of cabinet lost ground. It is interesting to note that in later years pro-restraint members of cabinet suddenly joined hawks to cash in on the political capital which the bomb had to offer.
Dr. Samar Mubarakmand, who was the head of test team, was invited by the Prime Minister to his office and was asked to initiate preparations for the test. When Samar asked about the no of detonations ,Mian Sahab responded in Punjabi: “Tussi ik ziada karna ai” (You are supposed to do one more).
Pakistan had already done cold tests as early as 6 October using high-density tungsten alloy as target instead of Uranium 235 to purposely not obtain yield. A year after cold tests in August 1985, the Pressler Amendment was passed by Congress banning most military and economic aid to Pakistan unless the President certified on annual basis that Pakistan did not ‘possess’ a nuclear bomb which was continuously provided by Ronald Reagan till he stayed in the office.
However on 28 May 1998 Pakistan detonated five nuclear devices at Chaghi Hills to level the score with India and one nuclear device on May 30 at Kharan site inside a vertical well to go one up, as the PM advised. The nuclear device detonated at Kharan site was a miniature bomb and it went on to become the warhead of Shaheen-1. Shaheen-1 is a solid-fuel-powered short-to-medium range surface-to-surface guided ballistic missile.
That even the nuclear umbrella couldn’t rid Pakistan of its security anxieties and our defense budget has been on a rise since, suggests that Pakistan’s problem and its solution lies elsewhere, which I am leaving to my readers’ imagination. U we recognize and deal with that problem, our common man doesn’t stand a chance in the race for growth, dignity and stability
For Pakistan what followed after 11 May was a security vs sanctions scenario. Hence to project better understanding of the decision making, here is a brief rundown of the US sanctions and their vconsequences on Pakistan.
The US imposed its very first sanction (military) on Pakistan in 1965 when Pakistan used US-manufactured military equipment against India. Again in 1971 the USA imposed another executive military sanction on Pakistan for violating human rights in East Pakistan.
Then came the Symington Amendment (to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961) in 1977. This was a legislative sanction and banned both economic and military assistance in response to Pakistan’s unabated pursuit of the French uranium-reprocessing plant deal.
France as a consequence halted the supply of nuclear equipment for a reprocessing facility at Chashma after Pakistan refused the french offer of co-processing of uranium instead of a reprocessing unit. Although despite the sanctions Pakistan continued to receive $50 million annually coupled with the food aid programme.
In 1979 the most stringent set of sanctions, Glenn and Symington were imposed.The Symington amendment prohibits US economic and military assistance to any country delivering or receiving nuclear enrichment equipment, material, or technology not under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.
But fortunately for Pakistan, the USSR invaded Afghanistan and all sanctions on Pakistan were lifted beginning a decade-long alliance between unequal partners.
Immediately after the Cold War ended, the Pressler Amendment (Section 620E(e) of Foreign Assistance Act of 1961) sanctions were imposed on Pakistan when George W. Bush didn’t provide annual certification regarding possession of nuclear device by Pakistan.
I talked to Mushahid Hussain Syed who was a key cabinet member of Mian Nawaz Sharif and discussed the prevailing situation at the time. Mushahid said, “The paramount consideration was security, as India’s tests had changed the balance of power from a conventional to a nuclear scenario. Another consideration, which I underlined to the Prime Minister when he sought my advice while we were together in Almaty, Kazakhstan, on 11 May 11, was the timing and context. Since India had already taken the first fateful step, it was, in my view ‘a golden opportunity’, a situation of ‘now or never’ for Pakistan, to respond in kind to what India had already done. And the world would be ready and willing to accept a Muslim nuclear power as we were going to follow India’s lead.”
When asked about possibilities of further sanctions Mushahid said, “In a situation of more sanctions versus greater security, the debate for greater ‘impregnable’ security via The Bomb won out. After all, Pakistan had been working on the Bomb Project for a quarter of a century with relentless, single-minded determination. The fruit of that hard work was finally going to get results with Pakistan becoming a nuclear power.”
He further added, “We were banking on our friends to alleviate the pain of the sanctions that we expected would come. Saudi Arabia, for instance, gave generous help with their assistance for deferred oil payments, approximately $2 billion relief. President Clinton offered a financial quid pro quo, of approximately $5 billion, which Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif rejected, as the decision to go nuclear had already been taken. Secondly, the assumption was that the nuclearisation of South Asia would be accepted as a fait accompli by the international community, given the high stakes of peace, security and stability involving Pakistan-India relations.”
Pressler by far was the longest serving sanction imposed on Pakistan and it was amidst Pressler that Pakistan decided to go ahead with its nuclear tests. Immediately after that Glenn amendment sanctions were imposed which prohibits US economic and military support to any country that acquires or transfers nuclear reprocessing technology, or explodes or transfers a nuclear device.
Within a span of three months from May to July of 1998, the Pakistani rupee devalued 28 percent in the open market and fell from 45 to 63 rupees. Foreign exchange reserves fell from $1.3 billion to $500 million. The Karachi stock exchange fell by 34 percent while GDP growth was revised down from 6 percent to3 percent.
Though Pakistan again had its way around the sanctions when Bill Clinton on 7 November 1998 waived the economic sanctions on Pakistan for one year using the Brownback amendment but till date Pakistan couldn’t get its way around its socio-economic worries.
Our economy is shrinking as GDP growth rate is expected to be negative 1.5 percent this year, mostly due to covid-19 but we weren’t doing great otherwise. Unemployment has been on the rise. The country repeatedly flirts with the possibility of bankruptcy and is dependent on foreign aid/loans/grants. We have failed to allow democracy find roots in Pakistan so much so that the contemporary government formed by Imran Khan in the center is at best a hybrid regime with military appointments at key government positions (PIA, NDMA, Information Ministry, WAPDA, among others). Pakistan is yet to reap benefits of civilian spin-offs of military technology. Our socio-economic indicators are anything but promising.
That even the nuclear umbrella couldn’t rid Pakistan of its security anxieties and our defense budget has been on a rise since, suggests that Pakistan’s problem and its solution lies elsewhere, which I am leaving to my readers’ imagination. U we recognize and deal with that problem, our common man doesn’t stand a chance in the race for growth, dignity and stability.
